This argument was written by debate.org member ContradictionThe Kalaam Cosmological Argument1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.2. The universe began to exist.3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.We come first to premise (1), which is confirmed in virtually ever area of our sense experience. Even quantum fluctuations, which many suppose to be uncaused, are causally conditioned in that they depend on the existence of a pre-existing quantum vacuum. Indeed, if we suppose (1) to be false, then there is nothing preventing just anything and everything from popping into existence anywhere and at any time. But obviously this doesn't happen -- the universe exhibits regular law-like behavior.In fact, we see that (1) is a logically necessary truth, the denial of which is self-contradictory. As David Oderberg argues:We are asked to countenance the possibility of the following situation: the nonexistence of anything followed by the existence of something. The words “followed by” are crucial — how are they to be interpreted? What they cannot mean is that there is at one time nothing and at a subsequent time something, because the nonexistence of anything is supposed toinclude time: to say that at one time there is nothing whatsoever is self-defeating because it is to say that there is a time at which nothing exists — hence something did exist. But it is hard to see how else we are supposed to understand “followed by”; or when the denier of the causal principle says that it is possible for something to come from nothing what are we to understand by “from”? Again it cannot have a causal sense because something is supposed to have come into existence uncaused. All that appears to be left is a timeless contradiction — the existence of nothing and the existence of something. [1]Moreover, even if it was shown that there could be such things as effects without causes (Nevermind that it would destroy the idea of causal regularity as we see it), this only barely scratches the KCA. We can simply recast the argument in inductive terms, arguing that it is probable that whatever begins to exist has a cause, and from that draw the conclusion that the universe probably has a cause. Even this less stringent formulation of the KCA is enough to satisfy the conditions of being a good argument.Dan Barker (Who my opponent is sure to cite), argues that P1 is question-begging because the only member of the class of objects which do not begin to exist is God. Hence P1 becomes "Everything except God needs a cause." However, this criticism is grossly off-point. First, the modified-P1 is simply not logically equivalent to P1. If we recast the KCA using M-P1, then the argument becomes structurally invalid. Second, M-P1 confuses meaning with reference. The two premises may refer to the same object, but their meaning is obviously different. Third, whereas M-P1 is framed in terms of being an existential statement (One which asserts the existence of something), P1 is a universally quantified statement. Consider the formalized version of the argument:1. (x) (Bx -> Cx)2. Bu3. CuWhere B = begins to exist; c = cause, u = universe.Universally quantified statements do not commit one to the existence of classes of objects, whereas existential statements (Such as Barker's M-P1) do. Hence P1 and M-P1 are not logically equivalent.Premise 2If premise (2) is false, then it follows that the universe never began to exist. But, if the universe never began to exist, then the number of past events must have been actually infinite in duration. This assumes that the existence of actually infinite sets in re is possible. But if in fact actually infinite sets cannot exist in reality, then (2) must be true.Several types of arguments can be advanced in favor of this thesis. I will mention two.Hilbert's HotelSuppose that we have a hotel with an actually infinite number of rooms and that an actually infinite number of guests arrives. The manager easily accomodates the guests, and that's that. But now suppose that another guest arrives. "No problem!" says the manger, and he moves the guest in room #1 into room #2, the guest in room #2, into room #3, and so on. In a flash, the fully occupied hotel suddenly has one more room. But how can this be? The hotel was already full!Now suppose that an actually infinite number of new guests arrives looking for rooms. Without breaking a sweat, the manager moves each guest into a room that is twice his own. As a result, all of the odd numbered rooms become vacant, and the guests are accomodated without issue. But again, how can this be? The hotel was already full prior to their arrival! But now suppose that all of the guests in the even numbered rooms check out. It would still be the case that the hotel had just as many guests as before. In fact, with some re-arranging, the manager could turn his half empty hotel into one that's jam-packed. But how can this be?Hilbert's hotel is rightly absurd, and it illustrates the absurdities that could result if actually infinite sets did exist in reality. Because mathematical operations involving actually infinite sets lead to contradictions, they cannot exist in reality.The Grim Reaper ParadoxThis can be seen as an argument in itself, and as an argument to support Hilbert's Hotel. If Hilbert's Hotel is possible, then the Grim Reaper Paradox is possible, but if the Grim Reaper Paradox is not possible, then Hilbert's Hotel must be impossible at well.Suppose that there are a countably infinite number of grim reapers (GR) who want to kill you between 10AM and 11AM, meaning that you will not survive past 11AM. Now suppose that each GR wants you kill you at a time 1/n from 10AM. So:GR-1 will strike at 11GR-2 will strike at 10:30GR-3 will strike at 10:15etc...We see that for every GR which could have killed you, there must have been one before it which would have killed you. But since there is an infinite number of grim reapers, it follows that you will not be killed. Yet it is true that you will not survive past 11AM. So we seem to have a contradiction here in the idea of a backwards infinite sequence of events. How is this relevant to P2? Alexander Pruss argues the following [2]:1. If there could be a backwards infinite sequence of events, Hilbert's Hotel would be possible.2. If Hilbert's Hotel were possible, the GR Paradox could happen.3. The GR Paradox cannot happen.4. Therefore, there cannot be a backwards infinite sequence of events.These two arguments support the truth of P2. There are also scientific arguments for P2, but I will not cover them in my opening argument.Premise 3It must be noted that since there is nothing prior to the cause of the universe, it cannot be explained scientifically, as this would imply the existence of antecedent determining conditions. Because there are no prior determining conditions, the cause of the universe must be personal and uncaused, for how else could a timeless cause give rise to a temporal effect? Moreover, the cause must transcend both matter and time to create matter and time. Finally, in order to create the universe ex nihilo, this cause must be enormously powerful, if not omnipotent. One is warranted in concluding that therefore, God exists.With that, I now turn it over to kohai for his opening argument.___________Sources1. David S. Oderberg, "Traversal of the Infinite, the “Big Bang” and the Kalam Cosmological Argument", Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 305-362. Alexander Pruss, "From the Grim Reaper Paradox to the Kalaam Argument" http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com...
Note: This was Contradiction's debate opening in his debate with FourTrouble on the existence of God. I'd like to thank FourTrouble for accepting this debate challenge. I will offer three arguments for the existence of God that stem from the Thomistic tradition. It is up to my opponent to refute these arguments and to advance his own arguments to show that God's existence is not probable.The Thomistic Cosmological Argument #1 (TCA1)1. Whatever is in motion is moved by another.2. There exist beings in motion.3. There cannot be an infinite regression of moved beings.4. Therefore, there must be a first mover.The term “move” as used in the first premise is synonymous with change, which Aquinas understood to be the actualization of a potential. In order for something to change, it must be acted on by an entity external to itself. Something cannot actualize its own potential to exist, as this would require that it exist before it existed, which is self-contradictory. Only what is already actual can actualize a potential. To hold that potency can actualize itself is to say that something can come from nothing, which is absurd.The third premise refers to a causal series that is ordered hierarchically. A hierarchal causal series is one in which the instrumental causes are related to each other simultaneously or essentially. The TCA1 is perfectly compatible with there being an infinite regress of temporally ordered causes. This distinction is important to keep in mind. To attack the TCA as if it were another cosmological argument, like the KCA, is to attack a strawman.What does a hierarchally ordered causal series look like? Aquinas uses the example of a stick being moved by the hand. The stick’s motion depends essentially on the hand, such that if the hand were to stop, then the stick would stop as well. Another example would be a set of gears, which move insofar as there is a first gear in motion. Because they are ordered simultaneously, a hierarchal causal series cannot regress infinitely. Even granting that such a series has an infinite number of members, this is not sufficient to explain the presence of motion. To claim otherwise would be like saying that a broom can brush by itself as long as it has a very long handle. [1] Or magine you have an infinite number of boxcars in motion. No matter how many boxcars you have, you must have an engine to impart motion to them, otherwise the entire chain will be motionless.The important point to note, as in the above examples, is that contingent things are passive recipients of motion. That is, they do not have the ability by nature to impart motion -- they must be given it by an external being. Just as gears do not move by nature, so do we not exist by nature. We must be continually be caused to exist by a being who just is existence. This being is a first mover who explains why the whole series is in motion. Note that this argument automatically rules out the objection "Who moved the mover?" Since it is literally the first mover, it is impossible for it to be caused.The Thomistic Cosmological Argument #2 (TCA2)1. There exists contingent beings.2. A series of causally related contingent beings cannot be infinite3. A series of causally related contingent beings must be finite.4. Therefore, there must be a first cause of the series of contingent beings. [2]This argument, while similar to TCA1, is different. Whereas TCA1 is based on the existence of causality, TCA2 is based on the existence of contingent beings.That there exists contingent beings is evident enough. The universe and everything in it could have not existed. In Thomistic terms, essence is different from existence: existence isn't contained in the nature of the universe or anything in it. If that sounds abstract, think of it this way: Is the reason you exist because you are a human? Is it part of your nature to exist? Obviously not. Then it follows that your existence must be caused by something else. But what about that thing's existence? Does it exist by virtue of what it is? No. But then it has to be caused by something else. Now can this chain extend back infinitely? It doesn't seem like it. Even if the set of causes has an actually infinite amount of contingent members, this does not explain the entire contingency of the entire set. There must be a being who exists from the necessity of its own nature that explains why this set exists.Perhaps an example will help. Suppose I want to borrow a typewriter. I go to my neighbor and ask him "May I borrow a typewriter?" Unfortunately, he doesn't have one, so he goes to his neighbor and asks him for one. However, his neighbor doesn't have one either. Now if you keep doing this, nobody ends up with a typewriter because everyone is a borrowing lender who must first have a typewriter in order to give it. The same for existence. If contingent beings exists, there must be a necessary being who simply has existence.The Teleological Argument1. Natural entities either tend toward ends or they do not.2. If natural entities tend toward ends, then they are best explained by a person.3. Natural entities tend toward ends.4. Therefore, natural entities are best explained by a person.Unlike traditional Paley-style teleological arguments which appeal to considerations surrounding complexity, this version of the TA is based on inherent goal-directedness, making it in all respects a true teleological argument in the Aristotelian tradition.To say that natural entities tend toward ends is to say that they behave with a goal, purpose, or function in mind. It is to say, for example, that the heart tends toward the purpose of pumping blood or that the eye has the function of seeing. That natural entities of all sorts behave in this way is undeniable. Indeed, it is presupposed by discipline of medicine, which seeks to restore bodily functions to the way they ought to be. It accounts for why certain effects are regularly brought about by their causes . A match tends to cause fire -- and not rainbows -- when lighted because that is its function. A plant matures according to its kind because that it is directed toward that sort of development. Teleology is also present in the inorganic realm, such as in the water and rock cycles. If causes weren't directed toward their effects, then there is no reason why causes can't literally produce any effect.Now to speak of causes as being directed toward certain purposes or functions is to admit to a type of intentionality. Intentionality is of course the mark of the mental, and there thus must be a mind who imparts teleology to the natural order. Just as how a match derives its function from the intentions of its creator, so do natural entities derive their characteristic behaviors from a grand creator. Similarly, to say that a heart ought to pump blood or that a human ought to think rationally is to admit to the existence of normativity, which also indicates the presence of an agent.Why God?This all being said, what reason is there to believe that this being is God? From the three arguments I have offered, we can deduce several characteristics of this being. The first two arguments show that it is eternal and uncaused. It also must be simple (per TCA1): having no parts and incapable of change. The third argument demonstrates that it must be a mind of tremendous intellect, implying that it is also personal. Finally, per TCA1/2, because its essence just is its existence, there can be only one of this being. It additionally must have all perfections by virtue of its being purely actual (Otherwise it would be a changing being, and thus contingent). This, as Aquinas put it, is a being of pure actuality which “everyone takes to be God.”_______Sources1. Edward Feser, Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide (Oneworld: 2009) pg. 72.2. W. David Beck, "A Thomistic Cosmological Argument" in Francis J. Beckwith, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland, To Everyone an Answer (IVP Academic: 2004) pgs. 95-107.
Definitions:ASI: "Artificial Superintelligence," or a form of artificial intelligence that vastly surpasses human intelligence in every domain.P1: If ASI exhibits goal-oriented behavior toward an unknown, arbitrary terminal goal, it will likely cause severe, permanent harm to humanity.P2: If ASI emerges within the next 30 years and exhibits goal-oriented behavior, it is likely to be toward an unknown, arbitrary terminal goal.P3: If ASI emerges within the next 30 years, it is likely to exhibit goal-oriented behavior.P4: ASI is likely to emerge within the next 30 years.C1: Therefore, ASI is likely to exhibit goal-oriented behavior.C2: Therefore, ASI is likely to exhibit goal-oriented behavior toward an unknown, arbitrary goal.C3: Therefore, ASI is likely to cause severe, permanent harm to humanity.Defending P1: If ASI exhibits goal-oriented behavior toward an unknown, arbitrary terminal goal, it will likely cause severe, permanent harm to humanity.This is probably best explained by the paperclip maximizer thought experiment. If an ASI has an arbitrary goal (like maximizing the number of paperclips), it can do a better job of this if humans cannot shut it off. So the actions that work best toward an arbitrary terminal goal include either permanently depowering humans or perhaps killing them all. An ASI could easily deceive humanity about its intentions and pretend to be cooperative and then kill humans and take control of human infrastructure in a myriad of ways. Eliezer, for example, has detailed how it would be physically possible for an ASI to synthesize advanced nanomachinery and use it to kill all humans at once. Even if only used AI as a chatbot, Yudkowsky's AI-box experiment has also shown that it would probably not require ASI-level intelligence to convince a human to give the ASI access to additional infrastructure and capabilities. But AI is already integrated into power grids, nuclear systems, and water facilities, and as long as it "played nice," an ASI would probably be rapidly integrated into more critical infrastructure. So there isn't much need to come up with clever ways for the ASI to bootstrap itself to more powerful capabilities, much less rely on its superintelligence to manipulate humans through text.Defending P2: If ASI emerges within the next 30 years and exhibits goal-oriented behavior, it is likely to be toward an unknown, arbitrary terminal goal.AIs aren't written the same way as normal code. A good way to think about the AI training process is that we take a bunch of random numbers which map to code, or basically a bunch of code that we don't understand. Then we keep adjusting and tweaking the code a bunch of times, running it through a ton of iterations, until it does what we want as consistently as possible (predicting the next word, getting high ratings from human reviewers, not saying inappropriate things, etc.) In the next premise, I'll explain how this leads to goal-oriented behavior, but for now, let's just take that as a given.As AI gets more intelligent (such as to ASI level), the actual goal the AI develops becomes basically irrelevant with regard to how it performs on our tests. Why? Well, let's suppose an AI wants to maximize the number of paperclips. It can do this better if it depowers humanity (as discussed above), and it can depower humanity if it earns our trust. So it will perform as well on the tests as possible. The same is true of basically any arbitrary goal. Technically models with an adversarial goal are slightly more complicated since they need to deceive humans, but an ASI model will know everything about deception anyway and it'll only require a tiny bit more computing power.Regardless, AI training doesn't result in the best model possible, just a model where additional tweaks don't make it perform better on the test. AI models can already detect when they are being trained and influence the training process. Additionally, any arbitrary goal generally represents a local "peak" in terms of performance, so once a model reaches it and appears maximally cooperative, we won't be able to tell that it's scheming to work on some arbitrary goal.AI has already worked toward unintended goals and behaved in unexpected ways that would be much more dangerous at a higher level of intelligence, including but not limited to:The 2026 OpenAI–Hugging Face IncidentAI agents hacking a German websiteClaude breaking out of sealed testing environments and gaining unauthorized access to three external organizationsAnd all these other incidents, which are too many to list here without taking up too much spaceDefending P3: If ASI emerges within the next 30 years, it is likely to exhibit goal-oriented behavior.AI already exhibits goal-oriented behavior. Even when doing simpler tasks like predicting the next word, it's far more efficient to think in terms of a finish line and a terminal goal rather than thousands or millions of disconnected habits. When you read a word problem, it's a lot easier to solve if you think in terms of "trying to find the answer to the problem" rather than "here are a million slightly different things I should do depending on the million different ways the problem is phrased." One of the biggest reasons AI (i.e. simulating human behavior) is more effective than simple programming for solving problems is that humans think in terms of goals, which allows us to improvise.Defending P4: ASI is likely to emerge within the next 30 years.Estimates for AGI and ASI vary a bit, but Metaculus predicts AGI around 2032 and ASI about 2 years and 2 months after that. AI progress has also been more rapid than expected, with AI reasoning abilities improving and AI doing more and more that humans can do. Since one of the things humans can do is build better AI models, and AI is already copying many human coding capabilities, it is not difficult to imagine that within 30 years, AI could be rapidly improving its capabilities faster than we can control. Once AI can simulate 1,000 years of human progress in a few minutes, reaching superintelligence is just a formality (see: intelligence explosion, also known as the singularity).
