Resolved: That the President of the United States should be elected by the direct vote of the people.

Topical Analysis:

Direct Election

Because the constitution specifies the electoral college as the method for selecting the president, switching to a direct election (i.e. the “popular vote”) would require a constitutional amendment with ratification by 38 of 50 states.

Proposed Counterplan

The description requires that I must defend “an electoral college in some form.” Hence, I propose the following counterplan: states implement proportional elector allocation, similarly to the split elector system Nebraska currently has, but proportional to population. Further, states should nullify the votes of faithless electors, as Colorado has done. Getting the majority of states to do this, or even all of them, is much more feasible than a constitutional amendment and less likely to lead to political backlash, since some states have already made reforms along these lines.

Framework:

In Baron de Montesquieu’s widely-lauded political treatise The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu argues that a government’s laws and structures must be designed with the society’s political structure and cultural context in mind. For example, a policy that works for a small, homogenous city-state may be counterproductive when applied to a large, heterogeneous republic.

For a country as culturally diverse as the United States, I propose a framework that takes this cultural context into account. The question that should underpin this debate is this: Does switching to a direct voting system risk undermining the spirit of the republic—that is, the principles and stability of the United States?

Accommodation

Montesquieu states that a just government must accommodate the diverse “general spirit, morals, and customs” of its people, so that people’s minds can be “prepared for the reception of the best laws” (Book XIX). True to Montesquieu’s point, governments imposed from above that are incompatible with the culture of the people are prone to collapse—consider the U.S. intervention in Iraq, when imposing a Western-style democracy on a society with deep-seated tribal divisions proved to be ineffectual.

Moderation

Montesquieu states that “political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments” (Book XI), and that tyranny is “sure to be felt whenever those who govern establish things shocking to the existing ideas of a nation” (Book XIX). Consider the National Prohibition Act, which prohibited alcoholic drinks in the United States. Because the act was so drastic and polarizing, it was poorly enforced and led to black markets run by criminal gangs, undermining the rule of law and the contract between the government and the governed.

Decentralized Power

Montesquieu argues that “power should be a check to power” and that “were [the judiciary power] joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control…were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression” (Book XI). If undue control is given to a single group or individual, this creates a great risk of corruption. Consider the South Korean Impeachment Crisis, in which a single executive declared martial law in South Korea in a bid for unchecked power, and the full strength of the legislative branch was required to repeal this declaration.

Burdens:

Because Pro’s plan requires radically altering the structure of our elections and the constitution itself, they hold the greater burden in this debate. I argue that Pro’s proposal must pass all of these tests—accommodation, moderation, and decentralized power—for us to consider it worthwhile. Think of these as three pillars supporting the republic, where the collapse of one undermines the entire structure. If a radical alteration to the constitution fails to accommodate the diverse factions in America, such a change fails the duty of government to serve the common good and cannot justify its existence. Similarly, if such a change disrupts moderation or decentralized power, it can lead to an inevitable vicious circle in which warring factions cling to increased power and undermine the common good.

1. Accommodation of Diverse Factions:

Over four-fifths of the US population resides in urban areas. Rural areas have often been written off by the media as irrelevant “fly-over country,” but they are granted greater representation by the electoral college than they would have under a popular vote system. Under a direct voting system, politicians could ignore the needs of rural, agricultural communities and prioritize urban interests, leading to policies that harm the very people who feed Americans.

Case Study: California

The state government of California uses a popular vote system, which means that interests from agricultural areas in the Central Valley are frequently ignored in favor of interests from the more populous city regions. For example, Proposition 1A, which allocated funds for the California High-Speed Rail Authority, passed with a slim majority. The rail line would have connected San Francisco to Los Angeles but failed to accommodate the Central Valley, leading to intense legal battles and the government used eminent domain to snatch land from homes, ranches, farms and businesses in the Central Valley. Today, the High-Speed Rail Project is widely seen as an inefficient, overexpensive failure.

2. Preferring Moderation to Drastic Political Measures:

Precedent of Electoral College

The electoral college has stood the test of time, scaling from 10 states in 1788 to 50 states today. That’s a 237 year timespan, 37 years longer than the average lifespan of democracies. This is a big sign that the current system is doing something right in keeping the republic stable and should not be thrown out. Radically altering the system now would be an extreme, immoderate measure.

