Granting theism as true (and thus there exists, at least, one God), polytheism is more probable than monotheism

I would like to start by thanking RationalTheist for accepting the debate and hope that it is as engaging as I hope.

To start off my opening arguments, I think we can start with the Diversity of Religious Experience.

DIversity of Religious Experience argument for Polytheism

This argument ultimately comes from John Michael Greer’s book A World Full of Gods, but Dr. Bowers has a fantastic YouTube summary of the argument that is linked below.

Greer presents an analogy of a researcher visiting a village with the goal of understanding the villager’s views on the existence of cats.

When the researcher interviews the first villager, the existence-exclusive mono-felist, the villager says that they obviously believe in the existence of Cat. There is one Cat, they say, and they have seen it. It is a tabby with blue eyes. I will leave out kibble for it in the mornings and by the end of the day it is gone. This villager also says that they know some of their neighbors have different views of Cats, which is sad since those cats don’t exist. They are leaving the wrong types of food and believing the wrong things about Cat. The food they leave out is probably just eaten by wandering hobos.

The researcher then goes to the next house to ask them about Cat. This villager, the value-exclusive mono-felist goes on to say they obviously believe in the existence of Cat. There is one Cat, they say, and they have seen it. It is a black cat with green eyes, and every morning they leave milk out for Cat and by the end of the day it is gone. They know some of their neighbors claim to have experience with Cat, but says they are just experiencing sewer rats and mistaking them as Cat. They think some might think they are feeding Cat while mistakenly feeding the rats, but also suspects some are purposefully feeding the rats.

The researcher then moves to the third house to ask the same questions. This villager, the existence-inclusive mono-felist, goes on to say they obviously believe in the existence of Cat. There is one Cat, they say, and they have seen it. It is a marmalade tom with orange eyes. They know some of their neighbors claim to have experience with Cat, and do not deny it (after all, they get some details correct), but say the neighbors are mistaken in certain ways. They probably only saw Cat in the dark or bad lighting conditions, causing them to get a bad look at Cat and mistake its characteristics. They leave out canned food every day, as they know that Cat prefers it over all else, though Cat probably also eats the kibble and milk, but it is canned food that Cat likes best of all.

We can skip the fourth house for the debate, as it is the house of the a-felinist and thus not entirely relevant to the debate.

So, finally the researcher makes it to the fifth house, the house of the poly-felist. This last villager informs the researcher that there have been three different Cats in the village for a while now, each with its preferred foods that they know where to go to get. What is funny is recently, they go on, is that they say they recently saw burmese Cat recently show up in the village and is curious to know what the other villagers will make of it when they see it.

The first three villagers are analogous to different monotheist positions one can take:

The first villager represents the monotheist that thinks all other Gods are fake and that people that claim experience of other Gods are delusional.

The second villager represents the monotheist that thinks all other Gods are something other than Gods (think of the particular Christians that hold that other religions worship demons), and that other people are either mistakenly worshipping demons or are doing so intentionally.

The third villager represents the monotheist that thinks others are worshipping God, but that their perceptions are flawed. Think of the Blind Men and the Elephant story (linked below).

The problem with these views is that they all, ultimately, rely on special pleading.

Each view is that their own experiences are valid (or at least anyone that would hold the same views), but that other experiences are not. Whether they think the experience of other Cats/Gods is due to delusion, mistaking something else for Cat/God, or just an imperfect lens does not change the special pleading involved.

Even if we take a modified variation of villager three, one that holds there is one Cat/God but no one’s experience is more valid than the other, this still does not explain it when people have experiences involving multiple Cats/Gods at once.

Only the person that acknowledges many Cats/Gods (or none at all) can avoid special pleading when it comes to explaining the diversity of religious experience. And so a diversity of religious experiences, which is what exists, better supports polytheism than monotheism.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem and Mathematical Platonism

This argument is ultimately derived from Willdam20’s argument on Reddit (linked below).

I do not think presuming Mathematical Platonism is true should be too controversial, as in the latest Phil Survey, linked below, the majority, not just a plurality, of Philosophers of Mathematics hold to this view. I will, however, still make a small case for it at the end of this section.

If abstract objects do exist in a Platonic manner, there are two main ways that they can be conceived of within philosophy.

Either they exist as independent, necessary things.