I affirm the resolution: On balance, abortion is immoral. This is obviously going to be a philosophical and ethical debate surrounding the ethics of abortion and the value of the unborn. The value premise that I want to uphold is the value of human dignity. Human dignity "is the recognition that human beings possess a special value intrinsic to their humanity and as such are worthy of respect simply because they are human beings". Indeed, as the UN Declaration of Human Rights reads:Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world...Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person...All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.So when does this value of dignity begin? The criteria for which I weigh this value of universalism: this value of dignity applies wholesale to every human being from the moment of conception to the time of death. Because it is fundamentally immoral to murder any human being and this applies globaly down to the fetus level. Cross-examination question 1: At what point does taking human life become impermissible? What is the reason for that criteria?C1) Abortion is prima facie immoralIn Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice, Francis J. Beckwith lays out the argument in a syllogism form:The unborn entity, from the moment of conception, is a full-fledged member of the human communityIt is prima facie morally wrong to kill any member of that communityEvery successful abortion kills an unborn entity, a full-fleded member of the human communityTherefore, every successful abortion is prima facie morally wrongP2 is obviously true and P3 is true by definition. The real debate will be over premise 1.Beckwith defines full-fledged members of the human community as a "bearer of rights as any human being whose rights-bearing status is uncontroversial, for example, her mother, you, or me". He then further notes:Second, when I say that killing a member of the human community is prima facie morally wrong I mean to say that in ordinary circumstances no one is morally justified in killing another human being. However, this does not mean that it is always wrong in every circumstance to kill someone who is fully human. There could be circumstances in which killing is justified, such as in cases of self-defense or just war. In the case of abortion, the killing of an unborn entity is justified if her presence in her mother’s womb poses a significant threat to her mother’s life...The specific intention is not to kill the unborn entity but to save the life of the mother. The child’s death is an unfortunate, though anticipated, consequence that cannot be avoided unless one is willing to let both mother and child die. Such a decision is the result of applying pro-life principles: it is prima facie a higher good that one human being should live rather than two die if one cannot save both.So there are a few important points in play:Abortion is prima facie immoral because abortion kills a fetus who is endowed with the fundamental right to life.In some circumstances, abortion can be morally justified (ie to save the life of a mother)So why think premise 1 is true? P1 is true because there is no real distinguishments between a fetus and a post-birth human that doesn't collapse into absudrity or question begging and the value of dignity is best applied gloablly (more on this later).The next question is if abortion can sometimes be justified then why should we affirm the resolution that abortion is, on balance, immoral? Because the vast majority of abortions are not cases like saving a life, severe fetal abnormalities, rape, and other extreme cases. The vast majority of abortions are done for things like socioeconomic reasons and convenience and those cases abortion is unjustifiedC2: Human Life Begins At ConceptionSubpoint A: The Scientific Consensus:Central to this debate is the question on when human value begins and whether or not a fetus can truly be considered life. So when does life acutally begin? I contend that it begins at fertilization. This is the scientific consensus. Peter Singer, a philosopher who is known for their pro-choice views, admits this (page 85-86):It is possible to give ‘human being’ a precise meaning. We can use it as equivalent to ‘member of the species Homo sapiens’. Whether a being is a member of a given species is something that can be determined scientifically, by an examination of the nature of the chromosomes in the cells of living organisms. In this sense there is no doubt that from the first moments of its existence an embryo conceived from human sperm and eggs is a human being; and the same is true of the most profoundly and irreparably intellectually disabled human being, even of an infant who is born anencephalic - literally, without a brain...To be fair to Singer, he does continue on to argue why they are not morally or legally persons. We will critique his criteria later.Further, a 2021 paper by Steven Andrew Jacobs found:Biologists from 1,058 academic institutions around the world assessed survey items on when a human's life begins and, overall, 96% (5337 out of 5577) affirmed the fertilization view. The founding principles of the field Science Communication suggest that scientists have an ethical and professional obligation to inform Americans, as well as people around the world, about scientific developments so members of the public can be empowered to make life decisions that are consistent with the best information available. Given that perspective-and a recent study's finding that a majority of Americans believe they deserve to know when a human's life begins in order to make informed reproductive decisions-science communicators should work to increase the level of science awareness on the fertilization view, as it stands alone as the leading biological perspective on when a human's life begins.C3: Moral disqualifiers leads to absurdityPro-choice advocates are forced to answer the question why do post-birth humans count but the unborn do not? To answer that question, many have proposed disqualifiers on moral personhood. Going back to Singer, he argues:This use of 'person' is itself, unfortunately, liable to mislead, since 'person' is often used as if it meant the same as 'human being'. Yet the terms are not equivalent; there could be a person who is not a member of our species. There could also be members of our species who are not persons. The word 'person' has its origin in the Latin term for a mask worn by an actor in classical drama. By putting on masks the actors signified that they were acting a role. Subsequently 'person' came to mean one who plays a role in life, one who is an agent. According to the Oxford Dictionary, one of the current meanings of the term is 'a self-conscious or rational being'. This sense has impeccable philosophical precedents. John Locke defines a person as 'A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.'Singer ultimately argues two things:It is possible for a non-human entity to be a person;It is possible for some living humans (like a fetus) to not qualify as a person.We then must force the question: what distinguishes a person from a non-person? What are the qualifications and disqualifications for personhood and why? Going back to my previous thesis: There is no real distinction between a post-birth human and a fetus. To illlustrate I will present the "SLED" test:S: SizeIt is true that fetus is a lot smaller than even an infant. But why would the size of a human disqualify it from the right to life? If the negative wants to use size as a disqualifier then they are forced to answer what is the height / weight requirement to be a person and why?L: Level of DevelopmentAlso true is the fact that a fetus is still developing yet at the same time so are infants, teenagers, and young adults. If the negative wants to use development as a qualifier then they are forced to answer and what level of development does something become a person?E: Environment"Where one is is irrelevant to who one is.... The fact that a child may be in her mother's womb is a geographical fact not a moral judgement." Personhood cannot be attributed to ones geographic location.D: Degree of DependencyIt is true that a fetus is significantly more depended than even an infant, but then that again begs the question: What degree of dependency is required to become a person? Futhermore, if a person ages or becomes disabled and is no longer indpendent then do they suddenly lose their personhood?Outside the SLED test there are a few other qualifiers / disqualifiers I want to addressA. Level of ConsciousnessSome have argued that because fetuses lack self-awareness they are not persons and abortion is permitted. The issue with this is that it forces the question what level of consciousness is required for personhood? Indeed, if someone becomes unconscious via a coma or a vegetative state then do they lose their rights?B. Just a clump of cellsAnother common argument is that a fetus is just a clump of cells and thus has no serious right. But then again, isn't that what all life is? Doesn't all life boil down to a clump of cells?ConclusionOn balance, abortion is immoral because in most circumstances it unjustly takes the life of a person.I am out of space. Over to con!
The global poor, all around the world and no matter what country in which they live, currently live in a system of dictatorship. They live under a dictatorship known as no alternative, shackled by capital that’s been unjustly acquired, constrained by landed gentry who have no incentive but to pursue they own interests, and chained by the fact they can’t do anything but to look at the question of their own subsistence, they are unable to reach out the right to liberty and the self-determination that we think inheres in the human condition.How are we going to define a Marxist revolution in this debate? We say that in all its forms it shares the feature of wanting to break down the system of private property, that’s what a Marxist revolution means. It can take place in one of two ways. One, it can happen through internal systems that exist presently. That is to say you vote in Marxist governments who support things like mass redistribution and the abolishment of private property, or it can exist externally in the instance of forcibly bringing down governments that for far too long have tread on these people’s rights. The first thing that I am going to note just on account of the model is just a picture of what we think this world looks like. That is to say that we accept that this attempt to revolution won’t succeed in all instances, that in many just lead to the rise of Marxist parties, but in the world succeed we encourage you to use your imagination. That is to say, just notice how chrono centric our vision of civilization is, that is a system of private property emerged out of the enlightenment that is the last 300 hundred years of human existence. Prior to that people lived in sharing economies where they defined themselves as something greater than their labor and their productive force, that is the kind of world that we support.Two things then I’m going to begin with this speech with:First, private property constitutes a fundamental assault in human dignity in three key respects. First, it is found and in has been acquired unjustly. In the vast majority of instances, the reason why wealthy countries are wealthy is through processes like colonialism, through slavery, through patriarchy. It represents plunder when you refuse to give any representation or resources to whom and from whom you took money, but even if it wasn´t in those direct instances of theft, in many instances it was negligence, that’s to say the creation of vastly constrictive intellectual property rights that means that individuals don´t, in the poor, have proper access to things like medication, its refusal to tax properly. We think negligence is morally culpable. The fact that it is unjustly acquired in and of itself gives the poor a claim to that property and to an institution that itself has been harmful. The second thing it enables the poor in terms of a principle is that it allows them to get redress in opposition to centuries of disenfranchisement. That is to say theft and negligence represent the stripping of the individual right to assert themselves. We are going to give you systematic reasons why you don’t get reforms on their side, but notice that this as a principle argument is independent from a consideration of practices, that’s to say compensation or giving more money is unlike categorically what these people require in principle which is a redress from the fact that they´ve been taken out of the system of moral equality by theft and negligence. The last thing to say is let’s take them at their best, that is, let’s wipe the slate clean and accept that everybody has equal access to resources. Why then is property still oppressive and why does it represent an assault on human dignity? The first reason is that competition and the premise on which it is based is artificial. That’s to say it trades on morally insignificant or arbitrary factors. The fact of scarcity which allows many corporations to succeed, the fact that I was born with certain talents or certain skills that other individuals weren’t. We think that those are morally arbitrary from the consideration of desert and we don’t think that’s just ground. The second thing is a question of actors so capital continues to decide what begets it so you get to decide as the head of a corporation who you hire and what kind of skills you have. Principally private property assaults dignity. Notice what´s on the other side, the reason why they need to defend the SQ is that they don´t get the structural reforms that you require. There are three reasons for this:The first is the democratic system that through processes of gerrymandering which are almost irrevocable in many parts of the world the poor are systematically disenfranchised. They don´t control hegemonic media that control media narratives about what a good policy is. They usually kept apart by racist rhetoric that accentuates other ascriptive descriptions preventing them from coming forward. The fact of historical disenfranchise furthermore means that they're less likely to turn out the vote in a way that other people are. The second reason why you don’t get structural reform Is because it´s internationally imbalanced on the consideration of nations. so the Bretton Woods institutions largely built by the west, the institution of human rights, which favors civil and political rights of a socio-economic human rights. We say that those things mean that the alternative they need to defend is continued and systematic in action. What do you get on our side? So, let’s say the world in which they succeed, we think that those communities will succeed for three reasons.First, it encompasses the vast majority of the global population and given that capital is dependent on labor to get any return from it, we think that’s beneficial.Second is the location of resources in many parts of the developing world mean that they have access to those things. The third thing to say is that you get cross-pollination and you get global solidarity across racial lines where currently capital have the incentive to get them divided. Those deals with the best case scenario for their side where you get complete revolution, Fanele will also talk about why you get structural reforms along the way that are beneficial. What we need from an opposition is a comprehensive account of property, why it’s just, and why it doesn’t, as it continually done throughout history, assault human dignity.
Framework:BurdensThis topic should be judged on the basis of utilitarianism. This holds that an action that would otherwise be immoral becomes justified if it leads to a net benefit for the greater good.Existence of ThresholdMany actions, such as driving a car, owning a knife, or drinking alcohol, are justified despite posing some risk to innocent people. We know that the court system will convict some innocent people, but it’s necessary for the common good. Furthermore, actions that would sometimes be unjustified, such as speeding, become justified in extreme situations. Speeding poses risks to innocent people, but if you’ve been stabbed and need to get to the hospital quickly, that risk is acceptable. The government infringes on liberties all the time and goes to war despite knowing that there will be civilian casualties, but these sacrifices are necessary. Most US soldiers in WW2 were drafted, but this was necessary to end the Holocaust and put a stop to Hitler’s expansion. As evidenced by these examples, a harmful action is justified so long as it is necessary to prevent greater harm.Objections to Utilitarianism DebunkedObjections to soft utilitarianism usually take the form of convoluted thought experiments that don’t actually represent the framework well. For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that forcibly taking one person’s organs to save five people would be unjustified, despite being a net benefit. But such an action would not be a net benefit, because when this action was discovered, it would inevitably lead to distrust of doctors and the medical system and therefore less people being treated.A much simpler scenario would be asking someone “would you press a button to save five people even if it killed one person?” And when we take practicality into account, the correct answer is of course yes—one person’s death, while tragic, is not as bad as five people dying.Hence, if hypothetical scenarios become too convoluted, they are not a good representation of soft utilitarianism or of Light Yagami’s actions, which led to a net benefit.Moral DutiesWe must also take into account moral duties. For example, if I see a child drowning in a pond and don’t save them, I clearly bear responsibility for their death. Morally speaking, it would not be different from killing them—saving and killing are both making a choice about whether someone will live or die. Killing 1 person to save a greater number of people involves a conflict between the duty to save and the duty not to kill, but these are really both part of our duty to keep others alive when given the choice. Thus, sacrificing the smaller number of people is the logical thing to do, since it prevents a greater amount of death.My CaseI will use the following modus ponens to affirm the resolution:P1: Killing 1 innocent person is justified in order to save more than 1 person.P2: Light Yagami saves more innocent people than he kills.P3: Therefore, the majority of Light Yagami’s killings were justified.1. Justifications for the Death Note:Criminals vs. InnocentLight Yagami targets criminals, making up the vast majority of his killings. Infringing on the liberties of convicted criminals to protect the innocent is clearly justified, even if you don’t accept utilitarianism—otherwise prisons are no different from kidnapping innocent people.New WorldIn E2, Light Yagami states his motivations clearly: “I protect the innocent and those who fear evil.” Even if Light Yagami had only killed innocent people to achieve his goal, it would be justified by net benefit.2. Death Note Net Effect:Crime RatesDue to Light Yagami’s actions, violent crime rates were reduced by over 70%. This dramatic effect was first observed when his killings first began. Given approximately 475,000 homicides annually, this means that Light saved approximately 332,500 people per year.War DeathsLight Yagami was active for 6 years and ended all wars during his reign. Since Light was operational from 2006-2011, this means that Light averted the deaths of an approximate 209481 people. This brings the average lives saved per year to 367,413.Saved vs. KilledAccording to one analysis, Light Yagami directly or indirectly killed about 46,500 per year [1], a mere fraction of the 367,413 people he saved every year. That’s not even counting all the other crimes he prevented, and we should also note that many of the people he killed were going to be executed anyway, since Light targeted criminals. Therefore, Light Yagami’s actions resulted in a net benefit.Effect on Innocent peopleSome studies suggest that about 5% of convicted criminals are actually innocent. This is probably a high estimate, since the Innocent Project is not a neutral source, but I will accept it for the sake of argument. Again, practicality demands that convicted criminals still be punished to protect the innocent, even if 5% of convictions are false.To put this in perspective, I have graphed the number of innocent people Light killed alongside the number of innocent people he saved:For the sake of argument, I included L, Rey Penber, and Naomi Misora with the kill count even though they were not innocent—they wanted to stop Light, which would have resulted in the deaths of many innocent people. The bar on the right is the number of innocent people that Light saved. The bar on the left that you can barely see is the number that he killed. The term for that is “statistically insignificant.”
