I look forward to this debate with you, SatanLucy! This is a topic I’ve been wanting to debate for a while, looking forwarded to seeing where this goes.
I’ll break this down into some setup for the debate before getting into my plan.
I. Framework
The focus of this debate is on judicial legitimacy. “Judicial legitimacy refers to the public’s acceptance of courts as rightful arbiters whose authority and decisions merit deference. This legitimacy rests on principles of impartiality, transparency and accountability, and it underpins the rule of law. Public perception of the judiciary is shaped by high-profile rulings, political contestation, media coverage and instances of judicial misconduct.” This is closely tied to the United States Supreme Court (SC)’s democratic legitimacy. How well a court adheres to those principles is established in large part by vesting in elected officials the power to appoint them. We cannot dissociate the nomination of new justices from the process of democratically electing presidents and senators, the latter of which was a foundational basis for passing the 17th Amendment.
Why does this matter?
The SC doesn’t have an army, nor can it pass legislation or budgets. That makes it inherently reliant on those bodies that can enforce its authority - the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as state and local governments - to do so, and those bodies reflect the will of the people. Justices need to be able to make decisions that, even if the American public broadly disagrees with them, will be complied with. Justices rely on that compliance, that compliance requires enforcement from other branches, and that enforcement comes from elected representatives who reflect the will of the people.
The SC needs judicial legitimacy to function. If I can establish that it has lost legitimacy and that term limits would help to restore that legitimacy, then I will have affirmed the resolution.
II. Background
The court has been plagued with scandals and trust deficiencies. A litany of undisclosed gifts, obvious conflicts of interest, and failures to recuse themselves from cases with said conflicts pervade the court. These have had a marked effect on trust in the court, with public confidence in the court at its lowest point in decades.
The very process by which justices are confirmed to their positions has become more partisan than ever before. Justice Roberts is the only sitting justice who received votes from a majority of senators on the other side of the political aisle from his nominating president. Additionally, the process of nominating and confirming a new justice has been drowned in dark money, engendering potential conflicts of interest and corruption.
While these are expansions on existing problems within the SC, recent changes to the nomination process create novel concerns. Vacancies have become opportunities for parties in power in the Senate to control when a seat is filled. Long-standing norms such as granting every nominee a hearing and a vote were tossed out with Merrick Garland in 2016, when the Senate effectively held an SC seat open for the next president to fill. This also places pressure on the justices “to time their retirement to permit a president of their political party to name the replacement,” paving the way for horse trading that allows justices to lobby for the person to fill their seat.
The result is a system that both entrenches existing biases on the court and only allows swings in ideology when unexpected vacancies happen by gaming the process for appointing a new justice. It has become increasingly common for presidents to appoint no new SC justices, and those that do often have an outsized and long-standing effect on the makeup of the court. This affects the bias of the SC, with 6 of the current 9 justices having been appointed by Republicans despite Democrats having won 5 of the previous 10 presidential elections.
III. Plan
As specified in the definitions, this would be a constitutional amendment. Note that, as with any “ought” resolution, we are concerning ourselves with the results of the change and not with the process of passing a constitutional amendment.
Justices will have 18 year terms. These will be staggered, with the aim of affording each president two appointees. Justices who finish their terms will be allowed to either retire or continue in the role of a “senior justice,” hearing cases by designation on the lower courts and stepping back onto the SC bench when there’s a recusal or an unexpected vacancy.
Current justices would effectively have this apply somewhat retroactively, with each justice reaching the end of their 18 year term in 2 year increments, i.e. Clarence Thomas, the longest-serving justice, would reach the end of his term in 2 years, followed by John Roberts in 4, etc. This is why terms would be 18 years, since that allows for 2 year increments across 9 justices.
The timing of these vacancies would be set such that they would coincide with the swearing in of new representatives post-presidential and midterm elections.
This yields several advantages.
IV. Will of the People
Recently, justices have served an average of 26 years, spanning over 6 presidential terms. With a declining age of appointment, justices are likely to serve longer in the future. This results in justices with very long and lasting imprints on court opinions. In direct contrast, the elected branches of government and therefore the people they represent have dwindling opportunities to shape the court, seeing half the number of new justices that someone would have just 60 years ago.
Under my model, no justice would serve more than 18 years on the bench, so efforts to expand the time a justice spends on the bench would be fruitless. Every new president nominating two new justices necessarily reflects the will of the people at that time, adding new dynamics and thinking to the makeup of the court.
V. Accountability
The Constitution sets a very high bar for impeachment, and while that preserves some independence of the court from political pressures, it also makes each justice almost entirely unaccountable for their decisions. This is particularly pressing when the court has made a regular habit of moving cases to the shadow docket. The resulting rulings don’t decide a case on the merits, but still carry immense stakes. This also reduces accountability, since these can often come without even a signed opinion, let alone reasoning.
Shorter terms would also reduce the stakes for each nomination. By making the interval between appointments consistent, elected officials nominating these justices have greater incentive to compromise and allow for public accountability, since otherwise their confirmation hearings would face greater impasses.
VI. Refreshing the SC
Political parties couldn’t use their majorities to grease the skids when it comes to getting justices in at opportune moments. Late-term vacancies, whether from death or retirement, would be filled by senior justices rather than a new confirmation. This ensures that the knowledge and experience of justices who finish out their term aren’t entirely lost to the court, while providing opportunities for fresh blood to pump through the arteriosclerotic blood vessels of the judicial system.
And that turnover is likely to improve judicial decision-making. Fresh voices would change the dynamics of the court, addressing issues that have become entrenched with existing leadership in an organization were scant few wield a lot of power. The current SC exhibits marked tension between members that has led to animosity and dissenting from the bench. Turnover creates opportunities to change these interpersonal dynamics for the better and increase the diversity of the court, which could inspire public confidence and produce a richer jurisprudence.
VII. Conclusion
The focus of this debate necessarily must be on what is best for a functioning, effective SC. My impacts all focus on engendering greater trust in the highest court. This is a court whose decisions have dramatically increased in importance over the years, with opportunities to place new justices becoming front and center in elections today. We need to recognize that the court is politicized and work to make the justices accountable for the resulting actions it takes. We need to reduce court polarization and make the SC a more effective and reflective body. Through turnover via term limits, the SC can achieve judicial legitimacy, recovering the trust it sorely needs among the people.