Or they exist within the mind of God(s).

If the former, then that means that there can exist multiple necessary things, which weakens monotheism’s probability.

If the latter, then Willdam’s argument becomes useful in establishing polytheism.

His argument is as follows:

P1) A God (in general) possesses a perfectly rational intellect.

P2) The product of a single perfectly rational intellect ought to be complete and consistent.

P3) If Divine Conceptualism is true then mathematics is the product of at least one divine mind.

P4) By Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, no system of mathematics is both complete and consistent.

P5) If Divine Conceptualism is true then mathematics is not the product of a single divine mind.

P6) Mathematical Platonism, and specifically Divine Conceptualism, is true.

C) Therefore, there exists more than one divine, perfectly rational mind, i.e. Polytheism is true.

P1 and P3 are definitionally true.

God, in a classical sense, is a perfect being, and an irrational intellect would preclude a being from being perfect.

Divine Conceptualism is definitionally that abstracta, which mathematics is (under Mathematical Platonism), are products of the mind of God(s).

P2 seems to also follow from God’s perfect nature. If God is perfect and Omnipotent, then it seems contradictory for God’s mind or the product of said mind to include either incompleteness or inconsistency.

P4 is also just a restatement of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem.

It seems like if one wishes to hold to Divine Conceptualism as the explanation of Mathematical Abstracta, while also adhering to the perfect nature of God(s), that one must hold that Mathematics is a product of multiple Divine Minds coming together. Each mind is consistent and, with the union of another Divine Mind, creating a complete mathematics.

Or you can reject Divine Conceptualism, hold that Mathematical Abstracta (and other abstracta) exist as their own, independent necessary entities. In that case, that means there can be things that exist that are not dependent upon one God, and that leaves the door open for polytheism.

I expect the challenge to this argument will mostly be on P6, denying Mathematical Platonism.

So, what reasons are there to accept Mathematical Platonism? One of the best arguments is, I believe, the Indispensability Argument (the SEP article is linked below).

The gist of the argument is that we are ontologically committed to the existence of Mathematical Abstracta in the same way that the field of electronics is ontologically committed to the existence of electrons.

To quote the basic argument from the SEP article,

P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.

P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.

C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.

Much of science would not work without mathematics. Mathematical entities are, essentially, necessary for science to work. If mathematical entities do not exist, then it would seem strange that science seems to work and produce empirically true results.

One of the main ways that those that argue against the Indispensability Argument typically try to do is try and eliminate science’s reliance on mathematics (see Hartry Field’s Science Without Numbers). This has mostly been considered unsuccessful as it seems, especially within higher level physics, chemistry, etc., mathematics is necessary.

An Ontological Argument for Polytheism

The final argument in my opening arguments is, what I believe to be, the strongest argument for polytheism (granted theism as true).

P1) A necessary being exists in all possible worlds.

P2) If the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not necessarily true, then there exists at least one possible world with many necessary beings.

P3) The PII is not necessarily true.

C1) There exists a possible world with many necessary beings.

C2) There exists many necessary beings, i.e. Polytheism is true.

P1 is definitionally true within modal logic.

P2 seems to be obviously true. The PII is the principle that there must be a property, outside of mere numerical distinction, between two things for them to exist (SEP article linked below).

Essentially, when applied to theism, the argument usually goes that there must be some property that one God has that the other does not, for if there were no differences then (via the PII) there is only one God.

Which means that P3 is the contentious premise.

There are two ways that I will support P3, starting off with the traditional means of using Max Black’s thought experiment, included in the SEP link, (and giving my own twist):

Max Black asks us to imagine a symmetrical universe with only two balls in it, each in perfect symmetry. Intuitively, there is nothing that seems to be wrong with the existence of such a universe. The only thing one can point to on why such a universe would be metaphysically impossible seems to be that such perfect symmetry would violate the PII, but such reasoning alone seems absurd.

But we can go one step further.

Let’s imagine a collection of universes. In every single one of these universes there exists two balls. What causes each universe to be different is the color of the balls, specifically each ball can be red, orange, yellow, green, blue, or violet in a different combination.

The position of the balls within the universe are such that if they are the same color, that the universe is a symmetrical universe with the balls in perfect symmetry.