Partisan Divide

Abolishing the electoral college is a strongly partisan issue, with significantly greater opposition from Republicans than from Democrats. Recent attempts to abolish the electoral college in 2016 and 2024 came entirely from Democrats, shortly after a Republican won the presidential election. As of late, Americans increasingly see the country as more divided than at any time since the Civil War. Switching to a popular vote system will inevitably be seen as one party “changing the rules” to win more elections.

3. Maintaining a Decentralized Delimitation of Power:

Unfeasibility of Decentralized Popular Vote System

A popular vote system would require a single national voting standard under a single organization. To see why, consider the Bush v. Gore election. When Florida was too close to call in the 2000 election, this led to an expensive, contentious recount. Under a popular vote system with no central voting standard, candidates would demand recounts in every state when an election was too close to call, multiplying the cost and complexity by 50.

Consequences of A Central Voting Authority

However, despite being required for a direct voting model, a single voting authority would come with a whole slew of unacceptable consequences. Both parties have made serious allegations of election tampering, and giving the federal government unilateral control over handling vote counting, trusting the rules and execution entirely to the executive branch and the final single adjudication entirely to the Supreme Court, would undermine trust and legitimacy in our highly partisan society and eliminate state checks on government power—as Montesquieu argues, “every man invested with power is apt to abuse it” (Book XI).

Rebuttals:

“States have frequently flipped on what party they have voted for…It is not the 'state identity, but the 'American identity that matters for president…Twenty states are overrepresented in the Electoral College by more than one vote, based on population. Texas is underrepresented by nine votes.”

I disagree that a simple majority is effective at capturing “American identity” in a diverse society with heterogenous interests. The wisdom of crowds is only effective when the crowd holds diverse, independent opinions. The interests of farmers and those in agricultural areas should hold significant weight and not be ignored, even if they are a minority of the country.

“The president should not have to focus on swing states and their local issues, but to the American people as a whole, and national issues…A state can have 51% - 49% vote for president, yet out of that can come an unequal number of electoral votes for one party over the other.”

My counterplan addresses this. Ending the winner-take-all system would force politicians to focus on all states. A popular vote system would do the opposite, allowing candidates to focus solely on urban areas and ignore the needs of farmers, as I addressed under “Accommodation of Diverse Factions.”

“As of the 2020 election, there have been a total of 165[3][4] instances of faithlessness”

Faithless electors are addressed by my counterplan, by having states nullify their votes.

“In 1812, slave states had 76 seats out of 143 instead of the 59 they would have had; in 1833, 98 seats out of 240, instead of 73. As a result, Southern states had additional influence on the presidency”

No longer relevant, since the three-fifths compromise has been abolished.

“The Electoral College traps us into a divisive system of two party politics…Southern favorite Wallace actually captured 46 electoral votes…Although he had received nearly 14 percent of the popular vote, he got only eight percent of the electoral vote. Some 4.1 million Wallace votes cast outside the states he carried were “wasted.”

Wallace doing poorly is a good thing—he was a pro-segregation candidate who strongly supported racist “Jim Crow” policies. Abraham Lincoln, who freed the slaves, failed to win a majority of the popular vote, but won a comfortable majority of the electoral college. These impacts all turn against Pro.

Topical Analysis:

Direct Election

Pro says that we’ve amended the Constitution before, which is true. However, it is still a very significant decision, requiring ratification by 38 of 50 states. It is not something that should be taken lightly—if it proves to be a terrible mistake, it will be just as difficult to change it back.

“I'm not sure I understand what proportional elector allocation is”

Let’s say we have a state with 10 electoral votes. We would take the percentage of votes for each candidate and round to the nearest elector. So if Candidate A got 72% of the vote and Candidate B got 28%, Candidate A would get 7 electoral votes and B would get 3 electoral votes.

“In Colorado, however, Baca sued in federal court, and the case eventually reached the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver, which ruled that electors can vote for any legitimate candidate”

This decision was overturned by the Supreme Court, which ruled unanimously that states may enforce laws to punish faithless electors, ruling in favor of the state that nullified Baca’s vote. Hence, my proposal to nullify the votes of faithless electors remains feasible.

“Why didn't Trump get 4 Electoral votes from Colorado?”

Because Colorado did not implement proportional elector allocation. Under my counterplan, they would implement proportional elector allocation.

Framework:

As I stated in R1, the question that should underpin this debate is this: Does switching to a direct voting system risk undermining the spirit of the republic—that is, the principles and stability of the United States? Pro does not dispute that this question should underpin the debate or provide an alternative framework. Nor does he dispute that accommodation, moderation, and decentralization should be used to test direct voting against this framework. Hence, voters should use my proposed value and criteria.

