Deontology is false

As Deontology is not necessarily monolithic, it would be most productive for you to clearly state the nature of the system you wish to defend. However, I intend to cover significant ground here.

My understanding of deontology is that it is a moral and ethical framework where the rightness or the goodness of actions depends on universal duty, laws, or the relation of those actions to those real obligations.

I would say that this depends on a straightforwardly false premise, that something about actions, the type of actions those actions are, or how actions stand in relation to these supposed universal duties or obligations, necessarily constitutes value or something ethically significant such that one necessarily ought to adhere to those duties.

For instance, though it may not be your position, the categorical imperative would likely reject the killing of an innocent human as something to be universally prohibited, something that we have a duty not to do. According to Kant, the basis of this comes from rational agency. Kant said that it is moral to be consistent, logical, to act according to rational nature, and to create and adhere to universal law.

I know what Kant said was more specific than this, but what this comes down to is the question of value or relevance. This debate will center the concept of ought. No matter how well you describe consistency, rational autonomy, agency, logic, and things like these, the question is, "So?" "Why does it matter?"

For instance, it could be rational to adhere to the categorical imperative, but, is what is rational good? More directly, why be rational?

Any attempt to derive value from or identify it with the mere creation of or the pure adherence to rational laws or systems already mistakes what value can be.

Why is that? It is only because value, significance, better/worse, and good are all themselves relational. Value, like all things, does not exist without determinate properties, including a for whom. Valuable to what? Better for who?

In other words, if it really is good to adhere to duties, whom or what is it good for? If you try to say that it is good for the rational beings themselves, then you're introducing a contingent empirical dimension to duty that would undermine any attempt at universality, and this simultaneously would make this a consequentialist system rather than a deontological one. Why is that? Because, if duties are justified by their benefit to rational agents, then rightness depends on contingent facts about those beings rather than duty itself. Yet, what is good for them cannot, in a circular manner, consist purely in the internal adherence to these duties. It has to be good for them in some way.

For instance, if in a particular scenario a duty existed in contradiction with your own self-interest, or even the interest of all rational agents, (and I don't mean short-term interest, I mean all of interest,) I do not see how you could reason that adhering to the duty would be good for anyone or anything specifically. If it isn't necessarily good for you, better for you, or even relevant to you, then I must ask, what could these duties be for? For themselves? For the concept of rational autonomy? The adherence to duties cannot actually matter to either of those two things.

To avoid internal contradiction as long as possible, you would have to assert that:

Adherence > Disobedience

">" is what it is for nothing

Yet, Adherence therefore must be relevant to us and constitutes what is good or right for us to do in general

And, the reason is that you almost certainly have to deny that value or any ethical worth is actually relational like I claimed it is. But, I would say there is no way to justify this kind of a position. That's because by employing and advocating for this framework, if it really is right to adhere, then would mean that it is somehow better to adhere than to not adhere. But, why would it be superior in any meaningful way that actually matters? You could say better is a poor way to frame it, perhaps it's simply rational to adhere instead. But, that's only circular, because once again, why be rational in the first place? To say that adherence is right rather than wrong already presupposes some standard by which adherence is to be preferred or superior, and it must be a standard that could only be external to duty. Duty cannot make itself be normative.

So, here is what I would say. Ought must prescribe something. It must prescribe according to actual value. And, actual value cannot exist without a valuer or as mere adherence.

So, my position is that to locate value anywhere but as what is valued is not only to treat us as mere means to an ethically irrelevant or incomplete end, as deontologists often do, but to misunderstand what ethics must be on a fundamental level.

The first issue with what you say is the following:

"In simple terms, statement such as "killing should not be done" is always true. It doesnt become true or false by any consequences, but is always true.

In order to show that this statement is false, my opponent must logically deduce that killing should be done at least in some cases."

This is not quite true. To prove it is false, I would need to show that intelligible instances of killings could be justified in at least one case, or, that killings would be irrelevant in at least one case. In my previous message I aimed to show not that killing is sometimes justified, but that the universal justification for not killing, or the universal condemnation for killing, is itself baseless. So, you have failed to justify that this duty actually applies in reality in the context of my argument on value and ought.

Then, you say, "It likewise isnt logically deduced that person should kill anyone, even killers, even in self defense. thus, the statement faces no contradiction."

Whether it is purely logically deduced is irrelevant, because you have not established that empirical factors are thoroughly irrelevant. However, like I said before, I do not need to justify any instance of killing.

Then, you suggest the following:

"P1. In order to make a logical decision, there must not be multiple logically valued same but contradicting options within same decision

P2. "Killing should not be done" produces no contradicting options

C. "Killing should not be done" is a logical decision which can be made"

For P1, I don't see why, even if there are contradictions, there couldn't still be a best option.

For P2, killing is a contradictory option.

Even so, I'd say C is true because it doesn't imply a universal ethical truth.

