Yes, I did. And in the hopes of not sidetracking this debate any further I asked my questions in the comment section, over 4 days ago as of the present time of writing, and got no response. With that in mind, unless Pro clarifies otherwise I will proceed on the basis of what I think he meant, which is that a loyal citizen should not criticize the incumbent President of the United States.
To that I will ask this question: what did the Framers of the Constitution have in mind when they envisioned the Presidency?
Before I continue I should add a big caveat, which is that while there was a majority in favor of ratifying the Federal Constitution, there was no absolute consensus, with many fearing the autocratic potential of a centralized government and specifically of its executive branch. Of the Constitutional delegates the final votes were as follows (in chronological order of signing):
Delaware:
Yes: 30, No: 0 (100%)
Pennsylvania:
Yes: 46, No: 23 (67%)
New Jersey:
Yes: 38, No: 0 (100%)
Georgia:
Yes: 26, No: 0 (100%)
Connecticut:
Yes: 128, No: 40 (76%)
Massachusetts:
Yes: 187, No: 168 (53%)
Maryland:
Yes: 63, No: 11 (85%)
South Carolina:
Yes: 149, No: 73 (67%)
New Hampshire:
Yes: 57, No: 47 (55%)
Virginia:
Yes: 89, No: 79 (53%)
New York:
Yes: 30, No: 27 (53%)
North Carolina:
Yes: 194, No: 77 (72%)
Rhode Island:
Yes: 34, No: 32 (52%)
To the above list I will add that none of the eight colonies with the largest populations (Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, New York, Maryland, and Connecticut, in that order) passed it unanimously, suggesting that the anti-Federal faction made up a sizable minority of the national population that late in our history.
Let it be noted also that the ratification process began as early as November 1787 in some states, and it became binding law law when the ninth out of thirteen colonies (New Hampshire) signed it on June 21, 1788. Of the remaining four, the last two didn't even begin the ratification process until after June 1788, when these states realized that it was a done deal; the two before this, meanwhile, waited until earlier in June 1788 to begin, when the Constitution was clearly on the verge of passing. What this suggests is that even the phrase "sizable minority" might be understating how many people were against having a Federal government.
But okay, it was still a majority...after both considerable compromises to the anti-Federalists, such as the Bill of Rights, and years of lively debate, during which the Federalists worked tirelessly to make their case and assuage popular fears surrounding this proposed government and particularly the executive branch (re: the Presidency). The most famous body of literature to come out of these debates, of course, is the Federalist Papers.
The Federalist Papers were written by supporters of the Federal Government, executive branch, and Presidency as opposed to by the enemies of these concepts. Which is to say that if the Federalists themselves did not advocate for a President who was beyond challenge, reproach, or accountability for his or her actions, then neither did the Founding Fathers / Framers of the Constitution as a whole.
Federal no. 68 (published March 14th, 1788) spells out the rationale for having a presidency. The entire document can be read below [1]. For brevity's sake I will only quote this excerpt:
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty...
...The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: "For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,'' yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.
Here Publius (Alexander Hamilton) expresses his belief that this political arrangement will accomplish certain goals, namely to prevent infighting within the executive branch by having a single executive head, and to uphold separation of powers (re: the executive is not beholden to the legislature) by having him elected by an electoral college as opposed to by Congress. But he also believes that the presidents selected under this model will be virtuous men and wise statesmen.
Note, at the end, that this system will be "tested" by the results it produces, namely that the president does, in fact, possess these qualities. But to prove that this was Hamilton's intent I will move on to Federalist no. 69 (also published March 14th, 1788):
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate...
...That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission...
...The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware...
... First. The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor.
Secondly. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.1 The governor of New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States...
...Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.
The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one (note: the President) would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other (note: the King of Britain) is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative.
I will point out that this is pamphlet dates to before June 21, 1788; there was, at that time, no Federal Government and no executive branch that could be said to exist but rather Hamilton was describing an ideal. In other words, unless one were to argue that Hamilton was being disingenuous everything written above describes what Hamilton, paradigm and prophet of the Federalists, wanted out of the presidency.
He wanted a figure arguably not more powerful than the Governor of New York. But more pertinent to this discussion in 2026, Hamilton foresaw a man who could be both punished (legally speaking, if he broke the law) AND disgraced for abusing his power, and that both treatments are appropriate for a man so guilty.
But what does it mean that a man is disgraced? It means that he enjoys neither the respect nor the good will of his peers, which for the President is the collective body of all citizens who elected him and/or who he represents as chief magistrate.
So, then, who says that the president is above personal criticism? How is this consistent with our values, either historical and present? This is the question I expect Pro to answer in his next round, and going forward until the end of this debate.