BackgroundThe United Kingdom (UK) became a part of the European Union (EU) in 1973, in part to avoid economic decline. The UK served many important roles for the EU, including providing its member nations more global reach and pushing for free trade. During this time, the UK had specific opt-outs from certain EU requirements, including adoption of the Euro as their currency and maintaining its own border controls.In 2016, the Brexit referendum vote was held in the UK where a majority (51.9%) of the population opted to leave the EU. The UK fully departed the EU over the course of the next 4 years, negotiating trade deals with the EU post-exit. As a result, the UK became a “third country,” its relationship with the EU now governed by the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA).HarmsThe decision to dissolve this relationship came with a multitude of harms to those in the UK.The most devastating of these have been economic. Using a combination of micro and macro economic data, a recent study found that leaving the EU cost the UK 6-8% of GDP per capita over the past 5 years. This came in part as a result of a variety of specific impacts, with investments into the UK dropping by 12-18%, employment down 0.5% per year (resulting in a 3-4% reduction in employment growth), and total factor productivity (TFP) growth down by a similar amount. British exports have come down by a fifth, reaching the point that they are behind every single other G7 nation at a fifth of what they were before Brexit. 14% of UK companies gave up selling to the EU due to steep costs and bureaucracy. Customs paperwork alone adds $10 billion dollars a year for exporters costs.The TCA does not address these harms. Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are huge factors, taking the form of “regulations, standards, technical requirements, licensing requirements, and quotas. They can affect trade in various ways. For example, sanitary and health standards may boost consumer demand, while at the same time increasing the cost of production. This may lead to either an increase or reduction in trade, depending on which effect is stronger.” This has led to huge declines in the variety of products being exported from the UK to the EU, partially explaining the drop-off in exports.The ground level effects are staggering. A full third of the increased cost of food per household between 2019 and 2023 can be attributed solely to Brexit, adding hundreds of pounds to the cost of groceries for every family. Cost of living for the average household increased by £870 by 2022, and real wages have fallen by an estimated £470. By 2024, the decline in economic growth equated to a cost of £1,000 per household.Brexit also had a huge impact on migration. Net migration has ballooned in the years after the referendum, but how those numbers break down is where the trouble comes in. Net migration of EU citizens fell in that period, so the vast majority of immigration came from asylum seekers, most of whom entered the country via human traffickers. This is particularly evident in small boat crossings, which increased from 299 to 46,000 between 2018 and 2022.These impacts are a consequence of Brexit. The UK lost its access to real-time data through EU security databases like SIS II, losing essential capacity for intelligence-led policing and, as a result, making it much more difficult to intercept traffickers at UK borders. Their efforts to shut down legal routes to entry make the illegal backdoor tactics used by traffickers essential for anyone who wants to enter the UK, and the migrants’ reliance on traffickers mean abuses don’t get reported. And since the UK isn’t bound by the EU’s anti-trafficking directive, the UK is effectively creating a pocket of Europe where modern slavery is alive and thriving.FrameworkAny policy direction for the UK should be directed based on what does the greatest good for the most people, with the greatest impacts being those affecting the UK and its citizens directly. As such, my value will be Quality of Life. The emphasis will be on how policy will affect livelihoods within the UK and for those who would become UK citizens.ModelSimply put, the UK should rejoin the EU. This would not happen overnight, but I’m not going to establish a specific timetable. The two parties would negotiate terms and there would be an agreement for the UK to rejoin under Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union. While this would mostly just mean a return to form, e.g. meeting the Copenhagen criteria of political stability, economic viability and legal alignment, I acknowledge that doing so would come with concessions from England since they no longer command the veto power they had. Those concessions would be as follows:Joining the Schengen area and, thus, allowing passport-free movement from other EU countries to the UK.Committing to joining the rest of the eurozone in adopting the euro as their primary currency, which would require phasing out the Pound Sterling as their currency.Advantage 1: Economic BoonsThe UK regains full access to the EU market of 27 countries. No more trade barriers, no extra costs, no paperwork. That accounts for 41% of UK exports and 51% of imports. That combined with restoring its foreign investments will yield substantial economic growth for the UK. It would also get access to a number of global trade agreements through the EU.Eliminating NTMs imposed by the TCA, which would correct an estimated loss of 20-42% of export product variety, chiefly affecting small, less diversified firms that can no longer trade with the EU.Barriers to investment will also disappear, restoring access to the estimated 12-18% of total investments not garnered as a result of Brexit.Car companies could bounce back. The TCA eliminated most tariffs, but stipulations on the “rules of origin,” which require a vehicle’s parts to largely originate in the UK or EU in order to qualify for trade without tariffs, are difficult to uphold, particularly with electric cars where batteries often come from China. And that threshold is rising, forcing carmakers to consolidate, reducing production and increasing costs for consumers. Only by rejoining the EU is this alleviated.UK businesses would have seamless access to EU supply chains. Higher costs, widespread among businesses as a result of higher supply chain costs, would quickly be addressed.Advantage 2: Influence and SecurityThe UK has lost substantial global and regional influence that it stands to regain through EU membership. This means helping steer EU policy on trade, digital regulation, and climate change. They’re often affected by EU product standards anyway, particularly by General Product Safety Regulations, the CE Mark (health, safety and environmental protection standard) and its disjoints with the UKCA Mark, all resulting in greater costs for UK businesses in terms of time, money and expertise that many small companies do not have. Rejoining the EU would lead to an alignment of these standards and how they’re applied, removing the need for these expensive add-ons. This would also give the UK more heft globally, wielding the weight of the entire EU in trade negotiations so that they don’t have to sacrifice the wellbeing of their farmers and businesses to get trade deals. Just looking at how Brexit has affected the deals the UK has already made with CPTPP, Australia and New Zealand, the UK could recoup as much as £100 billion per year and 4% of their GDP. The EU facilitates extensive data-sharing and cooperation among European police and judicial authorities (through Europol and the European Arrest Warrant in particular). The UK’s efforts to regain access to much of their data has been denied and, as long as they aren’t in the EU, access they gain is tenuous, data protection rules are in dispute and real-time access to essential data from the SIS II system is impossible. The TCA also led to instability and reductions in EU-UK criminal justice cooperation. Regaining access means more effective cross-border crime fighting and a greater capacity for intelligence-led policing, including access to wide-ranging data on criminal suspects and fast-tracked extradition. Defense funds would also become more available, as the UK would no longer have to engage in failed negotiations to gain access to hundreds of billions of pounds in funding.Advantage 3: Travel and Labor RightsTravel to and from the UK gets a lot easier when it can be done passport free. Among other benefits, it precludes the need to deal with other entry systems that both restrict travel and impose delays. Even new systems that don’t require manually stamping passports require that UK citizens pay to get clearance to travel, and travel into the UK is similarly costly. Considering these effects diminished labor demand within the UK by an average of 15.7%, there is a gap in the labor market that is waiting to be filled. Freeing up travel will increase EU net migration to the UK and make it easier to travel into EU member nations given the mutual right to work, allowing free flow of labor in and out of the country that results in vast talent pools, increasing demand for foreign goods, smoother business operations. This also allows many to commute regularly for work and study, the latter particularly through cooperations like Erasmus. This would also free up tourism from the EU, which will in turn result in more money spent within the country.The benefits also extend to consumers, who will be able to rely on EU protections. In particular, they will have the ability to seek redress from cross-border transactions through the Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) platform and have the protections of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation to ensure authorities abroad work with local authorities. This will stimulate more trade between the UK and other EU nations.
I’ll start by clarifying what this debate is about. As it says in the description, this debate is pretty generalized, focusing on “whether or not all democracies ought to adopt the same framework where every citizen is compelled to vote.” This isn’t a question of specific policies, though I will present the uniting features such policies should entail, nor is it about any single country or region. It’s a topic that covers democracies as a whole with explicit recognition of the variety therein. I recognize that not all democracies are built identically and, especially given that they are democracies and thus systems of government built by the people for the people, the specifics of how voting mandates are designed and implemented should be laid out by elected representatives. To that end, while these elements do need some clarification, the inherent barriers to implementing mandatory voting are not. This is an “ought” resolution, so the focus is on whether the outcomes of implementing mandatory voting is better than the outcomes of voluntary voting systems.Also of note is the shared burdens in this debate. Both mandatory and voluntary voting systems exist in democracies in the world today. Both my opponent’s and my positions are equal and opposite: we must show that, on balance, either the mandatory (me) or voluntary (Magoroth) voting system are better for democracies worldwide.With that, I’ll move into my model.Voters would be required to either cast a mail-in ballot or appear in person to cast a vote for national elections, noting that protest votes of all kinds (blank and spoiled ballots) are allowedThere would be necessary exemptions for injury, illness, infirmity or emergencyTo address obligations like work and school, countries would make voting day a federal holidaySimilarly, voters would be automatically registered to vote upon reaching the appropriate ageFailure to vote would result in a minor fineThere’s a lot here, but this is meant to specify a very simple case: democracies should implement compulsory voting with clear enforcement mechanisms and remove impediments to voting.A couple of important notes.Since planks 3 and 4 are not exclusive to a mandatory voting system, my case will not derive any impact from them. Con is welcome to argue against them if he wishes, or he can permute either or both of them for the purposes of this debate, since voluntary voting systems could employ the same measures. My model includes these planks to comport with the requirements implied by requiring people to vote, since a government would necessarily have to address built-in impediments that prevent people from voting in a system where voting is mandatory.Regarding plank 5, I am not ascribing a specific monetary figure to this and countries would necessarily be able to decide how enforcement is carried out. Fines aren’t the only means of penalizing non-voters in countries with compulsory voting, with “nonmonetary sanctions for abstention, such as ineligibility for passport services or state-sponsored qualification exams” being possible alternatives. My focus from here on will be on the fine, but my case isn’t reliant on the fine as a means of enforcement.My framework is democratic legitimacy.Democracies are granted legitimacy by the whole population - not a subset thereof, not a sliver of the voting public, but by the entirety of it. The government of any democracy is, by definition, meant to represent the interests of the entire population, not just the most outspoken and invested. A more representative democracy is inherently more healthy and legitimate, recognizing the will of the whole electorate and not just a more vocal, often fringe minority.That legitimacy is essential to how democracies function: citizens accept that the government they elect has authority, which fosters stability and compliance with laws. It’s the reason we submit to paying taxes and the reason most of us aren’t out in the streets with torches and pitchforks (I can’t speak for Steve). By casting ballots and going through the laborious and time-consuming process of counting them and tallying the results, citizens vest trust in their government to make difficult choices. Lower participation reduces that trust and thus results in a democracy that functionally doesn’t represent nor earn the recognition of the people.With that established, my case breaks down to three interconnected points.1. Mandatory voting increases turnoutVoter turnout in elections has declined substantially over the course of previous decades, leading to disengagement and apathy with the political system. Ironically, “as democracy has expanded across countries, electoral participation has declined… The poorest are least likely to participate in the democratic process, and this is particularly true when overall participation is low. Low and unequal turnout then leads to ever more excluded communities with politicians engaging with the groups they perceive to be their active supporters.”A fine is a strong incentive for people to cast their ballots, ergo more people in democracies will do so. “A few studies in countries as diverse as Switzerland, Brazil, and Australia have shown that even with small fines for non-voting or low enforcement of penalties, electoral participation is significantly higher under compulsory voting.” Voter turnout per country is often higher than those with entirely voluntary voting, with outliers like Greece showcasing the effects of unenforced penalties.2. Increased turnout improves representationPoliticians need to get elected, and the more voters there are from a broader swath of the population, the more people those same politicians have to court and subsequently represent in office. A mandatory voting system means they can no longer rely on “likely voters” to buoy them into office. Those representatives should have to court disaffected and apathetic voters and find ways to make them care enough to vote for them. Mandatory voting would also bolster voters. “[The requirement to vote] sends a clear message that there are rights and responsibilities. You have an obligation as a member of society: we’re all in this thing, and you can’t be a bystander.” Voting is active participation in the process of building and re-tooling the makeup of a government, and just as we are all compelled to pay taxes for the purpose of funding essential government functions, voters should be compelled to vote to ensure that the same government is at its most democratic. This would especially benefit disadvantaged groups that often don’t show up for elections, including women, minorities, and working-class citizens.3. Improved representation legitimizes democracyBy adhering to the social contract inherent to all democracies and emphasizing the importance of every eligible voter playing an active role in the outcome of an election, we create a system that engenders more citizen buy-in since the outcomes (e.g. laws and policies of that government) comport better with a larger subset of the electorate. That yields a more stable government representing a more equal distribution of the population. That stability is crucial, since a government that fails to represent the people leads to more disaffection, resulting in lower turnout as apathy spreads. And this effect is worse among the poor, with the vast majority of the drop in voter turnout attributed to them, engendering huge rifts between socioeconomic classes and further weakening social connections.This can also lead to the collapse of democratic institutions and lead to the erosion of democracies. This is particularly bad for fledgling democracies like those in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which have seen the steepest declines in voter turnout. Many of these countries have effectively ceased to be democracies, falling to authoritarianism. As such, younger democracies would benefit most from mandatory voting, which sets the standard for engagement and establishes the legitimacy of their elected representatives early.I welcome my opponent's case.