Then, you suggest the following:

"P1. In order to make a logical decision, there must not be multiple logically valued same but contradicting options within same decision

P2. "Killing should be done" produces multiple contradicting options (How to decide who gets killed?)

C. "Killing should be done" is a logically self contradicting principle which results in multiple contradicting options, making logical decision impossible, and thus is not a logical decision."

For P2, this is quite arbitrary. The same could be said for the previous P2, for instance, how to decide who doesn't get killed? But, you're right that there are multiple options, but this is essentially true for actions in general. This also wasn't Kant's argument. He would argue that despite there being contradictory options, there would be an option to adhere to duty. The duties themselves, he could argue, would not contradict, but different actions can.

For C, I would say it is logically self-contradictory but only because it doesn't function as a universal duty because it is baseless.

Then, you argue:

"Further,

P1. Not killing people is not an action

P2. Something which is not an action doesnt require a reason to justify it

C. Not killing people doesnt require a reason to justify it"

For P1, it could be. If, instead of killing someone, you're doing something else, then yes, it is an action.

For P2, this is stipulation. Why does nothing besides action warrant justification?

For C, like I just said, it could be if prescription doesn't necessarily have such a confined scope. You would need to specifically justify why prescription is tailored to the actions of rational agents. For this specific argument, you would also have to justify why doing something else isn't an action.

Next, you argue:

"P1. Killing people is an action which requires logically deduced decision behind it, or it is not a logical action

P2. Killing people doesnt have logically deduced decision behind it

C. Killing people is not a logical action"

For P1, does it matter whether it's a "logical action" or not?

For P2, it certainly does in many cases. People have killed people for many different logical reasons. Logic also isn't a binary. We always implicitly use logic through active decision-making, but nothing we do is perfectly logical.

Finally, you say:

"Further,

Killing people is justified for subjective reasons = Killing all people is justified = Principle stops existing in same way people do"

That killing can be justified to or for certain subjects does not produce that killing everyone is justified. Regardless of what allowing killing implies, you've already presupposed that we or the principle should exist, or that we ought to act in a way that does not contradict our existence or this principle. But, you haven't shown why or how that could even be true.

The central issue seems to be that you have taken deontology as a given to justify it.

You say, "No logical deduction made here."

Actually, there was. You claimed that I had to justify killings when that's not true, and I explained why, logically.

Then, you said, "If something is not justified by deductive reasoning, then it isnt certainly true. And justifying "should" statements by observation is impossible, for nowhere outside your mind do you find "should", and inside your mind it is merely a claim which needs to be proved by logical deduction."

That's pretty straightforwardly false. We can think about many things that were true before being justified by deductive reasoning. For instance, it was true that the Earth existed billions of years ago. Then, you say that justifying "should" (normative) statements by observation is impossible, which is technically true but only because observation doesn't really justify things in the first place.

Then you say, "Contradictions make logical decision impossible. If A and B are contradictive, and no logic enables preference of one over another, no logical decision can be made."

This also isn't true. If A and B are contradictory, one could still be better. The qualifier "no logic enables preference of one over another" is stipulated. Why can't things be better than other things?

Next, you say, "this argument was about not killing."

That is correct, which is why killing contradicts it as a potential option

Next, you say, "C simply means not killing is a logical decision which can be made without contradictions."

But, you didn't actually demonstrate this. Your reasoning was that it requires no justification, but deontology isn't the absence of justification, it's the positive justification through duty. Using your logic, absolutely nothing should be done ever. Total inaction would all have the same justification that "something which is not an action doesn't require a reason to justify it". This is far from Kant's argument.

Next, you say, "the statement is absolute, in simple terms, no one gets killed, thus no decision needed to be made on who gets killed."

But, that's thoroughly arbitrary. There are still people who don't get killed, so if a "decision needed to be made on who gets killed" in order to kill people, then one would need to be made about who doesn't get killed in order to not kill people. If not, then you must explain why.

Then, you argue, "the question on "who doesnt get killed" aka "who gets killed" is an exclusive problem of position "killing is sometimes good or good always"."

I've never had to claim that killing was always or sometimes good. I'm only asking for the justification of a duty to not kill.

Then, you say, "If you are doing something else, you still dont need reason for not killing people. And yes, one can have reasons to do something else, or not have reasons. It doesnt change that he doesnt need reason not to kill people."

This is only true if all duties are purely negative, but by Kant's own admission, and through any thinking of this through, they must not be. You agreed that you're always doing something, but that something must always be justified according to its adherence to duties. Duties are not just abstaining from certain actions, there are duties to help others or yourself too. So, even what you could potentially do, even if you never do it, must be logically evaluated based on if it can constitute a duty. So, there must indeed be a justification for not killing people (such a justification does exist), or at the very least a reason that there is insufficient justification for it, neither of which you provided.