So, the question is why can each ball, Individually, be any of the available colors while they cannot both be the same? It seems, to me, like the PII, when applied to this hypothetical collection, is absurd, and thus via reductio ad absurdism should be dismissed.

But as much as I enjoy the various thought experiments one could have with symmetrical universes, it turns out that we don’t even need them to reject the PII. Why? Because we already know it is false due to quantum mechanics as bosons violate it!

Unlike fermions, bosons can occupy the same quantum state as each other.

To quote from Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis,

“it is not the case that in practice we cannot distinguish between two photons, but, rather, that there is nothing in principle which can serve to individuate them [...]Furthermore, the photons existing in mode P are not identical to the ones before or after, and are excitation of the same field mode and possess all properties in common, yet are numerically distinct, PII is violated."

Nick Huggett has even gone further into looking at the applicability of the PII to quantum mechanics and found it wanting (link below).

We are, ultimately, left with no good reason to accept the PII as true, let alone necessarily true. As such, P3 is established, and thus the argument follows, so long as there exists at least one necessary being (God), there are many, and thus polytheism is true.

Conclusion

I hope that my opening arguments have, at the very least, given thought to pause and consider polytheism. I hope that I have convincingly showed that both human experience and logical deduction lead us to polytheism as being probably true (at least, when granted that theism is true)

Sources:

A World Full of Gods by John Michael Greer

The Logic of Polytheism by Dr. Bowers (https://youtu.be/R2l7jo-apXI?si=Fwvikv6pgJxHFs9C)

Blind Men and the Elephant (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_men_and_an_elephant)

Willdam20’s An Argument for Polytheism (https://www.reddit.com/r/Defense_of_Polytheism/comments/woyf3h/an_argument_for_polytheism_using_platonism_g%C3%B6dels/)

2020 Phil Survey (https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4818?aos=47)

SEP Indispensability Argument (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathphil-indis/)

SEP Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/)

Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis by Steven French and Decio Krause

Quarticles and the Identity of Indiscernibles

Nick Huggett (https://philpapers.org/rec/HUGQAT)

RESPONSE: Modal ontological argument for Monotheism

In this argument Con presents one variation of the Ontological argument. The part that is relevant to the debate here are:

1. The assertion that uniqueness is a maximally great quality (with the assumption that it would not exist in polytheism).

2. That multiple infinites cannot exist due to logical paradoxes.

I feel as if the inclusion of uniqueness as a maximally great quality is unwarranted and illogical. Something is only unique in relation to something external, and thus to say that a quality of God is uniqueness is to say that there is a quality of God that is contingent on something external to God. Uniqueness is, it seems, an incidental property, but if we include such properties in this discussion/debate then it seems trivial to allow for many Gods that only differ in their incidental properties.

Furthermore, even if uniqueness was not incidental, the question becomes one on if one needs to have a different property to, ultimately, be unique. There are many ways of arguing against this, from arguing that personhood is a feature and not a property but is still something God possesses (and thus arguing that each God could have a unique personhood), to using Neoplatonic philosophy, or arguing that how the Gods relate to each other is not a fundamental property of the Gods but still serves to differentiate them, etc.

There are, it seems, many conceivable ways in which one could have multiple Gods be unique while sharing all fundamental properties. Con has presented nothing to actually argue otherwise.

So, while I disagree that uniqueness even can be considered a Great Making quality, as it is a property that would (if a Great Making quality) make one great in light of other things existing, I still ultimately feel as if it does not actually refute polytheism if it were such a property. So long as there exists at least one means in which one can imagine that two, or more beings, can be unique despite sharing, at their core, all properties, then polytheism is not refuted.

To address the Hilbert’s Hotel argument, there are a couple flaws to using this argument. For starters, Hilbert’s Hotel does not apply merely to multiple infinite sets but also creates paradoxes with just one infinity. If Hilbert’s Hotel is deemed successful in arguing against infinities in the same manner in which that concept might apply to God(s), then it is just as detrimental to monotheism as it is to polytheism. It also makes the fundamental mistake of treating infinity as a number which one can manipulate in mathematics like you can an integer.

So, while I think Hilbert’s Hotel already is flawed at addressing whether infinity can exist, it is, if successful in the manner Con is employing it, just as detrimental to monotheism as polytheism and thus does not actually help Con in this debate.

