1. People get treated always according to their actions
2. People dont always get treated according to their actions
I defend 2, while my opponent defends 1. In other words, he must argue that treatment each person receives is a consequence of person's own willing actions.
Person receives treatment before any action is made by person, such as creation, getting their own body which is chosen by God and not them and cannot be a consequence of any willing actions as no willing actions were made yet.
Another obvious problem is many diseases and disorders given to children randomly. Child who gets cancer at age 2 obviously did nothing to deserve that.
However, my opponent holds position that everything which happens to the person is a consequence of own actions. In other words, injustice cannot exist. My opponent argues that every rape victim, every holocaust victim, every murder victim, every abuse victim, every person who suffers from disease or illness or a disorder essentially “deserved it by own willing actions”.
But in many cases, this is logically impossible. For example, in cases where person gets killed or dies without ever making any willing actions. Then of course, the place of creation is different for every person, and that too is different treatment as no willing actions were made before creation. Person also gets different parents, which cannot logically be result of willing action as here too, none existed.
But crucial problem for my opponent's position is the impossibility of being unjust in case his position is assumed true. Because all people get treated in a just way, then logically it is not possible for any person to actually not be just towards others. This creates a contradiction because in such world person must be just yet person also gets punished for being just. The one person's actions towards another always must be consistent consequence of another's willing action, yet also must be cause for one person's own punishment. So person cannot be not just, so it is logically not possible to justify why any people get treated badly.
Also, different levels of knowledge in people cannot be consequence of their willing actions, as no willing actions existed before gaining knowledge.
* **Possible worlds scenario**: Instead of a single world, consider multiple worlds—past or future incarnations, parallel universes, past or future lives (as in reincarnation or karma theories)—where treatment is purportedly aligned with one’s free actions.
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### 2. Opposite claim (¬A): People *are* treated according to their actions in other worlds
* **By-definition contradiction**: These systems (karma, reincarnation) depend on an assumed transfer of identity or karmic substance across lives. Yet they simultaneously deny individuals memory and awareness of past actions. So if identity is not continuous, justice cannot be tied to past only actions. If identity is continuous, memory must persist—contradiction internal to the definition.
* **Assumption of proportionality**: Critics (e.g., on moral luck and karmic proportionality) show that many punishments are grotesquely disproportionate to claimed deeds (e.g. Auschwitz survivors implication in past sin
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### 2. **No knowledge of future action can justify current punishment**
Even if some omniscient being knows what someone *will* freely do, that doesn’t justify punishment **before** the action occurs.
Why?
* Because **moral agency depends on freedom**: until the moment of action, the person **could choose otherwise**.
* To punish them **before** they act assumes **determinism**, which contradicts the idea of **willing action**.
* So:
* If actions are determined, there's no moral freedom, and justice becomes impossible.
* If actions are free, the person **hasn’t yet** committed the deed, so punishment now is **not earned**.
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### 1. Foreknowledge ≠ Causation
Let’s begin with identity logic and time ordering:
* Knowing X will happen is not the same as X having **already happened**.
* Even if God *knows infallibly* that person P will do wrong in 20 years, that wrong **does not yet exist in reality**.
* Therefore, P has not *yet* taken a willing action.
* Therefore, punishing them *now* is not a response to a willing action.
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### 2. Foreknowledge and Free Will: Mutually Exclusive
Now let’s consider this logical structure:
Let’s assume:
* God knows (infallibly) that person P will murder someone in 2045.
* Person P has free will.
We now ask:
**Can P choose *not* to murder someone in 2045?**
If yes → God’s knowledge was wrong.
If no → Then P had no free will in that case.
> So either:
>
> * God's foreknowledge is fallible, or
> * Free will is an illusion.
**Therefore**: You cannot logically hold both of these as absolutely true:
1. God *infallibly* knows all future free actions,
2. People *freely* choose their actions.
This is the classic **foreknowledge paradox**—and it’s **unsolvable** without sacrificing either divine omniscience or human free will.
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## Logical Form
* **A** = Person is treated based on their willing actions (justice)
* **B** = Person is treated based on a willing action they will do in the future
* **C** = God infallibly knows that future action
* **D** = Person still has free will
Assume all of B, C, D are true.