Then, you argue, ""No action" is not an action. It is "nothing". And "nothing" doesnt need logical justification, because there is no action which needs to be justified in the first place. No decision to be justified either. Because "nothing" doesnt exist, it doesnt need justification for its existence. I dont need to justify an idea which I dont hold. I dont need to justify decision which I dont make. And I likewise dont need to justify lack of decision, because there is nothing to justify, its not a decision. Its nothing,

and nothing = nothing to justify."

It seems you misunderstood. I never claimed that no action was an action, but earlier I said that instead of doing "no action", you're instead just doing a different action. However, you specifically said this in response to when I asked, "Why does nothing besides action warrant justification?" So, this implies that you interpreted "no action" as nothing, but you failed to realize that actions are not the only thing that exist. For instance, would you happen to prescribe the annihilation of all of reality such that nothing is all that remains in an instant, or would you happen to not? Would it really depend on if someone is doing the annihilation? If so, why? So, as you may notice, even things besides actions are quite relevant to us, perhaps even more so than duties. So, why would ethics not concern them?

Then, you argue, "If your action isnt logical, saying that opposite action or inaction (deontology) is illogical would be logically impossible.

Likewise, if your action isnt based on logical decision, it is by definition an illogical action.

Further, if your action isnt based on logical decision, then logically choosing to do mentioned action becomes impossible."

Firstly, saying something is illogical remains logically possible, but, I'm assuming you mean saying it and being correct simultaneously. So, the main issue arises with the third line. But, this largely depends on your implicit conflation of actions and types of actions. If I do something illogically, then your conclusion would be that doing that same thing logically becomes impossible. But, this doesn't follow unless you're referring to very specific and context dependent (one of a kind) actions, which is antithetical to deontology in the first place and aligned more with consequentalism. So, if you, in a consistent manner, are referring to types of actions that could produce a universal rational duty, then you've left out that actions or behavior either can be illogical or that such a lack of logic necessarily diverges from logic in practice somehow, and you haven't demonstrated either. As I said before, that logic in decision-making isn't binary will also complicate this.

Then, you argue, "this only proves that lack of action is the most reasonable stance.

P1. Lack of action doesnt require a reason to justify itself

P2. What doesnt require a reason to justify itself is more justified than what requires a reason to justify itself but doesnt have that reason.

C. Lack of action is more justified."

I showed how P1 isn't accurate earlier. For P2, you're saying things can be justified for no reason, which deontology does not claim. So, C is not a logical conclusion but the culmination of a series of baseless presuppositions.

Next, you say, "If you start from idea that killing is justified for arbitrary reasons, you enter a problem "Which killing is justified?" Arbitrary reasons can justify all killing, because they are not logical reasons. thus, same reason used to kill others can be used to justify own killing, due to gap fallacy of non-deductive reasoning."

I never claimed killing can be justified for arbitrary reasons. But, if killings were justified, then the matter of which ones are can have non-arbitrary resolutions. However, I do not need to provide those as such, I only need to show that anything such as "killing is universally wrong" cannot exist without contradiction.

Then, you say, "However, a lack of decision to kill others is itself not a principle, thus it doesnt face any self-contradiction with own existence, as it itself is not existence but a lack of. thus no self-contradiction possible."

Whether the lack of decision happens or not is irrelevant to whether it adheres.

Then, you say, "the only thing a lack of decision to kill others contradicts with is decision to kill others. Latter needs a logical reason in order to be a justified decision. the former does not, as former is not a decision at all."

Besides what I've already mentioned, it's important to know that not killing can contradict with more than just killing because the effects of them exceed them. So, you need to explain why the causal influence bears no weight on the "logical reason".

Then, you argue, "In same way lack of belief in God is not a position which needs to be justified by anything, as it is not a position at all... the lack of decision to kill others doesnt need any justification, because nothing = nothing to be justified."

Not believing in god is a position. However, in that particular case the burden of proof is not on you to prove god does not exist. It's a passive position one could unknowingly possess. That you have a duty to not kill is an active claim that absolutely needs justification.

Then, you say the following, "Or in more simple terms,

something which doesnt exist doesnt need to justify its existence.

Something which doesnt exist doesnt need to justify its non-existence.

And in case non-existence would have to be justified, it would be justified by simple lack of reason to exist.

Because "not killing people" is not a conclusion, it doesnt need logical deduction to be concluded. Because it is not an effect or action, it doesnt need a cause."

Not everything that does not exist automatically has no reason to exist. You would need to demonstrate that. "Not killing people" can be a conclusion. Whether it needs a logical deduction is besides the point. Why should one not kill? Can you answer?

Then, you say, "And if one were to say that not killing people is unjustified, one can merely respond with counter-deduction:

P1. Killing people cannot be logically justified with deductive logic

P2. Killing people is opposite of not killing people

C. Opposite of not killing people cannot be logically justified with deductive logic."

For P1, why not?

For P2, not necessarily. There is no sharp boundary between killing and not killing. For instance, whether it's accidental, whether you were only a contributing factor, etc. all complicate this. Then, we can also consider dilemmas of multiple lives being on the line.