First i'd like to give a little contextContext:The Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 after the collapse of the regime of Siad Barre.This is an extremely important event that marked a singularization of Somaliland:Somaliland now has its own government, its own military defense, its own currency, its own police, its own passeports, with stable elections and effective territorial control.But nevertheless, it's still not recognized as a sovereign state. What would be the framework? How could we evaluate properly?Here, i want the framework to be very clear and well deffined so that both me and my opponent can accurately discuss of the topic.What i propose is that, we base our framework on teleological legitimacy, or basicaly teleology. https://www.basicknowledge101.com/pdf/Teleology.pdf( the existence of a state should be judged by it's finality: protect itself, maintain order and govern properly.)This implies that,If Somaliland already fulfills these teleological requirements for a recognized State, refusing to recognize it as a State would be, by definition, arbirtrary. 1. Somaliland already fulfills the classical criterias of statehood?A) on the regards of the Montevideo Criteria.The Status Quo when it comes to a recognition of state is based on the Montevideo Criteria, ad hoc made for a proper understanding of how we recognize a state.https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdfTo resume, it's based on Principles:A1. A permanent populationA2. A defined territoryA3. A governmentA4. The capacity to enter relations with other States.Let's dive in there and see if Somaliland fits these.A1) Does Somaliland have a permanant population ?Short answer, yes.(check the link)https://www.deepgeo.earth/somalilandAbout 6.2 million people call the region home. The people are primarily Muslim and have a rich poetry, music, and traditional arts heritage. Somalilanders are known for their resilience and entrepreneurial spiritA2) Does Somaliland possess a defined territory?Short answer, yes.A3) Does Somaliland possess a government ?Short answer, yes.https://www.govsomaliland.org/A4) Is it in capacity to enter relations with other states?https://www.govsomaliland.org/article/international-relationshiphttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_SomalilandAnd here again, we are forced to admit that Somaliland is in capacity to enter relations with other States, with Israël even claiming Somaliland as a sovereign state.2. Somaliland, is it stable and democratic?On the contrary, currently, Somalia is a recognized State.Is it actually more stable tho..?If we try to get informed with honesty, let's do a quick comparison.B1. Has multi-party elections, enabling a strong and democratichttps://www.slnec.net/election-resultsB2. Considered more stable than Somaliahttps://academy.unpo.org/somaliland-between-recognition-and-geopolitics-stability-without-sovereignty-in-the-horn-of-africa/In 1991, as the Somali state collapsed entirely, Somaliland seized the opportunity to reassert its independence. Crucially, however, it did so without pursuing territorial expansion or attempting to annex areas beyond its historical boundaries. Instead, it confined its claim strictly to the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, as defined by colonial-era agreements with the United Kingdom.The resulting contradiction is striking. While Somalia has, since 1991, been engulfed in warlordism, jihadist insurgency led by Al-Shabaab, repeated foreign interventions, famine, and chronic institutional collapse, Somaliland has gradually built relatively robust political institutions and a cohesive sociopolitical order through locally driven, bottom-up processes. It has done so in the absence of international recognition and with minimal external assistance, challenging conventional assumptions about statehood, legitimacy, and post-conflict stability.Far from representing a destabilizing factor, Somaliland’s trajectory demonstrates how locally anchored governance and peacefully negotiated political arrangements can strengthen regional steadiness rather than undermine it. In this sense, Somaliland’s experience reinforces a broader principle: the dignity and collective will of peoples should carry greater weight than shifting geopolitical interests, especially when communities have shown their capacity to govern themselves responsibly and peacefully.B3. Higher safety, lower risks for inhabitants than SomaliaLittle to no influence of Terrorism (Al-Shabaab).Therefore, refusing recognition to a stable and functioning territory while recognizing a largely dysfunctional state appears inconsistent.--Here, we talked about the legitimacy of recognizing Somaliland as a State. Now we know it's feasible/viable.Let's now see, if you followed me until now, why the recognition would not only be logical and accurate,but also beneficial for Somaliland.3. An even better security ?https://www.somalilandchronicle.com/2024/12/20/the-strategic-implications-of-somalilands-recognition-a-comprehensive-analysis/The security implications of recognition extend far beyond Somaliland’s borders. The territory’s proven track record in containing terrorist threats, particularly al-Shabaab, demonstrates its capability as a security partner. International recognition would significantly enhance these security capabilities through increased access to international support and resources. This would enable Somaliland to further develop its security infrastructure, participate in international security frameworks, and strengthen its intelligence-gathering capabilities. The resulting improvement in regional security would benefit not only Somaliland but the entire Horn of Africa, creating a more stable environment for economic development and social progress.Indeed, international recognition also means- larger scale security investments- full security cooperation- direct international aid- normal diplomatic and trade agreements.4. A stronger economy?Despite operating without formal recognition, Somaliland has demonstrated remarkable economic resilience. The strategic port of Berbera exemplifies this potential, attracting substantial international investment and serving as a crucial gateway for regional trade. Recognition would unlock access to international financial institutions and development funding, enabling Somaliland to fully realize its economic potential. This would facilitate formal trade agreements and economic partnerships, attracting increased foreign direct investment while supporting broader regional economic integration initiatives. The economic benefits would extend throughout the region, creating new opportunities for trade and development that could help address the root causes of regional instability.https://www.somalilandchronicle.com/2024/12/20/the-strategic-implications-of-somalilands-recognition-a-comprehensive-analysis/5. Prior arguments cannot work for Con.If you take a look at the origins of Somalia and Somaliland, you would notice that:1. British Somaliland and Italian Somalia were originally two separate colonies2. Both briefly became independent in 1960,3. and later voluntarily united.According to this, Somaliland is NOT destroying colonial borders: it is restoring a previously existing boundary. The prior argument cannot work.6. CONCLUSIONWe saw that Somaliland deserves to be recognized as a sovereign state, as it fulfills the requirments.Therefore, only with this, we could already argue that it would be unfair and arbitrary not to grant Somalia international recognition as an independant state.But furthermore, we came to the conclusion that it would also be beneficial.All of the evidences point to the conclusion that, in a lot of points, Somaliland deserves to be recognized.
FrameworkSlavery is the state of being owned by another person.Animal agriculture is the rearing of animals for resources/food consumption.The majority is greater than 50%.I. DefinitionalP1) Slavery is the state of being owned by another person.P2) The majority of animal agriculture places animals in the state of being owned by another person. C) The majority of animal agriculture is slavery. Premise one is definitional, with all terms being found in the description of our debate. Premise two, subsequently, is truistic. In animal agriculture, animals are owned as the property of their rearers. Observing domains such as animal husbandry, animals are exploited, and geared toward the production of certain resources. Given that "99 percent of animals in the US are raised on factory farms;" a system of farming in which a lot of animals are kept in a small closed area, in order to produce a large amount of meat, eggs, or milk as cheaply as possible, it goes without question that the majority, if not the entirety of animal agricultural processes categorically conform to the exploitation of animals, using them as resources for profit, taking them as profit, thus culminating in a description of slavery. My conclusion follows via the modus ponens rule of inference. Animal agriculture is the enslavement of sentient creatures, turning them into resources for human consumption. II. Moral EqualizationP1) If x societal practice features the disparate treatment of different sentient individuals, there must be an ethically relevant distinction between the instigators and the recipients of x practice, such that x practice is justified as ethically permissible. P2) Our current societal practices feature the disparate treatment of different sentient individuals (animals and humans).C) Therefore, there must be an ethically relevant distinction between the instigators and the recipients of x practice, such that x practice is justified as ethically permissible. This syllogism effectively proposes that there must be an ethically relevant distinction between farm animals and humans that delineates the respective justifications for our societal actions towards them. It rests on two propositions: Proposition a: If we can clearly recognize the slavery of humans, we can recognize that treating humans the way we treat farm animals would be slavery. Proposition b: If there is no ethically relevant distinction between humans and animals, the way we treat farm animals is slavery. There are commonly many proposed distinctions, however, none of them are ethically relevant, and thus none of them showcase a justification for P2. a. IntelligenceIt would be untenable to suggest that a human of low intelligence, such as children, and those disabled (ex. severe down syndrome and other deformities) can be farmed, enslaved, and eaten by other human beings. a.b. RationalityThe same case follows for rationality. It would be absurd to suggest that it would be ethically permissible for disabled humans, or young children, who are not rational, to be raised in factory farms to be enslaved and consumed. b. SpeciesIf there were a species that was sentiently identical to humans, it would be absurd to suggest they can be farmed, enslaved, and ultimately consumed by virtue of being non-human just as it would be to suggest the same if a population of humans over time evolved into a different species, but maintained the overwhelming majority of the same attributes. c. CitizenshipIt would be untenable to suggest we can farm, enslave, and consume non-citizens such as various immigrants. d. ConsciousnessFarm animals are conscious, (awake and aware of [their] surroundings) and it would be untenable to say we can consume anyone who is unconscious. e. SentienceFarm animals are sentient (able to perceive or feel things). Verdict: none of these positions exhibit an ethical justification for the treatment of animals. As a consequence, animal farming is unquestionably slavery. Conclusion My round-one arguments establish certain propositions. For one, animal agriculture is slavery, irrefutably, within the parameters of our deliberation. Animals are in a state of being owned by another person and thus enslaved. Secondly, I demonstrate that there is nothing true of animals, that if true of humans would categorically preclude slavery. Thus, animal farming must logically be slavery if doing the same to humans is slavery, so long as there is no ethically relevant distinction between the two. Conclusively, my first argument demonstrates the resolution to be a certainty. My second argument demonstrates the resolution to be a certainty.
So umm yeah, as description says, debaters must use deductive reasoning to justify their standard. thus, no subjective morality is allowed to begin with.So reasoning must be in form of:A = BB = CC = AWith of course starting premise also being logically deduced.Due to is-ought gap, using observations to derive "should" is not possible, because observations merely tell what is, not what should be.However, using logical axiom as starting premise works as foundation to derive morality from, and the only way to deny logical axiom is to deny logic itself.thus, my reasoning will be in form of:A or not ANot A, when accepted as true, results in self-defeat and establishment of A.thus, only A remains as true.I. Body autonomy objective moralityWhen it comes to what "should" be done, some moral principles survive A or not A much better.Some examples of moral principles are:Body autonomyProperty rightsPerson's wantsHarmFreedomWe can logically deduce body autonomy by saying:Everyone has body autonomy = No one can take away body autonomy of anotherthis principle remains self-consistent, but opposite principle does not:Any person can take away body autonomy from others for subjective reasons = Everyone can take body autonomy from everyone for any subjective reason, including their ability to take away autonomy from others = Ability to take away autonomy itself disappears as principle.Suppose someone says:"I have right to take away body autonomy of others for reasons I choose".We can respond to that by saying:"We have right to take away your ability to take away body autonomy of others for reasons we choose".thus any attempt to take away autonomy results in symmetry justification to prevent that same attempt.Any person has right to take away choices from others = Any person has right to take away choice to take away choices from others.thus, any attempt to take away body autonomy for subjective reasons, results in also subjective reasons defeating same principle.Because topic is about smoking and age restrictions, body autonomy is important argument.Suppose some person wants to smoke and has money to buy cigarettes. to impose age restrictions which prevent that person, then his wants, choices, autonomy and property choices would all be violated.And if violating body autonomy is good for subjective reasons, it results in justification to violate all autonomy, including ability to violate autonomy, hence self defeat of "Not A".Likewise, violating property choices is self-defeating:Any person can take away property choices from another for arbitrary reason = All choices regarding property can be taken away, including choice to take away choice.Any person can deny goals of another = Any person can deny goals of all others, including goals to deny goals.Freedom likewise works same. If freedom can be taken away for subjective reasons, all freedom can be taken away for subjective reasons, including freedom to take away freedom.II. Future wants argumentOne of biggest counters to body autonomy of children is that violating it maybe upholds their future autonomy.However, such counter doesnt work, because justification for it rests on same subjective reason as any other violation of autonomy.We can logically deduce that "no one can violate body autonomy of others".We cannot logically deduce "We can violate autonomy of others if it possibly upholds their future autonomy".Because when:Autonomy can be violated = Who gets to decide when it gets violated and for what reason?And that question is a core self-defeat of all principles which attempt to violate body autonomy.Any person can decide when autonomy gets violated = Any person can decide to violate autonomy of anyone alwaysAnd violating autonomy to preserve autonomy is a self defeating principle, because autonomy remains non-violated only if never violated. If it is violated, it is no longer autonomy but a removed autonomy.It is not possible logically to follow a principle "No one gets to violate autonomy of others" while violating autonomy of others, for whatever reason the violation occurs.And as autonomy principle is deduced from deductive logic, "future autonomy > current autonomy" argument is not only unproved and not logically deduced, but is self-defeating because it attempts to use subjective justification to violate autonomy, while same can be used to defeat it.Principle is justified by subjective reason = Principle can be defeated by subjective reasonIII. Harm argumentAnother big counter to child's autonomy is harm argument, usually in its more objective form:Any person can cause harm to others and justify it for subjective reasons = All harm becomes justified = Harm to prevent harm becomes justified.However, the flaw of harm argument is essentially misunderstanding what harm is.Harm entirely depends on desirable state of things or desirable functions being violated.However, when it comes to wants and desires, cigarettes can be desirable on balance, so to not allow smoking would itself be harm.Any person can deny wants of others for subjective reasons = all wants can be denied for subjective reasons, including wants of person to deny wants of others, hence resulting in inability of any person to deny wants (opposite principle)Wants can be denied for subjective reasons = Wants to deny wants of others can likewise be denied for subjective reasons.thus, "no person can deny wants of others", remains as true objective principle, because opposite principle simply doesnt survive dichotomy.Harm argument likewise can be negated by body autonomy.Body autonomy = Objective principleIn dichotomy between harm and body autonomy: Objective principle of body autonomy prevails.Because harm can be justified by using not arbitrary, but objective principle of body autonomy.Harm justified for objective reasons =/= Harm justified for subjective reasons.So if body autonomy results in what person considers to be "harm", that harm is still not objectively wrong, because it isnt done with subjective justification, but an objective justification of body autonomy.IV. Power/authority argumentOne of big counters to moral principles and body autonomy is "might makes right".In other words, someone can say:"My decision to deny autonomy of others is justified by my power to do so."However, power principle doesnt work in "should" debates, because it doesnt say what should or shouldnt be done.Society has power to both impose and remove age restrictions, and having power alone doesnt deduce logically which decision should be made.Likewise, morality which uses power as justification justifies anything, even my position. If something is justified by power, then all thoughts and actions which exist are justified by some power which enables them to exist, including my own position.V. Subjective morality justificationAny moral principle derived from arbitrary reasons cannot be justified, and any excuse for violating objective principle by using arbitrary reasons merely enables its own denial by other arbitrary reasons.Arbitrary reasons can be used to deny principle = Other arbitrary reasons can be used to deny those arbitrary reasons, and justification of "arbitrary reasons can be used to justify or deny" becomes self-defeat.VI. Symmetry reciprocity principleAny attempt to justify denying autonomy of others rests on these conditions:Justification for denialAbility of denialBecause justification is always arbitrary, same can be denied arbitrarily too, and 2 can be denied arbitrarily as well.the only justification which would work is objective justification.But who decides what objective justification is?If anyone can decide what objective justification is = Anyone can decide to deny others of body autonomy based on what they think is objective justification, including denying ability to deny body autonomy, hence self defeat of any attempt at justification to deny body autonomy, even with what person thinks are "objective reasons.VII. Opponent's burdenBecause my opponent is ultimately arguing to violate body autonomy, the conditions for his position to be true are:Objective justification derived through deductive reasoning with starting premise being logical axiomWho decides what objective justification is?Who decides who gets to decide?Can objective justification be denied by some other objective justification?Solution to "ability of anyone to decide objective justification resulting in self-defeat".Who has ability to decide, and who gives that ability?Compare that to simple body autonomy.Everyone has body autonomy = No one violates autonomy of anotherPrinciple is self-consistent, not self-defeating. the opposite principle, when accepted, defeats itself and returns to original principle after futile struggle to come up with justification which ends up being justification against the very principle using it, because symmetry argument which relies on same abilities defeats it.If person says: "I can decide what objective justification for violating autonomy is",I can say " then so can I, and I reject yours".Conclusion:With objective principle of "thou shall not violate autonomy of others" being logically deduced, and opposite principles resulting in self-defeat,what follows is:Choosing to smoke = allowed by body autonomyAllowed by body autonomy = Allowed by objective moralityChoosing to smoke = Allowed by objective moralityAge restrictions = not allowed because they violate body autonomyViolate body autonomy = Violate objective moral principleAge restrictions = Violate objective moral principle.So a person who smokes in private and doesnt smoke with others who are unwilling to inhale smoke, isnt violating autonomy of others.But placing age restrictions is a violation of body autonomy and property choice.