Burdens:

Pro does not dispute that failing a single one of these three tests (accommodation, moderation, and decentralization) should be enough to reject direct voting. Hence, if voters feel that I have won on even a single one of these points, that is enough to warrant a Con vote.

1. Accommodation of Diverse Factions:

Extend my points about most Americans living in urban areas and agricultural interests being overlooked under simple majority rule (with California as an example). Pro has dropped all these points. 

“Accommodation is addressed by the people as a 'whole being appealed to, not just swing state votes…And not the 51% majority of various states, but the people as a 'whole.”

As I explained, my counterplan addresses this by having states replace winner-take-all with proportional elector allocation. Politicians will have to appeal to people in all states, not just swing states.

2. Preferring Moderation to Drastic Political Measures:

Extend my points about the electoral college being a strongly partisan issue, and that it will inevitably be seen as one party “changing the rules” to win more elections.

“What is 'Moderate about disfranchising the voters by unequal votes?...The Electoral College has outlived it's purpose…What is 'Moderate about…winner take all votes?...We don't need some 'electors telling us what's best for us.”

I will address these later under rebuttals. However, these points are not relevant to the moderation criterion under my framework, even though Pro puts them in this section. Montesquieu’s moderation criterion is about “things shocking to the existing ideas of a nation” (Book XIX). Since the electoral college has been used and accepted from 10 states in 1788 to 50 states today, and Americans have grown up with it, it is not shocking to the existing ideas of the nation. Only radical new proposals (such as a constitutional amendment that will inevitably be seen as a power grab by a particular party), can fail the test of moderation.

Pro does not dispute Montesquieu’s definition or dispute that said criterion should be used to judge this debate against my proposed framework, so voters should consider these points irrelevant when evaluating Pro’s proposal under the moderation criterion.

3. Maintaining a Decentralized Delimitation of Power:

“gerrymandering”

My proposal isn’t gerrymandering, because one party isn’t given unilateral control to draw up state borders however it pleases.

“Why should we let [the idea of appeal to a minority of voters] stop us?”

Because the goal is to balance power between the minority and majority to meet their basic needs and not ignore the needs of one group simply because it has fewer members. Pro states that “America ran on ideas of democracy and representation, disfranchising the people by not letting their votes matter, is not freedom.” I agree. That’s why the voice of the minority should matter and should not be trampled on by the majority. The electoral college forces them to compromise.

“All the states have to do is report how many people voted for which candidate, then have that applied in the presidential election. They can handle the details of 'how locally.”

As I said in R1, recall the Bush v. Gore election. When Florida was too close to call in the 2000 election, this led to an expensive, contentious recount. Under a popular vote system with no central voting standard, candidates would demand recounts in every state when an election was too close to call, multiplying the cost and complexity by 50. Pro does not dispute this.

At this level of complexity, there would not be time to find conclusive evidence favoring one politician over another, or for either campaign to invest the resources in legal cases across 50 states to make sure all recounts are handled properly. With so many recounts, many cases would eventually make it to the Supreme Court, and the justices could select the most ambiguous, disputed cases as justifications for assigning whatever winner they want while maintaining plausible deniability. A growing number of judges have criticized the Supreme Court. Hence, Pro’s proposal would inevitably centralize power in the hands of a controversial authority and give them unilateral power to decide the president.

Meanwhile, my counterplan would not have such a drastic issue, as recounts could only be demanded if vote totals in a particular state were close enough to the cutoff for assigning an additional elector (since my plan involves rounding to the nearest elector).

Rebuttals:

“What is 'Moderate about disfranchising the voters by unequal votes?”

As I have argued, we should strive to balance power more equally among factions rather than exactly equally among all individuals. One vote by itself will not guarantee a voice is heard—if individuals want the government to care about their interests, they need their voting “faction” (people with similar concerns) to have significant representation.

“What is 'Moderate about…winner take all votes?”

As I explained, my counterplan addresses this by having states replace winner-take-all with proportional elector allocation.

“The Electoral College has outlived it's purpose…We're roughly all educated and informed of current and relevant events.

The advantage of the electoral college that I am advocating isn’t compensating for people being uneducated or uninformed. The advantage of the electoral college is that it gives a voice to smaller states and groups that would otherwise be overlooked, such as people living in agricultural areas.

“We don't need some 'electors telling us what's best for us.”

As I explained, my counterplan addresses this by having states nullify the votes of faithless electors.

“Three fifths compromise…'Continues to be felt today, in related court cases and laws such as my vote mattering less than a rural voter.”