C is just an attempted restatement of P1.

Finally, you say, "However, saying that "not killing people is unjustified" is a logically contradictory statement.

"Not killing people" is a lack of something. If something doesnt exist, it also doesnt exist in category of "unjustified".

Saying that "Not killing people is unjustified" is same as saying "nothing" is unjustified, and "nothing" doesnt exist, so it likewise doesnt exist in category of "unjustified.""

You have not demonstrated any of this. And, it's mostly a restatement of earlier claims. Not killing and nothing are not identical, as I've shown.

You start by placing the burden of proof on me, which is accurate. However, in my initial message I laid out why deontology is false, and you don't seem willing to engage with the core arguments.

You say, "Void lacks killing. "Nothing" lacks killing. Person can likewise lack killing. thus, lack of killing is possible, and thus not logically self-contradicting."

Sure, it's obviously possible to not kill people. Whether it's necessarily not logically self-contradictory (in terms of decision-making) is stipulated.

Next, you say, "Because "lack of killing" is not a presence of anything, it logically doesnt exist, as it is a negation of certain existence (existence of killing)."

If you abstract enough this is true.

Next, you say, "By law of identity, what doesnt exist also maintains its non-existence in category of "needs a reason"."

I can see where you're going with this. It doesn't work because the decision to not kill is real, it's not nothing. And, also, deontology isn't just doing what's not prohibited.

Next, you say, "thus, if "lack of killing" doesnt exist because its not "something" or presence of anything, its non-existence likewise is maintained in category of "needs a reason"."

You're successfully abstracted from deontology here. The decisions that exist in the context of duties are always something. That includes the decisions to not do certain things.

Next, you say, "In simple terms, it is impossible to place non-existence in any category other than "non-existence", as something which doesnt exist likewise cannot exist in any category which only includes things which exist."

A fine conclusion!

Next, you say, "It is likewise illogical to say that "non-existence" requires a reason to exist, as it doesnt exist, and thus doesnt require a reason to exist."

Might it require a reason to not exist?

Next, you say, "Non-existence is the absence of something. It doesnt require anything to be added to it. "Non-existence" only stops when "existence" is added."

Why doesn't it "require" anything to be added to it?

Next, you say, "By definition, non-existence is a lack of something. As such, the only thing it requires is "not adding something" (Lack of cause for existence)."

"Not adding something", if interpreted as an action, is itself something.

Next, you say, "However, killing is by definition presence of something. thus, it needs "killing" to be added by some cause."

I'll say that we can agree it would be justified according to duties assuming deontology is true.

Next, you say, ""nothing" merely requires not adding anything to it. So the only reason for "nothing" is a lack of reason for "something", thus it is "something" which needs a reason to justify it."

A lack of reason for something isn't equivalent to a reason for its opposite.

Then, you argue, ""It is okay to kill sometimes"

this is not any logical law. It doesnt need to exist everywhere, and as such, it only exists when there is a reason to make it exist."

So, if you admit that there can be reasons to make it exist, then why does it need to be universal? Does it?

Then, you argue, "the reasons can only be: arbitrary, or material causation chain. However, none of these justify a "should" statement."

What makes those two descriptions exhaustive of all possible reasons? And even then, what makes them unable to justify a normative claim?

Then, you argue, "Material causation chain, such as a rock falling onto person's head, and killing a person, does not say "this should happen", because "should" statement deals with morality of an action which should happen, not action which did happen."

Why do you separate what should happen and what has? Also, material causation chains will go into the future, so this argument doesn't work in the first place. So, the statement in that case could remain accurate if it was "this should not have happened".

Then, you argue, "Arbitrary reasons likewise arent reasons which are logically deduced, and as such, they are not true reasons."

You can, to some extent, produce an arbitrary justification through logic. But, if the reasons themselves are arbitrary then, sure, they're not true.

Next, you argue, "My opponent must prove that "lack of killing" rule is false. He can only do so by using deductive logic to show that presence of killing is at least sometimes good. However, he never once used deductive logic in this whole debate."

Why must I only use "deductive" logic? And, no, I do not need to show that killing or anything in particular is sometimes good. I only need to disprove any deontological rule such as "do not kill", and I feel I've already done so. That rule has no basis in ethics because every possible justification for it logically contradicts itself.

Then, you argue, "Opponent already conceded that observations cannot derive "should" statements, thus the only thing thats left is deductive logic which he so far didnt use."

Observations can derive very little by themselves, if anything. Observation must be interpreted to derive anything. I'm not sure why you're obsessed with "deductive" logic. Not all logic is deductive. You can just say logic.

Next, you say, "Likewise, the only way for my opponent to prove that "lack of killing" is unjustified, would be to first prove that a lack of something needs a justification at all, and then that "killing" is sometimes justified."