Then:
* If C and D, then the future action is **not causally fixed** yet.
* Therefore, under D, B violates A—because the action hasn’t happened yet.
* If you want B to be compatible with A, you must deny D (no free will).
* If you want to preserve D (free will), then B cannot lead to A (justice).
**Therefore, A and B are incompatible.*
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## Argument A: Past-world-based treatment violates justice
### 1. Identity is discontinuous across worlds
* If person A now is not consciously, biologically, or psychologically continuous with person A in another world, then they are **not the same person** in the only sense that matters for moral responsibility.
* If there’s no memory, no knowledge, and no recognition of the past self, there’s **no continuity of moral agency**.
> **Moral principle**: One cannot be justly held accountable for another agent’s actions.
So: if the person now **cannot identify with the agent who acted**, then **justice cannot apply**.
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### 3. Causal disconnection
* If a willing action in another world causes treatment now, but there is no causal bridge (memory, awareness, choice), then:
* The present person did not make a cause occur that brought about the effect.
* The system has **detached effect from moral cause**.
So this fails the **definition**: treatment is not based on *this person’s* known, chosen action.
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## Logical Breakdown
Let:
* A = Treatment is just
* B = Treatment is for a willing action done in a past world
* C = The person now is the same person who acted
* D = The person now remembers or knows about the act
Then:
* A requires B ∧ C ∧ D.
* But in reincarnation/karma/etc., C and D usually fail.
* Therefore, A is false.
**Conclusion**: Treatment is not just.
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If the person now **cannot remember** their past act,
* They do not see themselves as the actor who sinned.
* So they are not, **in experience or self-recognition**, the same person.
Therefore, the person now is:
* **Not morally accountable** for that act,
* And cannot be **justly punished** for it.
> Punishment requires the *same moral agent* to be present at both ends of the action-consequence chain. Memory is essential to that continuity.
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## Logical Breakdown
Let:
* **A** = A person is justly punished
* **B** = The person willingly did something wrong in the past
* **C** = The person now is the same moral agent
* **D** = The person is aware of their guilt
Then:
* Justice requires: **A ⇨ B ∧ C ∧ D**
* If **D** is removed (they forget), then **A** fails
* If **C** fails (no memory, no identification), then **A** fails
Thus, **self-concealing punishment** makes **justice impossible**.
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## **IV. Argument from Spatiotemporal Location**
### Premise P3:
Every object in space-time exists at a **specific point** in that structure. If two persons are said to exist, they must occupy **different points** (else they are literally the same object).
* You cannot have two people in **the same point** of space-time. That would collapse them into being **one** person, not two.
> **Therefore:** Even if two worlds are nearly identical, if they contain distinct persons, **those persons must be located differently**, even if the difference is one Planck length or one femtosecond.
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## **II. Immediate Logical Conflict (Law of Identity)**
Let:
* A ≠ B (Person A and Person B are numerically distinct),
* W₁ ≠ W₂ (Worlds are distinct, even if structurally identical).
Now, suppose:
* Person B lies in W₂ → Person A in W₁ is punished.
* Or Person B prays in W₂ → Person A in W₁ is rewarded.
### This is a direct contradiction of the justice definition:
* Person A’s treatment is not due to **Person A’s willing action**, but to **Person B’s**.
* This is **definitionally unjust**.
So:
> **Law of identity**: A ≠ B
> **Justice**: Treatment must follow A's willing actions
> → Treatment of A because of B's actions is **categorically unjust**.
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## **IV. Reductio ad Absurdum**
Suppose this idea were just:
> "Person A can be rewarded or punished for Person B's actions in a parallel world."
Then we could construct the following absurd consequences:
### 1. **Punishment by Proxy:**
> Person A chooses not to murder anyone. But in another world, Person B (who is similar) commits murder. God punishes Person A.
This is unjust by definition. A did not will the action.
### 2. **Moral Lottery:**
> Person A does evil. But in another world, Person B (a "parallel" version) does good. A is rewarded for B’s actions.
Again, A is treated based on **another person’s will**, not their own.
→ **Justice collapses** under this logic.