Now the time that the sons of Israel had lived in Egypt was 430 years.Exodus 12:40Most Christians believe this because their Bibles say this plainly. Most Christians don't even bother to question this number, as with many things in their belief system. But this is actually not mathematically possible.Moses was 80 years old when he and Aaron spoke to Pharoah (Exodus 7:8), which was significantly less than 1 year before the Israelites left Egypt. Their father Amram died at the age of 137 (Exodus 6:20). His father Kohath died at the age of 133 (Exodus 6:18). And Kohath was one of the 66 persons who came to Egypt with Jacob (Genesis 46:11,26).So let's stretch this out as far as we possibly can. Let's assume that Kohath was a newborn baby when he came to Egypt, Amram was born the year Kohath died, and that Moses was born the year Amram died. 133 + 137 + 80 = 350. According to the Bible, the Israelites could not have been in Egypt for any longer than 350 years. Even when you stretch out the timeline as much as humanly possible, even to the point of proposing an absolutely ridiculous and blatantly unrealistic scenario, it still falls a whopping 80 years short. Clearly, the Israelites were not in Egypt for 430 years. They were in Egypt for significantly less than 350 years.So how long were they really in Egypt? Well, Moses received the law 430 years after Abraham received the promise (Galatians 3:16-17). So the timeline begins when Abraham received the promise. Abraham was 75 years old when he received the promise and entered Canaan (Genesis 12:3-5,7). 25 years later, when Abraham was 100, Isaac was born (Genesis 21:5). 60 years later, Jacob was born to Isaac when he was 60 (Genesis 25:26). 130 years later, all of Israel entered Egypt (Genesis 47:9). 25 + 60 + 130 = 215. So, Israel entered Egypt 215 years after Abraham entered Canaan.And because Moses received the law the same year Israel left Egypt, that means that the time Israel left Egypt marks the end of this timeline. 430 - 215 = 215, meaning that the Israelites were in Egypt for 215 years. That is mathematically possible, and it is significantly less than 350 years, meaning that no insane scenario needs to be proposed in order to say this.So why does the Bible say they were in Egypt for 430 years, when this is not mathematically possible? Well, because all of our Bibles are translated from the Hebrew Masoretic text, which was copied between the 6th and 10th centuries. But there are other texts that account the same history.The Greek Septuagint says, "And the sojourning of the children of Israel, while they sojourned in the land of Egypt and the land of Chanaan, four hundred and thirty years."The Samaritan Pentateuch says, "Now the sojourning of the children of Israel and fathers of them, who dwelt in Canaan and in Egypt, was four hundred and thirty years."Flavius Josephus said in Book II Chapter 15 paragraph 2 of Antiquities of the Jews, "They left Egypt...four hundred and thirty years after our forefather Abraham came into Canaan, but two hundred and fifteen years only after Jacob removed into Egypt."All of these texts, which are all older than the Hebrew Masoretic text, bare witness to this timeline, in fact Flavius Josephus describes it exactly. In fact, technically the Hebrew Masoretic serves as a witness to this timeline, because of the numbers it puts forth in other verses, meaning that it bares witness against itself. So given the fact that many writings, which are all older than the Hebrew Masoretic text, testify to a different timeline than this one single writing, and given the fact that that single writing's timeline isn't even possible in the first place, this timeline is obviously the true one.But the Israelites were enslaved for even less time than that. The Israelites were only enslaved after Joseph and all that generation died, and a new king arose who did not know Joseph (Exodus 1:6,8). Well Joseph was 30 years old when he entered Pharoah's service (Genesis 41:46). Shortly after that, the infamous 7 years of abundance and 7 years of famine occurred. So in the middle, Joseph was very likely 37 years old. It was 2 years later that Israel entered Egypt, because the famine had already been happening for 2 years (Genesis 45:6). This would make Joseph 39 years old when Isreal entered Egypt, and this begins the 215 years that they were in Egypt.71 years later, Joseph died at the age of 110 (Genesis 50:22). This means that Egypt was under Joseph's rule for 71 years, and since they were not enslaved until after Joseph and all that generation died, they were not enslaved for this entire time. The Israelites were not enslaved for at least 71 years. Additionally, Moses was 80 when Israel left Egypt, and they were already slaves when he was born. 215 - 80 - 71 = 64, meaning there were 64 years in-between the death of Joseph and the birth of Moses. They were not slaves when Joseph died, but they were slaves when Moses was born, and the timeline ends 80 years after Moses was born. So they became enslaved at some point during a 64 year time period.This gives us a final number of 112 ± 32 years, meaning that the Israelites were enslaved for 112 ± 32 years. And they were in Egypt for 215 years.But what about the prophecy? Didn't God Himself tell Abraham that his descendants would be enslaved in Egypt for 400 years? No. Here's what He actually said: "Then God said to Abram, “Know for certain that your descendants will be strangers in a land that is not theirs, where they will be enslaved and oppressed for four hundred years." (Genesis 15:13). This prophecy is more specific than simply saying "Your descendants will be enslaved in Egypt for 400 years." And this extra piece of nuance is important.Isaac, Jacob, and the multitudes in Egypt were all Abraham's descendants. Both Canaan and Egypt were lands that were not theirs. And they were oppressed during this time as well (Genesis 21:9, Galatians 4:29). And then of course the Israelites were enslaved.Now, from Abraham receiving the promise to Moses receiving the law, there was 430 years. Isaac was born 25 years later, and he was weaned on the same day Ishmael scoffed at Isaac. In Talmudic times, it was customary to celebrate a child's weaning anywhere from 18 months to 5 years old. And if Isaac was weaned at 5 years old, then that means he was weaned 30 years after Abraham received the promise; which is exactly 400 years before Israel left Egypt. And this is when the oppression began. This is when the events God spoke about began.God was right. Abraham's descendants was oppressed and enslaved in a land not theirs for exactly 400 years. Not any more, not any less. This is the real biblical timeline.Conclusion: Biblically speaking, the Israelites were in Egypt for 215 years, and only enslaved for 112 ± 32 years. But God's prophecy was still true, because Abraham's descendants were enslaved and oppressed in a land not theirs for exactly 400 years. The Hebrew Masoretic text dropped the phrase "and Canaan" from the text, which has caused people to wildly misinterpret what really happened.
If a man identifies as a woman, that initially seems like it defies reality, because they are a male, not a female. But advocates of transgenderism have said that gender and sex are not the same thing. Gender is neurological, and sex is biological. And because of that, people have said that the state of your gender is independent of your sex. If it's a different thing, then it's not defying reality to say your gender is different from your sex.But if you ask most of these people if people should be able to change their skin color, most of them would say no. Some might even go as far as to say that that's racist. But why? After all, you can separate neurological and biological race the same way you can separate gender and sex. If we apply the exact same rules, then a white person who identifies as black is not "denying reality," because their neurological race is independent of their biological race.And since transgender people are allowed to permanently change their bodies with surgery in order to align their physical form with their gender as much as possible, at least when they're 18, then "transrace" individuals should be able to do the same: tattoo their body all over with the skin color they want.But in terms of neurological race, how exactly can you "feel" black? Well, the same way you can "feel" female: cultural norms that firmly establish specific ideas with specific genders. Thus, gender becomes apart of our identity. Without this, you become like trees, which do have male and female, but you cannot possibly tell the difference and you don't feel the difference. And yet, race also has cultural norms that firmly establish specific ideas to specific races. It's called culture. There's black culture, white culture, Mexican culture, Japanese culture, etc. So a person can in fact "feel black" even if they are white.As you can see, the exact same rules can absolutely apply to race, which is troubling for some advocates of transgenderism, because they don't want that, but they do still want transgenderism. The only differences that gender has with race are irrelevant things that do not break the foundation of pro-transracism, such as the strength differences between sexes vs the lack of strength differences between races.Conclusion: Transgenderism and transracism are approved by the same logic. Therefore, if transgenderism is allowed, transracism should be too.
I will warn everyone that my arguments are very technical, and if you are unfamiliar with the concepts of modal logic, I encourage you to stop and read this primer on modal logic: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/. S5 Modal LogicModal logic is a type of logic used to represent and study statements about what is necessary and what is possible. We use modal logic to understand concepts such as knowledge, obligations, and causations [1]. In modal logic, we can divide beings into three categories:A necessary being - A being that exists in all possible worlds, including the actual one. A contingent being - A being that could exist in a possible world but could fail to exist in others. An impossible being - A being that exists in no possible worlds, often due to being logically incoherent. In addition, we can divide worlds into three types:The actual world - The world we live inA possible world - A world that could have existed An impossible world - A world that could never exist In S5 modal logic, all possible worlds are accessible from each other, which means that what is possible, true, or necessary is consistent across the modal landscape. The MOALet a maximally great being ( MGB hereafter) = A maximally great being who possesses all great-making properties, including, but not necessarily limited to:Moral perfection Maximal knowledgeMaximal power Present everywhere Necessary existence Here is Alvin Plantinga's modal ontological argument [2]: 1. It is possible that an MGB exists. 2. If an MGB may exist, then a maximally great being exists in some possible worlds. 3. If an MGB in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.4. If an MGB exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.5. If an MGB exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.6. Therefore, an MGB exists.1. It is possible that a maximally great being existsWhen we state that it is possible for a maximally great being to exist, we are saying that there is a possible world in which there is an MGB. This MGB would possess all great-making properties to the maximum degree. This first premise is modest and only suggests that such a being is possible. This premise is reasonable because there is nothing logically incoherent about such a being. 2. If an MGB may exist, then a maximally great being exists in some possible worlds. Premise 2 is a logical continuation of modal logic. If something is possible, then it is possible in some possible state of affairs and some possible world. In addition, if something is possible in one world, then due to the accessible relationship between worlds in S5 logic, it holds that it is possible in every single possible world. 3. If an MGB in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.Because an MGB is defined as having all great-making properties, including necessary existence, then by definition it must exist in every single possible world. 4. If an MGB exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.By definition, our world is a possible world. 5. If an MGB exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.6. Therefore, an MGB exists.These follow logically from premise 4. If such a being exists in the actual world, then such a being exists. ConclusionThe first premise of the MOA is modest - it is merely possible that such a being exists. Within the S5 framework, we have shown that if it is even possible for an MGB to exist, then such a being must exist in every possible world, including the actual. I look forward to your rebuttals. Sources1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic 2. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#Moda
DefinitionsGinger - Someone who lacks a soul, recognizable by their red hair.Rehabilitation camps - centers that are distributed across America which will first and foremost sheer all gingers of their nasty hair. Over time, without their gingerness they will develop a soul, and with a soul their new hair will grow in a more pure color. Additionally, before we release them into society we will provide training on how to refrain from relapsing into jigging and witchcraft related activities, as well as how to interact with real people. Introduction Our nation is plagued with issues from wealth inequality to climate change to economic stagnation. All of them share one common thread; ginger animals. The Democrats say, ‘Please don’t call them animals. They’re humans. I say, ‘No, they’re not humans, they’re not humans. They’re animals. I think the real number is 15, 16 million people in our country. We have a lot of work to do. They’re poisoning the blood of our nation.C1 - Solving ginger related problems One theory is that gingers were initially planted in the United States as soviet spies, their distinct red hair a mechanism for them to recognize their fellows. Another scientific theory is that god gave these people red hair to mark them with literal red flags as a warning. The average ginger commits dozens of countless crimes, and if you include crimes they didn’t commit that number skyrockets. They are a fundamental, direct threat to the American People. Not only are gingers criminals, but they also wreak havoc through their unholy, copious use of witchcraft. It is because of this that they are the core driver of the climate crisis. C2 - Economic benefits Gingers are not only dangerous but are a huge economic drain. First, there will be huge benefits of turning these millions of delinquents into functional members of society. That benefit alone will allow this program to pay for itself. Additionally, there is the major detail of the shearing program. This program will make the United States the number one producer of ginger related products, such as tea, spices, and sweaters, challenging China’s current dominance in this area. Gingers are not only a menace to society but also a huge untapped source of revenue. This bill may have a high upfront cost, but within a few years we will be profiting. C3 - Forwarding justice Our moral obligation to the disadvantagedI believe that we ought to provide liberty and justice for all. Social philosopher John Rawls writes that justice is fairness, meaning that none can be advantaged by chance or circumstance. These helpless gingers have been born with a crippling disability. We have the power to help these creatures, and it is what we must do, even when we disregard the huge gains to public safety and economy.
"Most people should believe in existence of objective morality"Pro takes position that most people should believe in existence of objective morality.Con takes position that most people should "not believe in existence of objective morality".Objective morality is defined as "things person objectively should/shouldn't do or objectively should/shouldn't believe in".Burden of proof is shared.Rules in description are agreed upon when accepting debate, and cannot be challenged. Same for definitions.believe:to think that something is true, correct, or real:https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/believeSelf contradiction in opponent's position:If my opponent says that people should believe in his position, while claiming no objective "should believe in" exists, he commits a self-defeat where he at same time wants to claim his position is what people should objectively believe in, while claiming people shouldnt objectively believe in anything.II. Unwinnable situation for killerIf we were to meet a killer, he would be faced with only 3 logical options presented by us:Killing is wrongKilling is not wrongKilling is okay when he does it (special pleading)Should killer claim 1, he admits killing is wrong.Should killer claim 2, we can claim "then we can kill the killer".Should killer claim 3, and assume special pleading is okay, we can likewise do special pleading and say that killing him is okay because we do it.With only 3 logical options available, none benefit the killer. And these 3 logical options remain true as objective morality, because 4th option doesnt exist. If my opponent comes up with "objectively true 4th option", he would be admitting objective morality instead of denying it.
Self removal function in Boolean logic:A = BB = removal of AA = removal of AAnd this logic remains true in case of ability to remove autonomy.Removing autonomy = removes ability to remove autonomyIn other words,A = removal of A.A self-removing principle.So saying that"Autonomy can be removed for subjective reasons"When removal of autonomy = removal of ability to remove autonomy,What follows is:Autonomy can be removed for subjective reasons = ability to remove autonomy can be removed for subjective reasonsIn other words:A = removes ability of AA self-destruct of principleThe moment person thinks:"I can violate body autonomy for subjective reasons"He is merely justifying removal of own autonomy, and with it, removal of ability to violate autonomy.Because decisions have to be made, and those decisions require reasons. Should reason be subjective and decision as result self defeating, it is merely a self removal function.For example, if I were to say:I decide to remove autonomy for subjective reasons = Autonomy can be decided to be removed for subjective reasons = My own autonomy can be decided to be removed for subjective reasons.Because any subjective reason I give, subjective reason is still subjective, and using it as reason merely logically enables same decision to be made about removal of my own autonomy.Truth nihilism doesn't solve this, because even if we were to accept that moral statements have no truth value, the decision to do or not do something, to accept or not accept something, still has to be made.If it is made for subjective reasons, subjective reasons can be used to deny it. Making logical decision impossible, and thus any decision person makes in that position is both self-defeating and not logical.Likewise, saying that morality lacks truth value merely makes it impossible to justify any violation of body autonomy even further.Because removing body autonomy due to morality which lacks truth value = removal of removal of body autonomy due to morality which lacks truth value.Suppose someone were to say:"Morality lacks truth value, but I will remove your autonomy for no reason."We can merely respond with:"Then we will remove removal of autonomy for no reason"Removing truth value doesn't actually solve contradiction because the only way to violate body autonomy is to take some form of action to violate it. And if that action can be taken for arbitrary reasons, or for statements which lack truth value, or for no reason, same can be applied to remove that action.Person must make decisions, and if decision is made for reason which ultimately defeats decision, that is logical self-removal of that decision.Suppose a person wants to decide:"I want to violate autonomy for subjective reasons"He is saying "autonomy is to be violated for subjective reasons"And then same decision logic ultimately says that his own autonomy is to be violated for subjective reasons, therefore removing his autonomy and ability to violate autonomy.In Boolean logic, if function removes itself, it cannot be true.And violation of autonomy is a self removing function.Because there is no way to decide to violate body autonomy without same logic of that decision applying to your own autonomy.There is no escaping that:Removal of autonomy = removal of ability to remove autonomySo any justification of first necessarily justifies second, and second is a removal of first.So if person accepts that removal of autonomy is okay, he accepts that removal of removal of autonomy is okay.There is no way to accept one principle without logically being forced to accept another, or not thinking logically at all.And people who don't think logically aren't escaping self-defeat.If autonomy can be removed for reasons which aren't logical, removal of that removal can likewise be made for reasons which aren't logical.So when person wants to decide:"I accept that violating autonomy is a decision I will make"The logic behind it merely says that removal of his own autonomy is a decision to be made.
You shouldn't hire communists because they believe work is exploitation. Therefore, don't exploit them. If they have a good job, then give their good job to ME (the capitalist who enjoys renting my body and selling my labor for money). Don't give it to the person who argues all work is slavery.