You're conflating several things here. Firstly, and once again, "lack of killing" as an action is still always something, which would need justification in deontology. As for the duty that "we ought not kill", that's not just a lack of justification of its opposite, that's the positive justification for it. So, no, I do not need to show that killing is ever justified, only that deontology's justification is itself self-contradictory.

Next, you say, "Without these conditions, it is not possible to prove that rule "lack of killing" is unjustified, and with that, not possible to prove that deontology (unchanging rules morality) is unjustified or false."

As I've shown, this isn't true.

Then, you say, "Because killing lacks in most of universe, it could be said that much more universe lacks killing than has a presence of killing."

I suppose you could indeed say that.

Then, you say, "So my opponent must simply prove why presence of killing is something which should sometimes exist."

As I've shown, this isn't true. You're repeating the same thing a lot.

Next, you say, "Saying that it sometimes exists is not same as saying "it should exist"."

True!

Then, you say, "And because it is possible to lack killing, no logical contradiction arises for lacking killing in any part of space which lacks it."

Well, nothing that actually exists or happens (or that doesn't) is actually logically contradictory in the first place besides conceptualization or reasoning.

Then, you say, "So lack of killing is possible, and it also doesnt need a reason to justify itself."

It could need justification if it's an action, which is what deontology is about.

Then, you argue, "Until my opponent presents a case for why "killing is sometimes justified" using logical deduction, no case against deontology is even made."

A brilliant stipulation, because the implication is that deontology can only be false if it is true.

Then, you argue the following: "the only reason which lack of something needs is lack of adding of that something. Or in deductive logic form:

P1. Lack of something means that something is not added

P2. Something not added is a lack of adding

P3. Lack of adding is not a presence of anything

C. Lack of something doesnt require presence of anything"

For P1, it could also be destroyed.

For P2, that's flawless. Did you come up with that one yourself?

For P3, once again, if we are discussing actions, then you'd still have to be doing something else.

For C, I suppose if you abstract enough this can be true. But in the context of real actions, this would fall apart.

Then, you argue, "thus, lack of killing does not require presence of anything. And in "should" morality, it likewise doesnt require presence of any "should" reason.

P1. Lack of killing is not a presence of anything

P2. Lack of presence of anything doesnt require "should" justification for anything

C. Lack of killing doesnt require "should" justification for anything"

For P1, it could be.

For P2, this isn't true. For instance, Kant argued that someone ought to never lie. That would be a "lack of presence of lying". Yet, it would be justified. This just shows that you can't interpret actions and non-actions the same way in the context of duty. You also seem to be conflating a duty to not kill and a lack of a duty to kill.

For C, as I've shown, it would.

Then, you argue, "to further expose the flaw in opponent's case:

P1. "Killing should be done sometimes" is a "should" statement

P2. "Should" statements require a justification to be accepted

P3. With lack of such justification, statement is not accepted.

P4. "Killing should be done sometimes" lacks a justification to be accepted.

C. "Killing should be done sometimes" is not accepted"

For P1, you're right. That phrase does indeed use that word. I have no choice but to accept that one.

For P2, not really. They require a justification to be true. But, people can accept them without properly understanding why it is or isn't justified.

For P3, it could be. But, if you just mean it can't be true, then sure.

For P4, why?

Due to it's reliance one the undemonstrated P4, C is mere assertion.

Then, you say, "thus, one merely needs to not accept "Killing should be done sometimes" in order to follow "Lack of killing" rule."

That's not true. For instance, if you accepted that "killing should always be done", then you may follow neither. You haven't properly justified any rule or any lack of rule. And, also, you could believe that killing should sometimes happen without killing anyone yourself. This wouldn't be arbitrary if it simply context dependent.

Then, you say, "Person who doesnt accept any "should" statement would likewise not accept "killing should be done sometimes" should statement."

Now we're getting somewhere. Fantastic.

Then, you say, "And once no "should" statement is accepted, the only thing thats left is lack of any "should" statements."

Yeah, that's the following conclusion. So, this would include rejecting a duty to not kill. You're on track.

Then, you say, "Lack of "should" statements translates into being impossible to justify "should kill" statement, while "It is not true that killing should sometimes be done" becomes true in a void."

Correct.

Then, you say, "So merely not accepting a "should" statement by logic means "should" statement isnt considered true there, and thus its negation becomes true."

Woah woah woah. What do you mean by it's negation? "People should sometimes kill people", if all normativity is false, does mean that, as you said before, "It is not true that killing should sometimes be done", but if you are trying to say that, therefore, "we should not kill", then you are contradicting yourself because that would not remain true either.

Then, you say, "Because lack of "should kill" is a negation of "should kill", it is true any time when "should kill" is not true."

And 1=1.

Then, you say, "And because void naturally lacks anything, thus lacks "should kill", there needs to be something which adds "should kill" in order for "should kill" to be there at all."

I guess so!