Ultimately, I see nothing here that actually excludes polytheism.

RESPONSE: Contingency argument for monotheism

While I agree with the Contingency argument, I feel as if the jump from there needing to be necessary being(s) to explain contingent things to “there is only one necessary being” is an unjustified leap.

It does not seem to me like Con spent enough time arguing from the contingency argument to monotheism. Whether one could differentiate one God from another seems immaterial on whether there are multiple Gods.

Though not directly brought up by Con, I ultimately feel like the contingency argument, at best, leads us to asking the question “Is the fundamental/necessary foundation of reality monocentric or polycentric?” rather than immediately establishing either monotheism or polytheism.

In other words, do things which exist contingently ultimately exist in relation to one necessary being (one center of existence, monocentrism) or many necessary beings (many centers of existence, polycentrism)? While not exactly the argument Con put forward, this is ultimately the question that is relevant to the contingency argument in relation to the polytheism vs monotheism debate.

While the terms are mostly used in urban planning, philosopher Edward Butler has made use of the terms in discussing the philosophy of religion in order to better express Platonic polytheism (see source below).

Now, what Con did bring up is the idea neither a necessary being nor a contingent being cannot have anything external to explain it. This is ultimately where the Polycentric Polytheism of Platonists, and many other polytheistic philosophies, is most relevant. As one of the earliest maxims in ancient Greece states (often attributed to the Pythagoreans), "All things are in all things, but in each appropriately." This is expanded upon by Olympiodorus when he states "All the Gods are in Zeus zeusically, and in Hera heraically – for no God is incomplete.”

Essentially, this is an idea that combines polytheism with pantheism (or panentheism). Each God contains all reality and all Gods. There is nothing external to a God, all relations are internal in a polycentric manner.

While this might seem initially unintuitive to some people, it is important to note that polycentrism is a thing within urban planning, mathematics, etc., and thus cannot be dismissed out of hand for merely seeming unintuitive.

The question becomes which should be preferred, a polycentric or monocentric foundation of reality? I believe my argument in regards to Mathematical Platonism can be adapted to show why monocentrism is, itself, flawed, but I also believe that we can tackle the issue more directly.

If X is able to be derived from Y but Y cannot be derived from X, then Y is more fundamental than X. This is a core aspect of relative fundamentality within metaphysics.

So in a metaphysical, religious context, can polycentrism be derived out of a monocentric system? No, it cannot. Necessary beings cannot start to exist, and there is nothing else that can be considered the center in this context, and thus at the very least monocentrism (in a religious, metaphysical context) cannot be more fundamental than polycentrism (see source below).

On the other hand, it is, at the very least, debatable on whether you can consider monocentrism derivable from polycentrism, as it depends on the nature of the monocentrism (of which Butler argues there are many ways for monocentrism to exist compared to polycentrism in the strictest metaphysical sense). For one example, a system might start polycentric (polytheist) and then orient towards monocentrism (in a way metaphysically reflective of monolatry/henotheism).

If monocentrism is, in fact, derivable from polycentrism, then polycentrism is more fundamental, and thus we should favor polytheism. If it is not, then whether we should favor polytheism or monotheism should be more dependent upon other arguments (like the ones I presented in the opening round) than on how contingent things relate to necessary beings.

In either case, with this line of reasoning we are not left with favoring monotheism. At best, we remain neutral, at worst polytheism is favored.

RESPONSE: Occam's razor

One of the biggest flaws of Occam’s Razor is the assumption that less = simpler. While it is true, in general, that one should favor the idea that proposes less entities, all other things being equal, it rarely is the case that all other things are equal.

One of the best examples of this is the One-Electron Model of the Universe (Wikipedia article linked below). It is an idea that every electron, and positron, in the universe can be explained with a single particle that moves forwards and backwards in time.

If one should always favor that which proposes less entities, then this model, or something like it, should surely be favored within the field of physics, right?

But it is not. The amount of baggage that comes with proposing a single electron is such that it is simpler to not only say there are many electrons, but many positrons as well.

I think the same reasoning is applicable to God(s). This is most obvious with the diversity of religious experience, which I addressed in my opening arguments. Ultimately, I think that polytheism is, actually, simpler (much like how proposing many electrons and positrons is simpler than proposing one single particle), but also that, at the very least, simplicity arguments are simply inadequate and would ultimately be reliant on other arguments to address which is actually simpler at the end of the day.