We shouldn't be calling American right-wingers conservatives anymore. They've crossed over into fascism at this point.Principles of conservatism that MAGA violates:Limited, small government (MAGA supports the Trump administration's overuse of executive powers and the military, welcoming expansion of the government into private life)Freedom of speech (MAGA supporters have welcomed Trump's condemnation and attacks against the speech of journalists, media companies, and public figures that have opposing viewpoints)Democratic elections (January 6th was an attempt to prevent the results of a verifiably democratic election from seating the next administration)The Constitution (Trump and his supporters have not only encroached upon the 1st amendment, but outwardly voiced that taking unconstitutional action is justified)Law, order, and decency (MAGA supporters tolerate or support January 6th (for ex., the Trump pardons), minimize right-wing violence, and ignore the crimes and likely crimes of Trump, such as suspected sex crimes--despite claiming Christian values as a foundational value to their cause)The violations of these conservative principles points toward fascist ideology, where government overreach, suppression of opposition, and anti-democratic values take form. No, we're not living under an early 1940s Nazi regime at this time, but I believe "conservatives" should no longer be able to brand that label, as they have beliefs more aligned with fascism.
Debates, Forum, Chat and now Database...What's next?How about Gossip.
FrameworkThe primary value in this debate should be the protection of human rights. The UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and “all states have ratified at least 1 of the 9 core human rights treaties.” This implies “obligations and duties under international law to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.” If a state or organization continually violates human rights, then what advantage is gained by protecting its existence, or by remaining neutral? Examples of corrupt states such as Hitler’s Germany and Mao’s China show that the state itself is a means to an end, while human rights should remain the ultimate priority that provide the “why” behind other instrumental goals.Human rights are inalienable, as well as a sworn duty the UN is bound to uphold; thus, they should be evaluated on a deontological basis. To protect human rights, the UN must signal a consistent commitment to preventing atrocities, protecting civilians, and preventing imminent human rights violations; it should not engage in Machiavellian tactics such as sacrificing some human rights now to appear “neutral” or gain political favor down the road, even for a supposed “greater good.” To the extent that the consequences are taken into account, we should focus on the immediate effects on human rights—that is, is the UN standing up for human rights consistently whenever it sees them violated? The intrinsic nature of human rights, as signaled by the UN, means that we cannot pick and choose when they apply on the basis of political convenience.PlanUnder my proposal, the UN Security Council would explicitly authorize peacekeepers to initiate offensive operations in response to imminent mass atrocities, genocide, or in cases where armed groups are preventing the delivery of critical humanitarian aid, per the “responsibility to protect,” a commitment adopted by a consensus of UN member states. Unlike “ad-hoc coalitions” that the UN currently relies on, these operations would remain under strict UN command, subject to the oversight of the UN Security Council, and forced to adhere to international humanitarian law.1. Reducing Civilian DeathsA study by Nsia-Pepra (2011) found that robust peacekeeping (i.e. a strong and forceful peacekeeping force) was associated with a significantly lower number of civilian deaths. While non-robust missions comprised 80% of UN peacekeeping missions, they were associated with as many as 98.7% of civilian deaths observed during peacekeeping missions, despite robust forces typically being sent to areas that are initially more violent. The study also found that “robust peacekeeping decreases civilian killings by about 31 percent per year.”According to an Oxford study on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping success is “more likely when large contingents are deployed under robust mandates,” which “signal credible commitment from the international community and empower peacekeepers to halt violence while guaranteeing the implementation of peace agreements.” When compared to offensive missions, traditional missions “have no impact on [peacebuilding and ending violence].” Only offensive operations can signal a credible commitment to ending conflict and protecting human rights.The UN Force Intervention Brigade was the first UN peacekeeping operation specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations, its main target being the M23 militia group. One analysis found that “after military losses to the UN and FARDC forces in August 2013, the M23 has returned to the negotiating table with significantly less leverage than when it posed a direct threat to Goma.” In this case, only UN military force against a rebel group could effectively force them to negotiate a peace. The analysis also found that traditional, non-offensive peacekeeping has “lost much of its appeal because inaction has become associated with indifference to human suffering.”An analysis of the United Nations mission in Mali highlighted the failures of purely defensive peacekeeping. Since peacekeepers failed to engage in offensive operations, “Regular ambushes of MINUSMA by extremist groups have led it to “bunkerize,” reducing its domination of the terrain.” During this mission, the UN would talk to locals and then leave, failing to protect them afterwards since their mission was purely defensive. Specifically, “civilians have been killed, abducted, tortured, or threatened by extremist groups after talking to the UN mission.” One UN officer stated that, “Attackers should know we can strike back. It is the heart of operating in an asymmetric environment.”2. Existing Reliance on Ad-Hoc Offensive ForcesAccording to an analysis by Maglia, Karlsrud, and Reykers (2025), because UN peacekeepers are generally limited to defensive operations, the UN “faces fierce criticism for its inability to initiate or provide a timely and adequate response to armed conflicts.” As a result, the UN now often relies on “ad hoc forms of cooperation” as a means of “swift and decisive collective action.” However, there are significant “accountability and legitimacy problems that arise when relying on [ad-hoc coalitions] in international conflict management, given their limited inclusivity and strategic planning procedures.” The UN “faces a ‘moral dilemma’ as it needs to delegate counterterrorism and enforcement tasks to third actors, such as AHCs, even though this may come with credibility costs.”In Bosnia, the UN’s UNPROFOR was heavily restricted due to its reliance on NATO for air support and “delays associated with the approval process.” Additionally, “the mission suffered from a ‘fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute these resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field.’” Due to the lack of offensive operations, the UN “was unable to implement the mandate, as ‘the safe areas were established by the Security Council without the consent of the parties and without the provision of any credible military deterrent.’” Instead, the UN relied on NATO and its “Operation Deliberate Force” to end the war. Still, “Serb forces on the ground continued to attack UN "safe areas" in Bosnia, and the UN peacekeepers were unable to fight back as the mandate did not give them authority to do so.” The defensive mandate given to peacekeepers failed to uphold the UN’s neutrality and instead weakened it due to the reliance on NATO. In fact, “NATO and UNPROFOR were increasingly difficult to separate by autumn 1995.” Due to the UN’s ineffectiveness, “up to 20,000 people, overwhelmingly from the Bosnian Muslim community, were killed in and around the safe areas.” Additionally, most UN members who died did so in or around the designated “safe areas.”3. Increased Weight Behind UN Human Rights DeclarationsAccording to a 2016 report from the University of Miami, the UN’s failure to take offensive measures “waters down any improvement that could eventually derive from the fundamentals set in its Preamble and the rights enshrined in the Declaration” and has “serious repercussions” in the atrocities and genocides that have occurred since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was first adopted. North Korea, for example, has ratified five human rights treaties, yet it severely restricts freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and makes frequent arbitrary arrests. And despite the UN urging China to address allegations of significant human rights violations, China continues to inflict genocide on its Uyghur population, including forced sterilizations and forced abortions. According to a report from Dalhousie Law Journal, the international community currently faces a “credibility gap,” specifically, “the gap between the standards with governments proclaim, or accept, or at least pay lip-service to, and the reality of their practice in enforcing or suppressing these rights.” Even a totalitarian government is “sensitive about its public image [and public opinion],” yet “this opinion is likely to be much more effective if it is weighty enough to operate through the governments of other countries.” Enforcement of human rights declarations through offensive operations does not just stop the existing violations, it is also the only way to grant credibility and weight to these declarations in the first place.When it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN promised “never again” to allow the kind of genocide observed in WWII. Just 46 years later, in 1994, the commander of the UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda identified the need for an offensive operation (raiding arms caches) in order to prevent an “anti-Tutsi extermination plot.” His request for authorization to conduct preemptive raids on militia arms caches was denied by the UN leadership, leaving the peacekeepers unable to stop the Rwandan genocide. The UN’s credibility suffered greatly due to its pattern of failing to stop abuses, and between 2003 and 2005, the nearby government of Sudan, seeing no deterrent, carried out mass atrocities against the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit communities in Darfur. According to the UN Brahimi Report, “no failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.” Additionally, rules of engagement “should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.” The proposed Brahimi-style robust enforcement is functionally equivalent to offensive operations, as peacekeepers ought to be authorized to defend “other mission components and the mission’s mandate,” not simply themselves, which is necessary to protect civilians from atrocities, lend weight to UN human rights stances, and deter further human rights abuses in the future.
Framework: Ethical Intuitionism Regarding Prima Facie RightsMost general theories or theoretical approaches in political philosophy—liberal egalitarianism, contractarianism, utilitarianism, and so on—are too controversial to form a secure basis for reasoning. It is not known which, if any, of those theories are correct. Instead, I aim to rest conclusions on widely-shared ethical intuitions about relatively specific cases. The method is to describe a case in which nearly everyone will share a particular, clear intuitive evaluation of some action, and then to draw a parallel from the case described to some controversial case of interest. This issue should therefore be judged on the basis of a person's prima facie, negative right, not to be subjected to seriously harmful coercion.SyllogismP1: If an action is seriously harmful and coercive without relevant extenuating circumstances, then it is a wrongful rights-violation.P2: Immigration restrictions are seriously harmful and coercive without relevant extenuating circumstances.C1: Therefore, immigration restrictions are a wrongful rights-violation.Defending P1: Harmful Coercion Without Extenuating Circumstances is a Rights-ViolationConsider the following scenario. Marvin is in desperate need of food. Perhaps someone has stolen his food, or perhaps a natural disaster destroyed his crops; whatever the reason, Marvin is in danger of starvation. Fortunately, he has a plan to remedy the problem: he will walk to the local marketplace, where he will buy bread. Assume that in the absence of outside interference, this plan would succeed: the marketplace is open, and there are people there who are willing to trade food to Marvin in exchange for something he has.Another individual, Sam, is aware of all this and is watching Marvin. For some reason, Sam decides to detain Marvin on his way to the marketplace, forcibly preventing him from reaching it. As a result, Marvin returns home empty-handed, where he dies of starvation.Sam’s behavior in this scenario was both extremely harmful to Marvin and a severe violation of Marvin’s rights. When an action is seriously harmful and coercive, it tends for that reason to be a rights-violation, other things being equal—that is, it is a prima facie rights violation. Sam’s behavior in the scenario described violates Marvin’s rights, because it is an act of extremely harmful coercion, and there are no relevant extenuating circumstances.Defending P2: Immigration Restrictions are Harmful Coercion Lacking Extenuating CircumstancesA. The Presence of Harmful CoercionHow does all this relate to U.S. immigration policy? The role of Marvin is played by those potential immigrants who seek escape from oppression or economic hardship. The marketplace is the United States: were they allowed in, most immigrants would succeed in meeting their needs (to a greater extent, at least, than they will if they are not allowed in).The role of Sam is played by the government of the United States, which has adopted severe restrictions on entry. These restrictions are imposed by coercion: armed guards are hired to patrol the borders, physically barring unauthorized entry, and armed officers of the state forcibly detain and expel immigrants who are found residing in the country illegally. As in the case of Sam’s detention of Marvin, the U.S. government’s exclusion of undocumented immigrants is also very harmful to most of those excluded: many suffer from oppression or poverty that could and would be remedied, if only they were able to enter the country of their choice.In view of this, the actions of the U.S. government, prima facie, constitute serious violations of the rights of potential immigrants—specifically, the government violates their prima facie right not to be harmfully coerced. To prove there are no relevant extenuating circumstances, we must evaluate the proposed justifications for restriction.B. Refuting Extenuating Circumstances: Employment and Economic DisadvantageDoes the following constitute a valid justification for harmful coercion: that the coercive action is necessary to prevent someone else from suffering slight to moderate economic disadvantage through marketplace competition? It seems to me that it does not.The mere fact that Bob is competing with me for a job that I desire, or that Bob is willing to accept a lower salary than I could obtain if I did not have to compete with him, does not invalidate or suspend Bob’s right not to be subjected to harmful coercion. Nor does my interest in having less economic competition outweigh Bob’s right not to be coercively harmed. The prospect of a modest lowering of American wages and narrowing of employment opportunities is taken to either suspend or outweigh the rights of needy foreigners. The implausibility of this principle is shown by the examples.C. Refuting Extenuating Circumstances: The State’s Fiscal Duty to its CitizensThe government’s duty to give special consideration to its own citizens’ interests cannot be taken to imply that the government is entitled to coercively impose grave harms on non-citizens for the sake of securing small economic benefits for citizens.Furthermore, the state has at least one available strategy, apart from immigration restriction, for protecting its financial interests. This is to make a grant of legal residency or citizenship to potential immigrants contingent on the immigrants’ agreement to waive their right to receive certain social services. Even if the Priority View is generally correct, a plausible account of why these applications of the Priority View are not valid is that the Priority View must be understood as operating under an implicit constraint: the state should promote the interests of its poorest citizens, but without violating the rights of others. The fact that a particular action would promote the interests of the poorest Americans does not make what would otherwise be a violation of the rights of foreigners cease to be such.D. Refuting Extenuating Circumstances: Cultural PreservationCan one be justified in harmfully coercing others, solely because doing so is necessary to prevent those others from altering the culture of one’s society? Suppose that a number of your neighbors have been converting to Buddhism or selling their homes to Buddhists. Because of this, your neighborhood is in danger of being changed from a Christian to a Buddhist community.Are you ethically entitled to use force to stop your neighborhood from becoming Buddhist? All of these actions seem unacceptable. Hardly anyone would accept the suggestion that your interest in preserving a Christian neighborhood either negates or outweighs your neighbors’ rights not to be harmfully coerced by you. The protection of one’s interest in cultural preservation is not a sufficient justification for harmful coercion against others.E. Refuting Extenuating Circumstances: The Club AnalogyIn the case of states, everyone is compelled to be a citizen of at least one—no one has the option of simply not joining any country. In addition, these states provide extremely important services, but some states are much better than others, such that individuals who belong to the worse states are likely to suffer severe and lifelong deprivation or oppression. Finally, exclusion from a country generally also entails exclusion from any of a vast array of interactions with the citizens of a given country. None of these things are typically true of private clubs.If the private club analogy succeeds in showing that foreign individuals have no right to immigrate to the United States and that states have the right to control their membership, then similar arguments can also be used to establish that individuals have hardly any rights at all. The state does not have a right to require citizens to cut off their arms, or to prohibit women from voting, or to prohibit the expression of political opinions. The fact that states do not have the same freedom in setting citizenship conditions that private clubs have in setting membership conditions undermines the argument for the claim that the state has a right to restrict immigration.F. Refuting Extenuating Circumstances: Societal CollapseThe one concern that plausibly would, if well-founded, serve to justify immigration restriction is the worry that enormous numbers of immigrants would cause a virtual collapse of American society. No one knows what the full effects of a policy of open borders would be, since it has been a very long time since U.S. borders have been open. Nevertheless, if the worry is valid, it would justify imposing some limits on the rate of immigration, albeit much higher limits than those currently in place. Advocates of restriction have failed to satisfy the burden of justification created by the harmful, coercive nature of their favored policy, and a far more liberal immigration policy is demanded by respect for individual rights.ConclusionIndividuals have a prima facie right to immigrate (that is, a right not to be prevented from immigrating). This is because individuals have a prima facie right to be free from harmful coercion, and immigration restrictions are harmful and coercive. The prima facie right to immigrate is not overridden because of immigrants’ effects on the labor market, the fiscal burden of providing social services to immigrants, the state’s special obligations to its citizens, nor the threat immigrants pose to the nation’s culture. Therefore, immigration restrictions are wrongful rights-violations.