Then, you say, ""Misrepresenting deontology"

Deontology is a wide area of morality, and my opponent has said they would let me present my version of it. Because deontology is by definition "unchanging rules which dont depend on consequences of action", one such rule is "Lack of killing", or lack of "should kill"."

I never said you were misrepresenting deontology, but I would say that you do misunderstand it for two reasons. You initially defined deontology "according to Kant", and clearly, what you've argued isn't aligned with his beliefs. More importantly, what you're trying to argue is completely untenable for several reasons, and even other deontologists have realized why, including Kant. But, you're perfectly allowed to defend whatever position you choose. Also, that's not the only definition of deontology, but it's likely sufficient due to the implications.

Then, you argue, "Because logically, there are only two options:

A. Killing should sometimes be done

B. It is not true that killing should sometimes be done

As long as A isnt proved true, it cannot be placed in category of "true", and thus B becomes true by default.

For this reason, opponent needs to prove A, or else his case against deontology is non-existent."

A and B are far from exhaustive. For instance:

C. Killing should always be done

D. Is it not true that killing should always be done

E. Killing should never be done

F. It is not true that killing should never be done

G. Killing should be done once

H. It is not true that killing should be done once

Though, not all of them contradict. You say that if A isn't proven to be true, then B has to be true. However, it could be true independent of proof, and much more importantly, neither B, D, F, nor H are deontological duties, they are descriptions of a specific lack of duty.

Then, you argue, "Or to be more precise:

A. It is considered true that killing should sometimes be done

B. It is not considered true that killing should sometimes be done

In order for something to be considered true, it needs a justification or anything can be considered true.

Without a justification for "killing should sometimes be done", it cannot be logically considered true, and as result, B becomes true.

If my opponent cannot provide justification for A, then B is logically accepted, and with it, deontology rule of "lack of killing"."

Not everything that is true has been justified. So, it doesn't follow that just because A is not unjustified, it would therefore not be logically considered true, and that therefore B is true. That's because A could be true independently of whether it is logically considered true. However, I do not intend to show that A is true in the first place. B is not a deontological rule of a lack of killing, it is the lack of a duty to sometimes kill.

Then, you claim, "this wasnt deductive reasoning. Claiming arbitrary reasons as "explaining why" is not any form of deductive reasoning.

Deductive reasoning comes in form of:

A = B

B = C

A = C

Because you already conceded that you cannot derive should statements from observation, the only thing thats left is deductive reasoning with first premise being a logical law itself.

And because deontology unchaning rule is "lack of killing", you still must logically explain why killing is sometimes justified, to prove that rule false."

You said this in response to when I said, "Actually, there was. You claimed that I had to justify killings when that's not true, and I explained why, logically."

And, I said that in response to when you said, "No logical deduction made here."

And, you said that in response to when I said, "This is not quite true. To prove it is false, I would need to show that intelligible instances of killings could be justified in at least one case, or, that killings would be irrelevant in at least one case. In my previous message I aimed to show not that killing is sometimes justified, but that the universal justification for not killing, or the universal condemnation for killing, is itself baseless. So, you have failed to justify that this duty actually applies in reality in the context of my argument on value and ought."

And, I said that in response to when you said, "In simple terms, statement such as "killing should not be done" is always true. It doesnt become true or false by any consequences, but is always true.

In order to show that this statement is false, my opponent must logically deduce that killing should be done at least in some cases."

Firstly, logic can still involve observation. It essentially always does on some level. So, my "concession" was that observation by itself cannot establish anything logically. As for my logical reasoning, it was about discovering your conflation of "it is not true that killing should be done" with "killing should not be done". How did I discover this?

To use the letter you seem to love, here is how:

A = Duty to not kill

B = Lack of duty to kill

C = Duty or justification to sometimes kill

A and C are mutually exclusive

and B and C are too

If C is false, then B is true, and A could be true

Yet, you suggested that

If C = False

Then A = True

But, this is asserted because both A is not necessitated, only possible

You made this assertion because you conflated A and B

You thought A = B, or you didn't realize B was possible.

Then, you argue, "If you are relying on arbitrary preference, then that is not a logical decision."

Logical premises or conclusions that happen to include preferences remain logical.

Next, you say, "the argument was about "killing" contradicting itself as an option, as no logical decision is possible to be made about who gets killed."

You said this in response to when I said, "That is correct, which is why killing contradicts it as a potential option."

And, I said that in response to when you said, "this argument was about not killing."

You said this in response to when I said, "For P2, killing is a contradictory option."

And, finally, this was in response to when you said, "P1. In order to make a logical decision, there must not be multiple logically valued same but contradicting options within same decision

P2. "Killing should not be done" produces no contradicting options

C. "Killing should not be done" is a logical decision which can be made"

So, I've already addressed this reasoning before. Earlier, you said that not killing produces no contradictory options like how killing does because you would have to choose who to kill. But, not killing is the exact same. In other words, there are contradictory options because you may have to choose who not to kill. But, of course, if you're not killing anyone, then I suppose that you wouldn't have to choose anyone in particular. However, you would still be doing something instead of killing, and among that something, there are certainly contradictory options. What I didn't note before is that something like "kill everyone" doesn't produce the exact contradiction you described.