RESPONSE: Conclusion

In the conclusion Con asked some questions and indicated that they needed to be answered. I do not actually agree with that.

Is there a maximum limit to the number of gods? If so, what is it and if not why not?

I see no logical issue with being agnostic on the maximum number of Gods. Polytheism merely requires that I hold to a minimum number. Being unable to answer this question does not, it seems, actually impact the probability of polytheism.

How can we tell the difference between gods? How do we know when one god is controlling something verses another?

These questions, while good questions for religious inquiry, do not actually seem that relevant to whether there are many Gods or not, just how to differentiate them and tell which one is responsible for what. It is also irrelevant to the debate in question, though is worthy of its own independent debate/discussion.

How do we determine which god is more maximally great?

I find this question to be nonsensical. Maximally Great is not a statement about how Great a being is in relation to others, it is about having Great Making Properties in a maximal way. There is nothing that necessitates only one being can have such properties. This seems almost like an equivocation fallacy to me.

How is “God” actually defined?

This is probably a question that would have been better asked before the debate than in the middle of it. At this point, if this question is truly up in the air, I could define “God” as an individual particle and win by default. Ultimately, however, I am using God as traditionally conceived, a Perfect, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Perfectly Good necessary being that is the foundation of reality. There are various ways to define the same concept using different words, but I believe going into the debate that we had the same concept in mind.

many polytheistic religions, especially the Greek-Roman religions, have gods that are born and die (meaning they are contingent and not necessary) and have moral flaws (meaning they are not morally perfect).

While not wholly relevant on whether there are many Gods or not (as one could also point to monotheists that might hold that God is flawed, or contingent, etc.), this is actually a misunderstanding of the Greek and Roman religions. Certainly the Gods are portrayed as being born, dying, having flaws, etc. within the myths, but the myths were not taken literally.

As Sallust opens his book On the Gods and the World,

“It is requisite that those who are willing to hear concerning the gods should have been well informed from their childhood, and not nourished with foolish opinions. It is likewise necessary that they should be naturally prudent and good, that they may receive, and properly understand, the discourses which they hear. The knowledge likewise of common conceptions is necessary; but common conceptions are such things as all men, when interrogated, acknowledge to be indubitably certain; such as, that every god is good, without passivity, and free from all mutation; for every thing which is changed, is either changed into something better or into something worse: and if into something worse, it will become depraved, but if into something better, it must have been evil in the beginning.”

While one might try arguing that this is moreso a reflection on what Platonists believed about the Gods, scholars are increasingly of the view that this actually reflects the actual practiced religion of the ancient Greeks,

"Our first conclusion may be that if the Greeks should be ‘desperately alien’ they are not so in that having so many gods they must do without the notion of theological omnipotence, but in that they have so many omnipotent gods” [...] “This whole argument can be extended to other divine characteristics as we have quickly listed them above, especially to omnipresence and omniscience, including all-seeing."

HS Vernsel

"The gods of the Platonic tradition are totally benevolent towards mankind. They are aware of human activities, hear humans' prayers and feel charis [grace] at humans' sacrifices and dedications, are concerned for humans' welfare, and bring to humans a multitude of benefits [...] The gods so described resemble closely the gods described in the best sources for practised religion”

Jon D Mikalson

Conclusion

While I would like to thank RationalTheism for their opening arguments, I must say that I, ultimately, remain unconvinced in their arguments for monotheism. I do look forward to their critique to my opening arguments.

Sources

Essays on the Metaphysics of Polytheism in Proclus by Edward Butler (https://www.academia.edu/5724546/Essays_on_the_Metaphysics_of_Polytheism_in_Proclus)

Henadology Philosophy Polycentrism (https://henadology.wordpress.com/philosophy/)

One Electron Universe (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-electron_universe)

HS Versnel Coping with the Gods

Jon D Mikalson Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy

I would like to thank RationalTheist for this debate. It has been a long time since I have had a more formal debate, and it has been quite enjoyable. If so desired, I would love to have an informal discussion on the topic once we have both finished posting our final rounds.