That’s not what the three-fifths compromise is. The three fifths compromise was used to determine how slaves were counted as part of a state’s population. The concept of states having electoral votes based on population existed as a broader concept anyway, regardless of how slaves were counted.

“It doesn't matter if Wallace was a bad person according to some people today. What matters is that the people as a whole have their values heard.”

Wallace’s presidency would have silenced the voices of minority groups through racist policies, such as supporting segregation. If you want everyone to have their voices heard, you should be glad that the electoral college harmed Wallace’s campaign.

“Give the people power, and society always get's what they deserve”

The minority groups that Wallace would have harmed did not deserve to have him ruling over them and implementing racist policies.

“What chance do we have at getting away from Bipartisen politics, when we only have two major parties, and they keep moving the voting districts around so only two parties are an option?”

As shown with George Wallace, the electoral college and its preservation of major parties is a necessary measure to prevent fringe, extremist candidates from taking power. The United States would have been worse off with Wallace in power, as he would have put more institutional power behind segregation and racist policies. Hence, bipartisan politics and the electoral college are a positive, not a negative.

Topical Analysis:

“If it's unwanted, it won't pass…And on the off chance it passes, if it's unwanted, it'll be passed back.”

Pro cannot stipulate that the political climate suddenly changes to make his policy more popular. That’s wishful thinking. Lawmakers pass unpopular policies all the time. And even if the initial amendment is very unpopular, that in no way guarantees it will be reversed. Reversing the amendment would require a new amendment and a vast supermajority of states (38 of 50 just to ratify it, as I’ve mentioned repeatedly).

“How does their PROPORTIONAL ELECTOR ALLOCATION empower the rural areas?”

Proportional elector allocation is meant to give a voice to non-swing states. Rural areas are already empowered under the Electoral College (per the source I cited in R1), because small states in rural areas are given increased representation under the Electoral College compared to a popular vote, preventing tyranny of the majority.

“there are still going to be winner take all”

Not under my counterplan, in which states implement proportional elector allocation. As I said in R1 (undisputed by Pro), all states implementing this is still more feasible than Pro’s proposed constitutional amendment, since some states have already implemented reforms along these lines. Basically, we’ve already seen split electors play out successfully in practice.

Framework/Burdens:

It is generally accepted in formal debate that dropped arguments should be seen as true in the eyes of judges. If Pro isn’t going to participate in a discussion on some point, voters should consider the only arguments left on the table—mine.

Has Pro provided a feasible alternative to my framework?

No. Pro claims that he is arguing based on “Democracy, Representation, and Knowledge,” but that proposed alternative comes in the final round and should not be considered by voters. Furthermore, Pro does not justify why these criteria are the most important, nor does he counter the justifications I provided for my framework back in R1 (Baron de Montesquieu’s widely-lauded political treatise, and the examples of Iraq, Prohibition, and South Korea). Pro also fails to attach a weighting mechanism to his framework (i.e. how many criteria does he need to lose on to lose the debate?) which means that even if he had defended these criteria sufficiently, they cannot be used to determine the debate outcome.

Has Pro provided a feasible alternative to the burdens I provided in R1?

No. Pro has not challenged my analogy of “three pillars supporting the republic, where the collapse of one undermines the entire structure.” Hence, voters should hold Pro’s popular vote proposal to the standard I suggested in R1, where it must pass all three tests (accommodation, moderation, and decentralization) to be considered worthwhile.

1. Accommodation of Diverse Factions:

Does a direct vote pass this requirement?

No. Rural areas are overlooked under a simple popular vote, as in the case of California’s inefficient, overexpensive high-speed rail project that ignored the Central Valley. Pro contends that “there's cities in all states, even some rural areas,” but urban areas are not distributed evenly among small-population and large-population states. The smallest states by population (those given a voice by the Electoral College, like Mississippi, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and the Dakotas) are generally more rural, since urban areas are densely-packed high population centers that significantly shift the state population. I provided a source in R1 explaining that rural voters are granted greater representation under the Electoral College. Pro does not provide an alternative source or a reason to doubt mine. Hence, a direct vote fails to accommodate the diverse “general spirit, morals, and customs” of the American people by failing the people who grow our crops—a significant but often overlooked group. Pro claims that “one person in a thousand wants pineapple on the pizza, we don't need pineapple on 'every pizza,”—sure, but under direct voting, if 80% of the population doesn’t like pineapple on pizza, they can outvote the minority and ensure there is no pineapple on any pizza.

Are Pro’s arguments relevant to this criterion?