Then, you say, "Decision on "who gets killed" is an entirely a problem of "it is sometimes okay to kill" position, not a problem of "it is never okay to kill" position."

Sure, that's true, but you're still making a decision that no one should be killed, which you have thus far stipulated. If you think about this in a more prior way, then there are already contradictory options in that "killing sometimes" and "never kill" contradict.

Next, you argue, "Deontology can include negative duties only. there is no reason why it couldnt. One does not need to follow everything Kant thinks to defend Deontology."

Sure, I'll allow this, but then you should realize that you're prescribing absolutely nothing. You are trying to say that everyone should do absolutely nothing, which is impossible. However, you failed to justify even that, because a lack of justification does not imply a justification to universally not. It straightforwardly implies nihilism.

Then, you argue, "Yes, if you are stealing things, you must logically justify that action. But you still dont need to justify "lack of killing", for you are not doing killing. So even if person does other things, lack of killing does not become unjustified."

Even if you don't have to justify it, it doesn't mean it is automatically justified to do it.

Next, you argue, "this is only if I defend positive duties deontology, which I dont need to. For dentology to be false, a version of deontology with only negative duties would have to be false too."

Correct.

Next, you say, "this would be an action, not a lack of."

As far as I'm aware, most don't call natural events actions. But, if you want to include everything in existence what must adhere, that's fine, but I believe you may come to regret this.

Next, you say, "My position here defends a lack of action, and not due to consequentialism (consequences of action), but rather due to action itself being impossible to justify logically before it is even made."

It does not defend a lack of action, it actually attempts to attack all action. (Not successfully, I will add)

Then, you say, "No, the conclusion is that if you are doing something illogically, you cannot at same time do same thing logically.

Maybe some other time you can do it logically, or maybe someone else can. But due to law of non-contradiction, something cannot be both logical and not logical at same time in same place."

You didn't mention at the same time before. In this case, your argument is trivially true but also irrelevant.

Then, you say, "No, saying that something isnt correct isnt same as showing it is not correct. You are yet to use deductive logic to show that lack of action requires a justification."

Well, maybe you should respond to what I said to your P1 the first time you used it instead of attacking my response to your repetition of it in which I was just saying I already responded to it.

Then, you say, "Lack of action is not a "thing". It is the absence of thing, and it is justified by mere lack of reason which adds that thing."

Once again, a lack of action here is really just not doing something, which also means you're doing something else.

Then, you say, ""Lack of killing" is not a thing, so it cannot cause anything. thus, no causation chain possible. Causation chain only exists in things which exist, not in things which dont."

I wouldn't be so hasty. A difference in reality can result from not killing. In a way, nothing can have causal influence, but only as opposed to the actuality of that thing.

Then, you say, "No, a void does not believe in God or anything, and holds no position."

A void also doesn't believe in anything. Does this mean no belief is a position?

Then, you suggest, "Likewise, burden of proof isnt on me to prove that "killing is sometimes okay" is false."

It's not on me to prove that's false either. Nor is it on me to prove that it's true.

Then, you say, "When there is no justification for killing, "not killing" becomes the default stance, or to be more precise, lack of belief in "should kill"."

Not killing wouldn't be the default stance. Both killing and not killing could be equally as justified (lacking total justification or justification to not), even if there isn't justification for killing.

Then, you say, "In order for something to be justified with deductive logic, it needs deductive premises. And first premise needs to be either logical law or observation. Because "it is justified to kill" is not any logical law, and it likewise isnt observed everywhere, no justification for it exists."

Then, I sure am glad I never made that claim!

Finally, you argue, "In order for something to be justified with deductive logic, it needs deductive premises. And first premise needs to be either logical law or observation. Because "it is justified to kill" is not any logical law, and it likewise isnt observed everywhere, no justification for it exists."

I never such such justification exists. In fact, I've been arguing against deontological justification.

The first issue with what you say is when you once again state that:

"the only way to disprove "lack of killing" is by saying "killing should sometimes be done". However, proving this statement is impossible."

As I've said probably about 10 times, this isn't true. The reason that this is not true is because regardless of the fact that proving that killing should sometimes be done would indeed disprove that it never should be done, this is not the only way to disprove it. I mentioned before that there is no possible justification for this duty. You have so far only repeatedly asserted that this duty exists, and you have not engaged with the arguments in my first message in which I attempted to show you why such a rule couldn't work. The reasoning worked something like this. If killing should never be done, there must be a reason why. It can't just be asserted. So, this rule would be an "ought" that prescribes what is right or what is valuable. Yet, value can't be valuable for or to nothing. So, In doing prescribing, ought cannot simultaneously be so broad and unchanging because that is not the manner in how anything relevant or valuable actually exists. However, it's also stipulated that proving that killing should sometimes be done is impossible. I simply won't because it is unnecessary.