DEFENSE: Diversity of Religious Experience

My opponent argues from a similar position as Villager 3, that other people are having genuine experiences and that God is merely appearing in a manner fitting for their cultures.

While this might seem like a good argument at first, the flaw occurs when taking into account polytheists that not only have experiences of multiple Gods, but have experiences of multiple Gods simultaneously. Why would God, a perfectly good being that, as Con said, would want a personal relationship with us act in such a deceptive manner? If it was merely that God appeared to different cultures differently, then that would be no different than how we behave differently in different friend groups, social circles, etc., but to appear to the same person pretending to be many Gods? That just seems too deceptive to the point it would violate the perfect goodness of God(s).

Con also states that because religions and religious interpretations of God(s) can contradict that it isn’t special pleading to deny the experiences of others. I think this makes two major mistakes:

1) It would still be special pleading to deny one person’s experience and not another’s (absent sufficient evidence to do so) even if their experiences contradict. The same reasoning one can employ to accept one person’s experiences is ultimately applicable to the other’s, and thus the fallacious reasoning would still exist.

2) Contradictions in religious interpretations do not actually impact whether or not the experience of a God happened, merely that people’s personal, religious interpretations of their experiences very well could be imperfect. We see this with character witnesses in trials constantly, where both sides can provide character witnesses that give different, contradictory accounts on a person’s nature, beliefs, etc. Why should we expect that such a thing would not also extend to the Gods?

The last point Con brings up here is that we should be skeptical of people’s claims of witnessing God(s) in the same vein we are with people claiming alien abductions. I feel as if these are not as comparable as Con might think. Philosopher Richard Swinburne presents an argument for the existence of God through religious experience by use of Reid’s Principle of Credulity (source below).

The Principle of Credulity is, in essence, that the world is generally as we observe it and so we should, generally, believe things are as they seem unless there exists other considerations.

Alien abductions bring about more skepticism because if they were happening, as people report, then we would expect other things to also be true that are not (for example, satellites or SETI picking up these visitors).

This is not as applicable with people’s experiences of the Gods (absent various atheist arguments like the existence of evil/suffering/etc.), and thus, it seems, the Principle is in much more effect here.

Given that, I believe that I have done an adequate job showing that religious experiences are best explained by polytheism.

DEFENSE: Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem

While I do agree that Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem is often misused, I do not believe that is what I am doing here. In the SEP quote provided, one of the examples of misuse is saying that Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem somehow proves Platonism. That would be a misuse, and is not what I did. To defend Mathematical Platonism I appealed to both the Indispensability Argument and the consensus view among relevant experts.

The conclusion of polytheism comes merely from the consequences of theism, Mathematical Platonism, and Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem all being true. I believe that this places the argument beyond the misuse talked about in the SEP article that was linked, which mostly deals with misuse and misunderstanding Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem and deriving fantastical conclusions from it on its own.

Con also says that we cannot apply formal mathematical systems to minds. I feel like this is not as applicable when it comes to the Forms as it does normal mental attributes, and that P2 of the argument (The product of a single perfectly rational intellect ought to be complete and consistent), which remains uncontested, adequately deals with this. The formal system of mathematics ultimately exists as the Platonic Forms of mathematics, which under Divine Conceptualism are products of the mind of God(s). As such, the rules of formal mathematical systems apply to minds in this particular way, the precise way used in the argument for polytheism. This also means that P5 (which should have been labeled C1, that is my mistake) is not a non-sequitur, as I showed how in this instance the rules of formal mathematics do apply.

The last part brought up by Con in this section are “some big questions that need to be addressed”, but do they need to be addressed in this debate?

Questions like “How do these different divine minds coordinate with each other?” and “If each contribute to different parts of mathematics then what is uniting all of them together?” are certainly interesting questions on the nature of how multiple Gods interact, but do they need to be answered in order to conclude that there are multiple Gods? I do not believe so.

I would be more than willing to discuss these questions with Con at some other time, but they just do not seem all that relevant to the debate itself.

The last point brought up was that classical theism posits that God’s mind completely transcends human rationality and there might be a reason why God would allow for some theorems to be incomplete. I believe that this can be met with a similar “big question” response, but it ultimately seems to leave us with two ways of resolving the argument I presented:

1) There exists one God whose mind is, from our perspective, irrational and the product of this God’s mind can be incomplete and/or inconsistent.