No. Pro does not attach any supporting evidence or impacts to his claims of gerrymandering, or a justification for why one-person, one-vote is more effective in accommodating the diverse “general spirit, morals, and customs” of the American people.

2. Preferring Moderation to Drastic Political Measures:

Does a direct vote pass this requirement?

No. Pro claims, without justification, that one-person one-vote is not partisan. However, I pointed out in R1 that the Electoral College is a strongly partisan issue, with significantly greater opposition from Republicans than from Democrats. Again, recent attempts to abolish the Electoral College in 2016 and 2024 came entirely from Democrats, shortly after a Republican won the presidential election. These sources all went undisputed by Pro.

Are Pro’s arguments relevant to this criterion?

No. Pro does not give any justification to his claim that proportional electoral allocation is partisan. And since this would be implemented independently by each state, it would not be “shocking to the existing ideas of a nation,” especially when each state already decides how to allocate its electors and already implement split elector systems in some cases. Pro’s claims about gerrymandering are irrelevant, since proportional elector allocation under my counterplan would preclude gerrymandering, as it does not divide votes by district. Furthermore, Pro has already stated that “I've not argued for the feds to be a single amorphous blob controlling voting…the states can still handle it,” which means that a direct vote would not prevent states from disenfranchising voters with policies akin to literacy tests. Hence, the points Pro brings up here fail to establish his plan as moderate.

3. Maintaining a Decentralized Delimitation of Power:

Does a direct vote pass this requirement?

No. Pro claims that each state would handle recounts independently and there would be no need for a nationwide recount, but under a direct voting system, if one candidate is a few thousand votes short of winning the election, they would just need a few thousand additional votes, and they wouldn’t care where they get those votes. Hence, they would demand a recount anywhere they could get a few more votes—that is, in every state. Pro drops all of my arguments that a direct vote would lead to power being centralized in a Supreme Court which has been widely criticized. Again, recounts in 50 states would lead to 50 times the cost and complexity of the expensive, contentious recount in the 2000 election. There would not be time to find conclusive evidence favoring one politician over another, and the justices could select the most ambiguous, disputed cases as justifications for assigning whatever winner they want while maintaining plausible deniability.

Are Pro’s arguments relevant to this criterion?

No. Pro’s arguments about “one person one vote” decentralizing power in an ideal world fail to address how these votes will be recounted, and how those recounts will be enforced. Both parties have made serious allegations of election tampering, so that enforcement matters a great deal in practice. Pro’s statement that “the states can still handle it” is non-responsive to the very real concerns I’ve brought up with ambiguous cases being handled by the Supreme Court.

Non-Topical Arguments:

Pro provides additional arguments (George Wallace, 3/5ths compromise, “small upper class of elites”) which he doesn’t really tie to to the framework I have defended, but I will address them here anyway.

Do Pro’s arguments here show any positive impact of a direct vote?

No. The 3/5ths compromise was abolished by the 14th amendment. Switching to a popular vote will not change the “enduring impact of the 3/5ths Compromise,” since the 3/5ths compromise already happened and Pro’s proposal does not allow him to get in a time machine and change what policies existed in the 1800s. Pro does not show evidence of the Electoral College in its modern form causing voter suppression or gerrymandering—particularly under my counterplan, where proportional elector allocation would preclude gerrymandering.

However, Pro gives more recent evidence of the Electoral College reducing systemic racism by harming George Wallace’s campaign. Pro claims that “segregation doesn't 'silence people,’” except that Pro has just cited “systemic racism and voter suppression” as things to be avoided, and the Jim Crow policies Wallace supported are direct causes of those things. Pro claims that “even by direct voting, he wouldn't have won”—but this example is evidence that direct voting would make candidates with strongly similar beliefs to Wallace more likely to be elected in the future. Hence, the “thumbs of this two party system” and binary choice are necessary for keeping extremely fringe candidates like Wallace from becoming president. Voters still have a voice because the two parties are competing for them.

Furthermore, Pro provides no evidence to justify why a “small upper class of elite political parties control the votes” under the Electoral College—sure, there are two main parties right now, but they are forced to compete to win voters by appealing to them.

Conclusion:

Does a direct voting system risk undermining the spirit of the republic?

Yes. A direct voting system fails all three tests that underpin this debate. Pro fails to engage with the core harms I’ve led out under each of these criteria, such as California’s disastrous Proposition 1A, the strong partisan divide around a direct vote, and the complications around recounts that would inevitably centralize power in the Supreme Court under a direct voting system.