Next, you argue the following:

"thus, deductive logic follows:

Deductive logic 1

P1. Deontology rule "lack of killing" is opposed by "sometimes kill" rule, and proving opposing rule as true is necessary to disprove deontology rule

P2. "sometimes kill" rule cannot be logically justified or proved true

C. Deontology rule "lack of killing" cannot be disproved"

As I have said before, it is not true that a duty to not kill is only disproven or contradicted by a duty to sometimes kill. So, P1 fails. P2 is therefore insufficient, because even if it were true, it is far from exhaustive of all methods of disproving the duty, including the one I've explicitly mentioned. Thus, C is not demonstrated.

Next, you say:

"Deductive logic 2

P1. One can hold belief that killing is sometimes justified, or one can not have such belief (No 3rd option exists)

P2. If belief is unjustified, not having such belief becomes justified state (Lack of unjustified is justified)

P3. "Killing is sometimes justified" is an unjustified belief

P4. Not having belief "killing is sometimes justified" is justified

P5. Not having belief "killing is sometimes justified" is contained in having a rule "not to make decision to kill" (decisions are based on justification)

C. "Not to make decision to kill" contains justified state"

P1 isn't fully true because beliefs don't operate with strict binaries like that. But, I'll say that it is probably true in most cases.

For P2, you're conflating the unjust with the not justified. They are not the same. The reason they are not the same is because unjust implies that it is evil or wrong to do. Not justified is more broad and can include irrelevant things. In that case, that would mean that it is neither right nor wrong. So, even if I grant you that various things may not have justification, it does not automatically follow that they become universally wrong to do.

For P3, you have not shown this in any particular way. Why is it unjustified?

For P4, you haven't shown this either. Why is that justified?

For P5, not having that belief is not ontologically "contained" in a rule to not make decisions to kill. That's because people can violate rules. Not all decisions are based on a sufficient level of justification.

So, C is far from derived.

Next, you argue:

"Deductive logic 3

P1. "Lack of killing" is not "something", thus it needs no adding to it to stay as it is.

P2. "Lack of killing" is true as long as justified killing isnt added

P3. Adding killing requires justification

P4. Adding killing cannot be justified

P5. Justified killing cannot be added

C "Lack of killing" is true"

As I have said several times, if you're adhering to a rule to not kill then you are still doing something while doing so. So, P1 isn't quite true.

Either way, a rule to not kill is not actually true even if a rule that justifies any killing does not exist. The reason is that a lack of justification of its opposite is not equivalent to its own justification. So, P2 is not true either.

I can agree that killing or a rule to kill would require justification, so P3 is fine.

P4 is stipulated. You gave no reason as to why killing cannot be justified.

P5 seems practically identical to P4.

So, C, you mean that a rule to not kill actually exists, is not true based on your argument.

Finally, you argue the following:

"Deductive logic 4

P1. Making a decision to kill requires justification for it to be a justified decision

P2. No such justification can be given

P3. Making a decision to kill is not a justified decision

P4. Not making an unjustified decision is justified

C. Not making decision to kill is justified

Not making decision to kill is itself not a decision, but a lack of decision, thus cannot be unjustified decision. But it supports deontology negative duty of "not making decision to kill"."

P1 is trivially true. P2 is asserted with no basis. P3 is essentially the same assertion. P4 is false based on what you really mean which is that "killing has no justification", therefore, "not killing is justified". But, this identity isn't necessary because it is possible for neither to be justified even though it is not possible for both to be. So, C is false too.

I would say that this debate has developed away from the main point. You seemed to be focused on logical consistency between rules. Though you failed to establish any, my argument is for the total lack of justification of the rules, regardless of how consistent they may or may not be in application. So, I'll try to place my original argument in the context of what you're trying to establish.

My main claim was that it is false that "something about actions, the type of actions those actions are, or how actions stand in relation to these supposed universal duties or obligations, necessarily constitutes value or something ethically significant such that one necessarily ought to adhere to those duties." If this is indeed false, then deontology is false too. So far, it seems like you didn't even read this part. You do mention justification, but that word is really only a surface level description of the concept. I tried to explicitly structure it later by saying, "Ought must prescribe something. It must prescribe according to actual value. And, actual value cannot exist without a valuer or as mere adherence." I anticipated a couple of ways you could attack this framing, but now if you do, I won't be able to respond.

Importantly, nothing about what you argued provided any defense against this.

You said you were running short on time, but you still had about 20 more hours to create your argument. So, unless you knew you weren't available during that, it seems like you're intentionally not engaging. Or, maybe you're waiting until I used my last message so that I'm unable to respond. Either way, it seems like it would have been more productive for you to forfeit or for you to have never accepted this debate.