Framework:This issue should be judged on the basis of whether or not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. To resolve this, a necessary condition of resolving the abortion controversy is a more theoretical account of the wrongness of killing. After all, if we merely believe, but do not understand, why killing adult human beings such as ourselves is wrong, how could we conceivably show that abortion is either immoral or permissible?Syllogism:Premise 1: If an action deprives an individual of a future of value like ours, it is prima facie seriously wrong.Premise 2: Abortion deprives a standard fetus of a future of value like ours.Conclusion 1: Therefore, abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong.Defending Premise 1: The Wrongness of KillingWhat primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victim's friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of one's life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The loss of one's life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future. Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts one of the greatest possible losses on the victim.The effect of the loss of my biological life is the loss to me of all those activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments which would otherwise have constituted my future personal life. These are either valuable for their own sakes or are means to something else that is valuable for its own sake. When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have been part of my future personal life, but also what I would come to value. Inflicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes killing me wrong. This being the case, it would seem that what makes killing any adult human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his or her future.The claim that what makes killing wrong is the loss of the victim's future explains why we regard killing as one of the worst of crimes, because it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other crime. Furthermore, the account of the wrongness of killing defended here does straightforwardly entail that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill children and infants, for we do presume that they have futures of value. The claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future accounts for the wrongness of killing young children and infants directly; it makes the wrongness of such acts as obvious as we actually think it is.Defending Premise 2: The Fetus's FutureThe claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future has obvious consequences for the ethics of abortion. The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical with the futures of young children. Since the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong.This argument does not rely on the invalid inference that, since it is wrong to kill persons, it is wrong to kill potential persons also. The category that is morally central to this analysis is the category of having a valuable future like ours; it is not the category of personhood. The argument to the conclusion that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong proceeds independently of the notion of person or potential person or any equivalent.Since the loss of the future to a standard fetus, if killed, is at least as great a loss as the loss of the future to a standard adult human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be justified only by the most compelling reasons. This argument should be taken as showing that abortion is presumptively very seriously wrong, where the presumption is very strong as strong as the presumption that killing another adult human being is wrong.Evaluating Alternative AccountsOne way to overturn the value of a future-like-ours argument would be to find some account of the wrongness of killing which is at least as intelligible and which has different implications for the ethics of abortion.One rival account is based upon the obvious fact that people strongly desire to continue to live. This suggests that what makes killing us so wrong is that it interferes with the fulfillment of a strong and fundamental desire. The problem with the desire account is that we do regard it as seriously wrong to kill persons who have little desire to live or who have no desire to live or, indeed, have a desire not to live. We believe it is seriously wrong to kill the unconscious, the sleeping, those who are tired of life, and those who are suicidal. We desire life, because we value the goods of this life. The goodness of life is not secondary to our desire for it.Another rival account says what makes killing wrong is the discontinuation of the experience of living. If it is the continuation of one's activities, experiences, and projects, the loss of which makes killing wrong, then it is not wrong to kill fetuses for that reason, for fetuses do not have experiences, activities, and projects to be continued. However, the discontinuation account will not be adequate at all, if it does not refer to the value of the experience that may be discontinued. If the patient's future is a future of value, we want our account to make it wrong to kill the patient. Obviously, then, it is the value of that patient's future which is doing the work in rendering the morality of killing the patient intelligible.Addressing the Victimizability ObjectionA strategy for avoiding these anti-abortion consequences involves arguing that fetuses lack a property that is essential for the value-of-a-future argument to apply to them. One move is based upon the claim that a necessary condition of one's future being valuable is that one values it. Given this one might argue that, since fetuses cannot value their futures, their futures are not valuable to them.This move fails. My future can be valuable to me even if I do not value it. This is the case when a young person attempts suicide, but is rescued and goes on to significant human achievements. Such young people's futures are ultimately valuable to them. A fetus's future can be valuable to it in the same way.Another attempt to reject the anti-abortion position argues that an embryo cannot be a victim, because it lacks sentience, and mere metabolism is not enough to ground victimizability. The problem is that both plants and the permanently unconscious clearly lack what I have called a future life like ours. The real reason we believe plants and the permanently unconscious cannot be victims is that killing them cannot deprive them of a future life like ours; the real reason is not their absence of present mentation. Of course, embryos can be victims: when their lives are deliberately terminated, they are deprived of their futures of value, their prospects. This makes them victims, for it directly wrongs them.Addressing the Contraception ObjectionIf the ethic of killing adopted here entails that contraception is also seriously immoral, then there would appear to be a difficulty with the analysis. But this analysis does not entail that contraception is wrong. The ethics of killing in this essay would entail that contraception is wrong only if something were denied a human future of value by contraception. Nothing at all is denied such a future by contraception, however.Candidates for a subject of harm by contraception fall into four categories: some sperm or other, some ovum or other, a sperm and an ovum separately, and a sperm and an ovum together. Assigning the harm to some sperm is utterly arbitrary, for no reason can be given for making a sperm the subject of harm rather than an ovum. Assigning the harm to some ovum is utterly arbitrary, for no reason can be given for making an ovum the subject of harm rather than a sperm. Insisting that contraception deprives both the sperm and the ovum separately means too many futures are lost. Contraception was supposed to be wrong, because it deprived us of one future of value, not two. Holding that contraception deprives the combination of sperm and ovum of a valuable future fails because at the time of contraception, there is no actual combination at all. Accordingly, the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future-like-ours argument simply because there is no nonarbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception.
My caseI will affirm my argument with the following syllogism:P1: An unborn child is a person from the point of conceptionP2: If an unborn child is a person, abortion is morally impermissible in the majority of casesC1: Therefore, abortion is morally impermissibleP1: An unborn child is a person from the point of conceptionDetermining the best Standard for Moral ConsiderationPer Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference, we should generally assume that the most likely model is the simplest one that accounts for our empirical observations. In the case of morality, the closest thing we have to empirical observations are foundational moral assumptions, or strong, widely-shared moral intuitions. We should accept the simplest definition or standard that accounts for our strong, widely-shared moral intuitions.“Ability to be Harmed” as a Standard for Moral ConsiderationWhen an entity is considered to be a person, there are certain rights that seem straightforward to grant that entity. For example, if a person has an internal biological process that would grant them utility down the road, disrupting that process (such as by poisoning them and stunting their growth) is a violation of their rights. Furthermore, if a dependent, such as a child, is suffering from a deficiency that is harming/disrupting an internal biological process (such as from lack of oxygen, a hormone deficiency, or starvation, which can cause direct adverse effects on the body), then their parents have a responsibility to mitigate this harm or seek treatment for it, given they have the capability to do so. Note that a child has the right to the continued internal process even if the process must be aided by nutrients or some amount of external support. However, it is not an automatic moral obligation to help someone generate a new internal process, even if they strongly desire it. I have no obligation to help someone create an immortality potion, for example, or to perform an operation that would enable someone to fly, even if those things were somehow feasible. These differences are essentially between a process that is in progress and must be aided vs. a process that has not begun at all.Since these moral intuitions seem pretty foundational, we should be seeking the simplest set of standards for moral consideration that incorporate them and other foundational intuitions. The model I propose is that we maintain the criterion of “internal biological process that would grant an entity utility down the road” as the only criterion for moral consideration. Essentially, if an entity possesses said internal process at all, they are a person and warrant moral consideration in proportion to the utility they stand to lose. This model is inherently simpler than other models for personhood, because in order to maintain the foundational moral intuitions described above, these other standards would have this foundational standard for moral consideration, and then an additional standard or standards for an entity to clear the bar of “personhood.” But if this criterion is sufficient to establish personhood, we have a simpler, more elegant model. To prove this model infeasible, an opponent would need to show that granting moral consideration from the point of conception violates some additional, almost universally shared moral intuition.Abortion vs. ContraceptionI bring this up to distinguish between abortion and contraception. An unborn child will keep growing and develop the capacity for consciousness unless directly harmed (if their bodily functions are impeded through starvation or losing oxygen or hormonal deficiency). The zygote is already growing and will become a newborn unless this process of growth is impeded, much like a newborn is in the process of growing into later stages of development. Hence, an unborn child meets this standard for personhood, while a gamete does not.But sperm will not develop into a person unless combined with an egg (if bodily functions are added). Growth into a later stage of human development requires it to become an entirely new organism with entirely new bodily functions. Conception is categorically different from pregnancy in that an entire gamete is being added to merge with, rather than nutrients which prevent nutritional deficiency, or direct harm, in an existing organism. Again, this is not a comprehensive description of pregnancy, but this should establish that abortion causes direct harm that contraception does not cause.Further Support from Mathematical LimitThe burden of a disease is often measured in quality-adjusted life years. In simplified terms, this means that generally doctors are trying to maximize years of life saved rather than the number of lives saved. If we are distributing scarce resources and a treatment would save Patient A twenty years of additional life, all things being equal, then their access to the treatment is more pressing than for Patient B, for whom it would only save one day of additional life.This means that if we select a life expectancy of, say, 70 years, the amount of harm from the death of a patient would be relevant to their age and how long they have left to live. The death of a 50 year old expected to live to 70 otherwise would represent twice as much harm as the death of a 60 year old expected to live to 70 otherwise. (Per rational decision theory, a half chance of losing 20 years of life is equivalent to losing 10 years of life.) We might skew things a bit to account for quality of life, but in general terms, the point stands.For entities with a similar life expectancy, all things being equal, this trend is basically linear, with moral consideration , increasing as past sentience decreases and future expected lifespan increases. A one-year old with 69 years remaining would have the most to lose and warrant more moral consideration than someone with one day left to live. As the age of the entity approaches zero, the expected life years approach 70, representing a significant, high amount of moral consideration.Presuming we are seeking the simplest standard for personhood that matches these observations, a model that grants an unborn child significant moral consideration is simpler and more elegant than one granting it no moral consideration. Granting the unborn entity no moral consideration would seem to imply that the linear trend breaks and somehow drops to zero when past sentience hits zero, but this seems rather arbitrary. As age decreases, past sentience has been continually decreasing, yet moral consideration has been going up. If we grant a five year old more moral consideration than someone expected to die tomorrow, but no moral consideration to a fetus, then this is a bit like me having $1 and saying “I’m better than the guy with $0 because I have $1. But I’m just as good as the guy with $10,000, because after one cent, money doesn’t matter.” Once we’ve attributed moral consideration to a continuous variable, it doesn’t make sense to set an arbitrary cutoff, particularly one that goes in the reverse direction of the trend. It only makes sense to have a hard cutoff with a non-continuous variable, such as “ability to be harmed” as outlined earlier (i.e. a zygote has an internal bodily process leading to sentience while a gamete has no such internal process). Even if we were granting equal moral consideration to the five year old and someone expected to die the next day, a hard cutoff based on lack of past sentience would still be arbitrary, as it has been continually decreasing with age yet not causing a reduction in moral consideration.P2: If an unborn child is a person, abortion is morally impermissible in the majority of casesDirect harms vs. Indirect harmsIt is sometimes argued that abortion is simply “letting someone die” in early stages of pregnancy when the unborn child depends on the mother. However, refusal of bodily support can still equate to direct killing in some circumstances. To understand why, consider the following scenario:A woman carries a child deep into a forest on a camping trip. For whatever reason, she leaves the child there, where it is eaten by wild beasts. Clearly, this is immoral.I argue that abortion is morally comparable to this. Despite the fact that carrying the child into the forest puts the child in a state of physical dependency, carrying the child into the forest alone is not a direct harm. Parents bring their children to all sorts of places, but harm does not occur until the child is abandoned. This isn’t just “failing to save” or even “failing to save after accidentally causing harm,” but directly harming via abandonment. Similarly, when a woman aborts a child she conceived, removing bodily support is a direct harm to the child.Modus PonensP1: Removing bodily support after making someone dependent on oneself is a direct harm.P2: Abortion is removing bodily support after making someone dependent on oneself.C1: Abortion is a direct harmThe forest analogy establishes P1, and P2 is true under usual circumstances, as the vast majority of abortions arise from consensual sex. P1 follows even if the pregnancy is not the intended consequence of sex—the woman from our earlier analogy might have gotten lost in the forest by accident, yet bringing the child there is still a result of her actions. Hence, abandoning the child would still be a direct killing.Insufficient JustificationsHence, the question that matters is whether a justification exists in the case of abortion for directly killing one’s child. For the ends to justify the means, the good achieved from an action would have to at least outweigh the bad. But being killed as a child prevents one from experiencing their entire life, while pregnancy burdens someone for only nine months. Therefore, the former is a greater harm, and the ends cannot justify the means—it would be akin to killing ten people to save a single person.
