Framework

The primary value in this debate should be the protection of human rights. The UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and “all states have ratified at least 1 of the 9 core human rights treaties.” This implies “obligations and duties under international law to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.” If a state or organization continually violates human rights, then what advantage is gained by protecting its existence, or by remaining neutral? Examples of corrupt states such as Hitler’s Germany and Mao’s China show that the state itself is a means to an end, while human rights should remain the ultimate priority that provide the “why” behind other instrumental goals.

Human rights are inalienable, as well as a sworn duty the UN is bound to uphold; thus, they should be evaluated on a deontological basis. To protect human rights, the UN must signal a consistent commitment to preventing atrocities, protecting civilians, and preventing imminent human rights violations; it should not engage in Machiavellian tactics such as sacrificing some human rights now to appear “neutral” or gain political favor down the road, even for a supposed “greater good.” To the extent that the consequences are taken into account, we should focus on the immediate effects on human rights—that is, is the UN standing up for human rights consistently whenever it sees them violated? The intrinsic nature of human rights, as signaled by the UN, means that we cannot pick and choose when they apply on the basis of political convenience.

Plan

Under my proposal, the UN Security Council would explicitly authorize peacekeepers to initiate offensive operations in response to imminent mass atrocities, genocide, or in cases where armed groups are preventing the delivery of critical humanitarian aid, per the “responsibility to protect,” a commitment adopted by a consensus of UN member states. Unlike “ad-hoc coalitions” that the UN currently relies on, these operations would remain under strict UN command, subject to the oversight of the UN Security Council, and forced to adhere to international humanitarian law.

1. Reducing Civilian Deaths

A study by Nsia-Pepra (2011) found that robust peacekeeping (i.e. a strong and forceful peacekeeping force) was associated with a significantly lower number of civilian deaths. While non-robust missions comprised 80% of UN peacekeeping missions, they were associated with as many as 98.7% of civilian deaths observed during peacekeeping missions, despite robust forces typically being sent to areas that are initially more violent. The study also found that “robust peacekeeping decreases civilian killings by about 31 percent per year.”

According to an Oxford study on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping success is “more likely when large contingents are deployed under robust mandates,” which “signal credible commitment from the international community and empower peacekeepers to halt violence while guaranteeing the implementation of peace agreements.” When compared to offensive missions, traditional missions “have no impact on [peacebuilding and ending violence].” Only offensive operations can signal a credible commitment to ending conflict and protecting human rights.

The UN Force Intervention Brigade was the first UN peacekeeping operation specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations, its main target being the M23 militia group. One analysis found that “after military losses to the UN and FARDC forces in August 2013, the M23 has returned to the negotiating table with significantly less leverage than when it posed a direct threat to Goma.” In this case, only UN military force against a rebel group could effectively force them to negotiate a peace. The analysis also found that traditional, non-offensive peacekeeping has “lost much of its appeal because inaction has become associated with indifference to human suffering.”

An analysis of the United Nations mission in Mali highlighted the failures of purely defensive peacekeeping. Since peacekeepers failed to engage in offensive operations, “Regular ambushes of MINUSMA by extremist groups have led it to “bunkerize,” reducing its domination of the terrain.” During this mission, the UN would talk to locals and then leave, failing to protect them afterwards since their mission was purely defensive. Specifically, “civilians have been killed, abducted, tortured, or threatened by extremist groups after talking to the UN mission.” One UN officer stated that, “Attackers should know we can strike back. It is the heart of operating in an asymmetric environment.”

2. Existing Reliance on Ad-Hoc Offensive Forces

According to an analysis by Maglia, Karlsrud, and Reykers (2025), because UN peacekeepers are generally limited to defensive operations, the UN “faces fierce criticism for its inability to initiate or provide a timely and adequate response to armed conflicts.” As a result, the UN now often relies on “ad hoc forms of cooperation” as a means of “swift and decisive collective action.” However, there are significant “accountability and legitimacy problems that arise when relying on [ad-hoc coalitions] in international conflict management, given their limited inclusivity and strategic planning procedures.” The UN “faces a ‘moral dilemma’ as it needs to delegate counterterrorism and enforcement tasks to third actors, such as AHCs, even though this may come with credibility costs.”

In Bosnia, the UN’s UNPROFOR was heavily restricted due to its reliance on NATO for air support and “delays associated with the approval process.” Additionally, “the mission suffered from a ‘fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute these resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field.’” Due to the lack of offensive operations, the UN “was unable to implement the mandate, as ‘the safe areas were established by the Security Council without the consent of the parties and without the provision of any credible military deterrent.’” Instead, the UN relied on NATO and its “Operation Deliberate Force” to end the war. Still, “Serb forces on the ground continued to attack UN "safe areas" in Bosnia, and the UN peacekeepers were unable to fight back as the mandate did not give them authority to do so.” The defensive mandate given to peacekeepers failed to uphold the UN’s neutrality and instead weakened it due to the reliance on NATO. In fact, “NATO and UNPROFOR were increasingly difficult to separate by autumn 1995.” Due to the UN’s ineffectiveness, “up to 20,000 people, overwhelmingly from the Bosnian Muslim community, were killed in and around the safe areas.” Additionally, most UN members who died did so in or around the designated “safe areas.”

3. Increased Weight Behind UN Human Rights Declarations

According to a 2016 report from the University of Miami, the UN’s failure to take offensive measures “waters down any improvement that could eventually derive from the fundamentals set in its Preamble and the rights enshrined in the Declaration” and has “serious repercussions” in the atrocities and genocides that have occurred since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was first adopted. North Korea, for example, has ratified five human rights treaties, yet it severely restricts freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and makes frequent arbitrary arrests. And despite the UN urging China to address allegations of significant human rights violations, China continues to inflict genocide on its Uyghur population, including forced sterilizations and forced abortions. According to a report from Dalhousie Law Journal, the international community currently faces a “credibility gap,” specifically, “the gap between the standards with governments proclaim, or accept, or at least pay lip-service to, and the reality of their practice in enforcing or suppressing these rights.” Even a totalitarian government is “sensitive about its public image [and public opinion],” yet “this opinion is likely to be much more effective if it is weighty enough to operate through the governments of other countries.” Enforcement of human rights declarations through offensive operations does not just stop the existing violations, it is also the only way to grant credibility and weight to these declarations in the first place.

When it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN promised “never again” to allow the kind of genocide observed in WWII. Just 46 years later, in 1994, the commander of the UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda identified the need for an offensive operation (raiding arms caches) in order to prevent an “anti-Tutsi extermination plot.” His request for authorization to conduct preemptive raids on militia arms caches was denied by the UN leadership, leaving the peacekeepers unable to stop the Rwandan genocide. The UN’s credibility suffered greatly due to its pattern of failing to stop abuses, and between 2003 and 2005, the nearby government of Sudan, seeing no deterrent, carried out mass atrocities against the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit communities in Darfur. According to the UN Brahimi Report, “no failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.” Additionally, rules of engagement “should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.” The proposed Brahimi-style robust enforcement is functionally equivalent to offensive operations, as peacekeepers ought to be authorized to defend “other mission components and the mission’s mandate,” not simply themselves, which is necessary to protect civilians from atrocities, lend weight to UN human rights stances, and deter further human rights abuses in the future.