2) There are many rational Gods.

I would argue that, when given a rational alternative, that there is no rational reason to believe in the irrational, and thus we should still ultimately come to the conclusion of polytheism.

DEFENSE: A Modal Ontological Argument for Polytheism

Con says that C2 (There exists many necessary beings, i.e. Polytheism is true) does not follow from C1, but it does follow from both P1 (A necessary being exists in all possible worlds) and C1 (There exists a possible world with many necessary beings).

While Con does say that I did not argue that necessary being = God, the argument I presented applies to any and all necessary beings, of which God is one. You can, essentially, replace the phrase “necessary being(s)” in the argument with “God(s)” and the same logic applies. If the logic holds up, then polytheism is true, and the logic merely relies on possible world modal reasoning and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) not being necessarily true.

Con tries to create a parody argument of my initial argument, but P3 (There are possible worlds accessible from the actual world in which PII is necessarily true) remains dubious at best. We are left with no reason to think that the PII is even contingently true in any possible world, let alone arguing that it could be necessarily true in one. Without P3, the whole parody argument falls apart.

While Con does try and argue that there is a symmetry issue, where Modal reasoning seems to conclude both monotheism and polytheism, I ultimately disagree that the Modal Argument presented (or any that I am aware of) actually necessitate the conclusion of a singular God existing. Most of these arguments are designed specifically for atheism vs theism debates, and so it should actually be unsurprising that they don’t actually tend to address monotheism vs polytheism, but a consequence of this is that they do not lead to creating the symmetry Con is trying to appeal to.

While Con does try and argue that the PII is, in fact, necessarily true, there are two major issues with the arguments in this section:

1) When addressing Max Black’s thought experiment they treat spatial coordinates as real instead of relative. Under a spatial relativity model (in which could apply to such a symmetrical universe), there would be no spatial point in which one could differentiate the two spheres. Furthermore, even if I concede the distinction between “intrinsic internal information and extrinsic properties” leading to a distinction between two things, even if all “intrinsic internal information” is otherwise identical, the same reasoning can ultimately apply to God(s) as a means for them to ultimately differ by their relation to each other rather than any inherent, internal property.

2) Con does not address the fact that bosons are already seen to violate the PII in the real world. If the PII were necessarily true, then we would not expect to find any violations of it, but we do find violations of the PII. This suggests that it isn’t a necessary truth.

Con brings up Occam’s Razon, which I feel I have adequately addressed, but also brings up certain other questions.

But under multiple different deities how do you get a unified source of reality? What happens if these gods differ on certain issues? What happens when one god wants to stop another god from performing a particular task?

I believe that the polycentrism I mentioned in my previous round is an adequate means of answering the first question. The other questions, however, seem quite illogical. Why would different Gods differ on certain issues and/or want to stop another God from performing a certain task? All Gods are perfect, which includes perfect Goodness, rationality, and Omniscience. Those shared properties would make such a circumstance of “Gods differing and wanting to stop other Gods” illogical.

This also is applicable with the issue of Moral clarity that Con brought up. Why would we expect different Gods, all of whom are perfect beings, to have different moral standards?

Ultimately, it seems like a large portion of this reasoning relies on addressing imperfect Gods rather than perfect ones. It does not address polytheism itself but rather a particular type of polytheism that is more like how Gods are portrayed in myths rather than worshipped in actual practiced religion (as I brought up in my previous round).

Even if the symmetry that Con proposes holds, I don’t think the reasoning they employed to favor monotheism works. I would instead appeal to the diversity of religious experiences as a reason to justify polytheism.

Ultimately, however, I do not believe there actually is the symmetry that Con proposes there is.

CONCLUSION

I really would like to thank RationalTheist for this debate. I did quite enjoy it, though I found the arguments for monotheism quite lacking.

I believe that I have adequately shown that the diversity of religious experiences favors polytheism, that modal logic favors polytheism, etc.

I believe I have adequately addressed arguments like Con’s use of Occam’s Razor, questions in regards to the contingency argument, etc.

Ultimately, I believe that I have shown polytheism as more rational.

While I welcome a further, more informal discussion on the topic, I believe that what has been presented here is enough to justify that you should vote Pro.

Thank you

SOURCES

The Existence of God by Richard Swinburne