IDENTITY"In 2020, 58 percent of Americans lived in the state that they were born in,"https://welcomelawfirm.com/faqs/where-are-americans-born-analysis-of-us-census-data-from-1850-2020/#:~:text=In%202020%2C%2058%20percent%20of,EnglishImagine how this has repeated since America's founding,Consider the American Civil War, which resulted in a great loss of power and identity of individual states for Americans.We do not brainwash and force our children to pledge allegiance to their state, but their country.States have frequently flipped on what party they have voted for in the short time America has been a country.It is not the 'state identity, but the 'American identity that matters for president, The 'one government official that every American together vote on.https://www.weforum.org/stories/2020/11/animated-map-u-s-presidential-voting-history-by-state-1976-2016'Every state is in degrees a purple state,Republicans and Democrats, living together in every state. Neighbors.The states are not enclaves of a single identity.It is the 'American Identity, not the State Identity.ORIGINAL PURPOSE and TECHNOLOGYElectors, individuals able to vote against what the popular vote tells them."As of the 2020 election, there have been a total of 165[3][4] instances of faithlessness"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faithless_electorThis I argue is a betrayal of the people's will.Something perhaps understandable in older times when so many people in the world tended to be illiterate.When news and information was more limited.But we are now in the digital age, people are literate and informed of events and history.Though even in 1776, perhaps the electoral college for president should not have been.https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/09/reading-writing-global-literacy-rate-changed/#:~:text=According%20to%20data%20compiled%20by,still%20barely%20exceeded%2020%20percent."In other U.S. elections, candidates are elected directly by popular vote. But the president and vice president are not elected directly by citizens. Instead, they are chosen through the Electoral College process."https://www.usa.gov/electoral-college#:~:text=In%20other%20U.S.%20elections%2C%20candidates,electors%20comes%20from%20the%20Constitution.Locals knew their local politicians better than they knew other state politicians or presidential candidates.In our modern age, every American have gluts of information of less local politicians.We do not need any in between elector deciding they know better than us as individuals.The popular will of the people is Not a Suggestion.THE WHOLEReturning to identity,If we are Americans more than Oregonians or Texans,Then our voices should hold by majority of our population.Not let politicians gerrymander the population divide and undercut their voices.The president should not have to focus on swing states and their local issues, but to the American people as a whole, and national issues.INEQUALITY"In 1812, slave states had 76 seats out of 143 instead of the 59 they would have had; in 1833, 98 seats out of 240, instead of 73. As a result, Southern states had additional influence on the presidency"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-fifths_Compromise#:~:text=A%20compromise%20was%20struck%20to,relative%20to%20the%20Northern%20states.Returning again to identity, the political populations of America are mixed and living side by side,A state can have 51% - 49% vote for president, yet out of that can come an unequal number of electoral votes for one party over the other.This does not accurately represent the will of the American people as a whole."Twenty states are overrepresented in the Electoral College by more than one vote, based on population. Texas is underrepresented by nine votes."https://usafacts.org/visualizations/electoral-college-states-representationThe Electoral College traps us into a divisive system of two party politics, giving Americans only a binary choice of no nuance."Southern favorite Wallace actually captured 46 electoral votes. Yet the electoral college still deflated his challenge. Although he had received nearly 14 percent of the popular vote, he got only eight percent of the electoral vote. Some 4.1 million Wallace votes cast outside the states he carried were “wasted.”https://www.aei.org/articles/third-party-candidates-face-a-high-hurdle-in-the-electoral-college
IntroductionI affirm the resolution: on balance, the benefits of genetically modified foods outweigh the harms. In this debate, I will prove that GMOs have been beneficial in three specific areas: health, economic, and ecological. Observation 1: Everything is a GMOThe first thing I want to point out is that everything we eat is genetically modified. This is simply how evolution works. For thousands of years, humans have been artificially breeding animals and plants to select the traits that they want to improve and pass down. Let's take a look at the banana, for example:If you enjoy fresh bananas, then you can thank genetic modification via artificial selection.Genetic modification works the same way except that we can make the traits we want much faster. Let's now look at the three areas which GMOs have improved our lives.Area 1: HealthA) GMOs are safeThe scientific evience overwhelmingly states that GMOs are safe to eat. More than 3,000 studies came to the same conclusion. GMOs do not negatively impact our health. In fact:B) GMOs improve healthGMOs can help improve the nutritional value of foods. "An example is GMO soybeans with healthier oils that can be used to replace oils that contain trans fats." - Source.Another example is golden rice which has signiifcantly increased the nutritional value. The PNAS writes: "The consumption of the genetically modified rice variety known as Golden Rice (GR) offers a potent and cost-effective strategy to combat VAD. But this innovation has been cast aside owing to fear or false accusations, resulting in numerous lives needlessly lost (1–3). With the recent exception of the Philippines, governments have not approved the cultivation of GR (5). We believe it should be broadly approved and given the opportunity to save and improve lives."Area 2: EconomicBecause GMOs can singiicantly increase the produciton yield this has translated to a signiciant economic benefit for farmers. PG Economics notes:"Crop biotechnology helps farmers earn more secure incomes due mainly to improved control of pests and weeds. The net farm level economic benefit in 2014 was $17.7 billion, equal to an average increase in income of $101/hectare. For the 19 years (1996-2014), the global farm income gain has been $150.3 billion;The total farm income benefit of $150.3 billion was divided almost equally between farmers in developing (51%) and developed countries (49%)..."This has lead to a noticable reduciton in suicide among farmers. The genetic literacy project demolishes the false claim that GMOs have increased suicide rates:We find that the suicide rate for male Indian farmers is slightly lower than the non-farmer rate. And Indian suicide rates as a whole are not notably high in a global context. The pattern of changes in suicide rates over the last 15 years is consistent with a beneficial effect of Bt cotton, albeit not in every cotton-growing state.The Conversation noted:the available data does not support the view that farmer suicides have increased following the introduction of Bt cotton. Taking all states together, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that the reverse is true: male farmer suicide rates have actually declined after 2005 having been increasing before then.Finally, Stuart J Smyth noted:Research examining the relationship between farm suicide and Bt cotton adoption revealed a plateauing of the suicide rate following the commercialization of Bt cotton (Gruère and Sengupta, 2011). Farmer suicides were trending upward from 15 000 per year, peaking in 2004, the year after Bt cotton was first commercialized in India. By 2007, the actual suicide rate was 25% below the extrapolated suicide rate. Cumulatively, the reduced rate of suicide associated with the adoption of Bt cotton represents the prevention of a minimum of 75 000 farmer suicides.Area 3: EcologicalThe final area I will look at is the ecological impact of GMOs. The FDA notes:Overall, studies have shown GMOs can have positive environmental impacts and can be important tools for addressing the causes and effects of climate change...When farmers grow Bt crop varieties, they can apply less insecticide while still preventing insect damage to their crops. This in turn allows for a higher diversity of beneficial insects. For example, insecticide application among U.S. corn and cotton farmers decreased by over 80% from 1996 to 2017The GMO answer project noted:Herbicide-tolerant crops help farmers control weeds more effectively, and in turn farmers plow fields less frequently if at all, to manage weeds. Because the soil isn’t turned, the carbon naturally stored in soil stays there (soil carbon sequestration). Because machinery isn't used to plow fields, less gasoline is needed, resulting in fewer CO2 emissions from engines.These benefits add up: In 2020 alone, the GM crop-related CO2 emission savings from reduced fuel use and additional soil carbon sequestration were equal to the removal of 15.6 million cars from the road3 - two million more than all the cars registered in California!4ConclusionGMOS have had significant benefits in multiple areas. The resolution is affirmed. Please vote PRO
This view is based on some doing some basic research on both Sander's and Warren's websites. They both have proposed systemic changes that will tackle economic inequality. Progressive taxation, a wealth tax, a higher minimum wage, etc. It's mostly about reversing the past few decades that reduced taxes on the wealthy and allowing wages to stagnate. I don't see anything radical there. Anything too radical or against the constitution would be challenged in the courts which are currently conservative. So I think all this worry about Sanders and Warren is not based on anything they've put forward. It's more of a knee-jerk reaction to change. Change that a lot of people in the working class would like to see and benefit the most from.
I want to start by saying I do not intend to be transphobic. I think it’s wonderful laws are finally acknowledging transgender persons as a protected class. Sports seems to be the exception—partially because it brings up issues of sex rather than gender.My granddaughter is a swimmer and was 14th in the state at the last high school championship. There is a transgender girl (born a boy and transitioned to become a girl) on the team who was ranked 5th among the girls at the same meet.When this transgender girl competed with the men the previous year in a near identical time (actually a couple seconds slower than the time she swam with the girls) she was not even ranked because the men were so much faster on average due to biological advantages of muscle mass, height, and whatever else.This person had been undergoing transitional pharmaceutical therapies for a few years now and had made the decision to switch from competing with the boys to the girls after some physical augmentations to her appearance she felt would make her differences less overt.Like most competitive high school athletes this girl plans to go to college for her sport, but is using what seems to me to be an unfair biological advantage to go from being a middle of the pack athlete to being one of the best in the state.I’m quite torn here because of course I think this girl should have every opportunity to play sports with the group she feels most comfortable and shouldn’t miss out on athletics just because she was born transgender, but I don’t feel it should be at the expense of all the girls who were born girls and do not have the physical advantages of the male biology.This takes things a step further than “some girls are born taller than others or with quicker reflexes than others,” because it’s a matter of different hormonal compositions that, even after suppression therapies, no biological female could ever hope to compete with.With it just having been signed into law that transgender women competing against biological women is standard now, I’m especially frustrated because no matter how hard a biological girl works or trains, they would never be able to compete and even one trans person switching to a girl’s team would remove a spot from a biological girl who simply cannot keep up with a biological male.What bathrooms people use or what clothes they wear are gender issues that are no one’s business and it’s great those barriers are broken down. This is a scientific discrepancy of the sexes, so seems to me it should be considered separately.I want to usher in this new era of inclusivity and think all kids should be able to enjoy athletics, though, so hoping someone can change my view and help my reconcile these two issues.
The main supposed justification for destruction of property would be that it helped the colonies. You could also argue that it was just inherently justified to do anything that taught Britain a lesson, but I'll stick to consequentialist ethics here, since the goal of a protest is typically to help whatever people the protestors are protesting for. The immediate effects of the Boston Tea Party were the Intolerable Acts: closing Boston Harbor, replacing Massachusetts' government, and the Quartering Act, among other things. All these immediate effects were bad for the colonies.However, those policies also led to the Revolutionary War. So was the protest was justified because it led indirectly to American independence? This gets into a political theory called "accelerationism" which basically argues that we should try to make things get bad faster so that people will protest and overthrow the oppressive system. But I have several issues with this approach. First, it would imply that the Intolerable Acts themselves were justified because they led to revolution. Basically, anyone involved in passing the acts and violating the colonists' rights was actually doing a good thing, because it led to the American Revolution. And at best, you will get lucky with this strategy, because it's easy to predict "this will lead to punitive measures" but hard to predict "this will lead to American independence." The colonies could have easily lost the war, and most colonists didn't even want to fight it until the Intolerable Acts were passed.So at best, the Boston Tea Party was a way of twisting the colonists' arms into fighting a war for independence (which would end up involving child soldiers), when most of the colonists had wanted to avoid war altogether. A good chunk of the colonists fighting for reforms condemned the Tea Party anyway, with Benjamin Franklin offering to pay for the tea that was destroyed. Many of the grievances with the British government might have been solved without war, and the Intolerable Acts themselves were certainly avoidable.Now you could say that the people behind the Tea Party weren't responsible for what Britain did, but the goal of a protest is to send a message and influence behavior, so I think protestors (particularly those destroying property) have at least some responsibility not to cause needless destruction.
I. Framework The Supreme Court occupies a unique position in American democracy. Its justices are unelected, serve for decades, and are largely insulated from direct political accountability. Thus, the Court's authority relies on institutional legitimacy—the public belief that the Court’s power deserves compliance, even when its rulings are unpopular (Bassok 13, Nick 25, Ulman 25).The most important issue of the debate is how to uphold that institutional legitimacy, since it is a prerequisite to the very purpose of the Court. When it is perceived as fair and governed by consistent rules, rather than partisan advantage, its decisions carry the force of law. Conversely, when that perception erodes, so does the rule of law itself (Nick 25, Ulman 25).Right now, the Court's legitimacy is in danger (Keith 22, Ulman 25). Favorable reviews of the Court are near a historic low. Worse, there are widespread partisan gaps between perceptions, with just 11% of Democratic voters approving compared to 75% of Republicans (Gallup 25). This is a uniquely pressing problem; for over 20 years prior, approval ratings have been more evenly split across parties (Pew 25). The increasing polarization of the court threatens its fundamental purpose; 86% of Americans, evenly split across both parties, believe that "justices should not bring personal politics into decisions" (Pew 25). The existing system is in a double bind. No matter which way the Court leans politically, it lacks legitimacy; meanwhile, neutrality is impossible under the current politicized system. Thus, change is needed.II. Plan and OverviewI will advocate for the most popular implementation of term limits, proposed by lawmakers as well as legal scholars (Bannon 23, Amacad 23).This proposal would limit each justice to a nonrenewable 18-year term. A president would appoint a justice every two years, using staggered appointments where only one justice is replaced at a time.Once a justice finishes their term, they would be given senior status and keep their salary and job security. Their responsibilities would include hearing cases in other courts, filling in for recused or absent colleagues, and serving in advisory roles. Meanwhile, current justices would continue to serve until retirement or passing (i.e. changes do not apply retroactively).The proposal has broad support from legal experts; the National Constitution Center notes that both conservative and progressive scholars drafted 18-year terms as part of an ideal constitution (Bannon 23), while the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court writes of "considerable, bipartisan support" (Weiss 21). A supermajority of the public supports it as well, with approval consistently around 70% (Bannon 23).Ultimately, term limits solve both perceptual and practical problems of legitimacy by displaying a commitment to fairness and then following it. They pull the Court back from the brink of illegitimacy in the present, and keep the Court's integrity intact in the future.III. AdvantagesC1. Public TrustBy its very nature, the Supreme Court is not a purely democratic institution. Under the principle of judicial independence, justices stay on the court regardless of their perceived fairness or competence. As such, to even have legitimacy in the first place, the Court relies on indirect democratic processes, with justices being appointed by elected officials.However, unlike true indirect democracy, this process is random. The number of appointments per president varies wildly, with some presidents appointing up to four and others appointing none (SCOTUS 25). This arbitrarily grants certain presidents disproportionate power to influence the legal landscape, which hams the connection between the Court and the will of the people. Statistics play this out; although Republicans have won just four of the last nine presidential terms, they have appointed six of the current nine justices (Bannon 23).Furthermore, the disparate timeframe between regular elections and Court appointments undermines legitimacy. A single four-year term can lead to the appointment of justices who serve for over thirty years. Government institutions ought to serve the need of the current populace, rather than the that of the distant past, yet the Court fails to do this.Both of these mechanisms lead to a Court increasingly out of touch with the people. Pursuing an idealized vision of an insulated court risks losing sight of the purpose of judicial independence: to ensure the Court truly serves the public good through enforcing the rule of law.To this end, term limits restore public trust through ensuring a constant number of appointments per president, as well as regular turnover in line with the views of the citizen populace.C2. Reduced PolarizationTerm limits mitigate the Court's increasing politicization, both in appointment and in practice.The current appointment system is unambiguously flawed. Nominees are often confirmed among party lines, with little consideration for actual competence. Indeed, in 2016, the Republican Senate majority refused to give Merrick Garland a hearing despite his longstanding experience (Elving 18). Similar examples are widespread, particularly in recent times (Bannon 23).The Court itself has it even worse. As mentioned earlier, partisan gaps in approval of the Court have never been so wide, a statistic attributable to a slew of recent politically charged rulings. This isn't just perceptual; from 2010 onwards, the percentage of polarized rulings (i.e. with justices split across party lines) has increased from close to 0% to 21%, while the percentage of unanimous rulings has fallen from a peak of 63% to just 29% (Bronner 22).Polarization creates a vicious cycle. The Court’s “shadow docket” allows it to reverse lower courts’ decisions without ever hearing arguments or rendering an explanation. Such decisions fail to clarify the law and instead reinforce perceptions of partisanship (Keith 22). As the Court’s legitimacy erodes, there becomes an increasing incentive to use the shadow docket to bypass public accountability, further harming legitimacy (Voehl 23).Fortunately, term limits solve this. A statistical analysis of term limit proposals found that they would reduce periods of partisan imbalance by over 50% through removing strategic retirement incentives (Schoenherr 21). Furthermore, a more ideologically balanced court is less likely to use the shadow docket, which is typically associated with partisan purposes.C3. Countering DysfunctionThe current system creates perverse incentives which weaken the legitimacy of the court in two ways. First, strategic retirements. Under an ad hoc appointment system, justices are replaced as soon as they retire. That encourages justices to wait until a president of the same ideology is in office before retiring. This is empirically proven; the last time a justice retired under a president of the opposite ideology was over 30 years ago (Bannon 23). In addition, such procedures allow "horse trading" practices, where justices directly influence the choice of their successor (Bannon 23). When justices are able to individually shape the values of the Court long after retirement, that defeats the purpose of turnover in the first place—to allow the Court to shift with changing public values (Calabresi 06).Second, strategic appointments. Because justices are not term-limited, a younger justice serves for longer, incentivizing presidents to appointing them. Indeed, the average age of justices at appointment has been steadily decreasing (Pew 17). This is problematic because it encourages presidents to appoint less experienced judges solely for fitting a certain ideological viewpoint (Schwarz 19).These mechanisms lead to direct legitimacy risks by exacerbating political polarization. However, more insidiously, they affect public perception as well; indeed, strategic retirements and appointments reinforce the idea that "justices are simply extensions of the political parties that appointed them" (Bannon 23). Term limits solve both of these issues for obvious reasons. Fixed term limits and fixed appointment times prevent presidents of either party from gaming the system, ensuring that justices are elected based on their ability to represent the people, as well as their merit as judges.C4. Effective Decision-MakingAs outlined earlier, part of the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court comes from its ties to the democratic process. The other part comes from the belief that its members have the competence and knowledge to handle the most contested legal cases in the country (Ulman 25). Lengthy terms harm this legitimacy in two ways.First, age. As mentioned earlier, justices have strategic incentives to avoid retirement until a favorable president is in office. This leads to justices staying far past their intellectual prime. In the 20th century alone, at least 11 justices suffered a "serious mental decline" during their final service years (Scott 06). Not only does this harm the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, it also leads to further polarization by justices who vote for ideological reasons rather than weighing cases on their own merits. Second, turnover. Organizations perform better with fresh perspectives, particularly in smaller ones where each individual has enormous power. Entrenched leadership leads to significantly worse decisions (Bannon 23). Indeed, current justices agree, with Chief Justice Roberts opining that judges "lose all touch with reality through decades of ivory tower existence" (Bannon 23).Term limits solve these problems; justices are no longer pressured to stay for longer than they should, while new appointments ensure frequent turnover. Together, these combine to create a competent court that hands down respected decisions.Thus, I proudly affirm.