As the Iran War has demonstrated, the Imperium Americae is being stretched too thin.
Contrary to headlines making rounds right now I don't believe that, barring further depletion of our stockpiles at least, there's a major risk of Russia and China exploiting this gap. In the event that the Strait of Hormuz is fully reopened tomorrow it will take possibly as long as 18-21 months for global oil reserves to fully recharge and China (which imports over 70% of its fuel) won't want to be caught in a really bad situation should it turn out they underestimated the Pentagon's remaining capabilities, whereas given current efforts to ramp up munitions production as fast as possible I believe the US will have sufficiently recuperated by the time China does the same. Russia, of course, is losing badly yin Ukraine and the last thing Putin would (or at least should) want to do is open up a second front.
However, what's clear is that, given the long-term decline of US hard power relative to its enemies (evidenced by a mid-intensity bombing campaign having this effect in the first place), to shore up the prevailing global system the US will need its coalition partners to step up to the plate and rebuild their own atrophied capabilities.
This is almost certainly what Trump has been trying to do since his first term, but the obvious dilemma is how to go about this without alienating them as allies. Which brings us to the topic of this post: a reform of the armies to better manage the threats we face on multiple fronts.
The first thing to note is that, like the armies of many historical empires, the Pentagon is divided into various theaters. Specifically it divides the globe into six Unified Combatant Commands, not counting space (which is technically the seventh). Each UCC has a Commander, the most famous of which at this present time is Admiral Brad Cooper of CENTCOM.
The second thing to note is that the Pentagon has broad flexibility to reshuffle forces from one UCC to another, as in the buildup of naval forces in the Middle East from, say, the Indo-Pacific leading up to the start of the Iran War. This has its obvious advantages, but it also leads our allies to assume that, in the event of a conflict, they'll enjoy access to the full scope of American firepower. Which, for them, may skew the old guns vs. butter calculus in favor of more butter and fewer guns.
What I'm proposing is a tightening of the belt. In other words, staggered reforms -which would take a couple of years to take effect - that would make it harder for the US to redeploy assets from one UCC to another. Each UCC has its own strategic plan for defending that theater, which relies on certain assets being present in said theater. I propose that, in the event that said redeployment would leave a given UCC unable to reasonably meet its own security needs per some regulatory definition, it should require an act of Congress before such could go ahead.
Obviously this ought to be coupled with a return to pre-Trump norms of publicly committing to honor our mutual defense treaties, and above all not being so batshit insane as to threaten our allies for no reason. But the main gist of this proposal is to give our allies advance notice that, in coming years, it'll be harder to secure US firepower from outside the given UCC that their country/regional bloc falls under, meaning they'll have to pick up the slack.
Discuss.