Was Killing Ayatollah Khameini Good or Bad?

Thanks Pro.

Overview:

In this round I'll be providing a framework under which to evaluate the debate, followed by primarily constructive arguments. Direct responses will be saved for next round.

Framing:

On February 28th, 2026, Donald Trump declared on Truth Social that the assassination of Ali Khamenei was in pursuit of their objective of "peace throughout the middle east and, indeed, the world" (Trump 26). Thus, the burden of proof should be split between pro and con in this debate. Pro must argue that the assassination of Ali Khamenei will promote regional stability and peace within Iran, while I must argue that this assassination will destabilize Iran. Whoever best achieves their burden should be considered the winner of this debate. Prefer this framing because Pro failed to provide their own framing within R1. My sole contention is that the assassination of Khamenei will destabilize Iran for a variety of reasons.

C1) Instability

Iran is a nation marked by many struggles, both past and present. It's a powder keg doused in kerosine, waiting for a spark to ignite an explosive inferno that could consume the entire nation. Rathi 25 outlines the situation:

... Iran is facing its worst economic crisis in over twenty years. Inflation remains above 40%, the rial has sharply devalued and youth unemployment is over 22%. A 2023 IranPoll survey found that more than 70% of Iranians distrust the government’s official narratives, and nearly 60% support fundamental political change. The 2022–23 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, were the largest since the 2009 Green Movement. Though the state quelled them through arrests and executions, the core grievances remain. ... Unlike the relatively controlled transition of 1989, today’s Iran is more divided, militarized and economically fragile. A successor without legitimacy or the ability to manage internal factions risks pushing the country into instability. ... Ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Baluchs, and Azeris are already demanding greater autonomy. A prolonged power crisis could embolden them and fuel violent fragmentation

Khamenei's death creates a power vacuum that promotes regional chaos and could have much further reaching implications. Rathi continues:

If a leadership vacuum emerges, these tensions could resurface. ... It is also likely that, in the absence of a strong leader, Iran’s nuclear program would fall increasingly under the control of hardline military figures. This could result in a much more aggressive posture toward the West, rather than a retreat. In such a scenario, diplomacy would become more difficult, and the potential for regional conflict would grow. Far from ending hostilities, Khamenei’s assassination could inflame them beyond Israel’s control. To assume that the death of one man will dismantle an entire regime is a mistake that history has repeatedly exposed. Toppling a figure like Khamenei does not guarantee the emergence of a stable successor, let alone a more moderate or cooperative one. It risks, instead, the collapse of an entire state apparatus, a power vacuum that could be filled by militia factions, radicalized clerics, or foreign actors. Such instability would have far-reaching consequences, disrupting global oil supplies, jeopardizing critical regional trade corridors and undermining existing nuclear nonproliferation efforts. If the goal is to eliminate threats, replacing a centralized regime with chaos does the opposite.

C2) Radicalization

In the wake of Ali Khamenei's assassination, Iran has appointed a new supreme ruler - his son, Mojtaba Khamenei. Herzlich 26 outlines an interview of why that should scare you:

Piers Morgan asked Mehdi Hasan ... whether he was happy that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was no longer ruling Iran after his assassination ... He tore into the Trump administration’s “Operation Epic Fury,” jibing that the “regime-change war” was a “real high-level success” in replacing Khamenei with his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who is “apparently more hard-lined … than his father.” ... “It was wrong to kill him, it was illegal to kill him, it will have disastrous effects for the region, it’s mad to take out a head of state and a spiritual leader, and it’s even madder when you replace him with his son who is quote-unquote ‘worse’ than him both for Iran and for US and Israeli interests,” Hasan said. ...

Crane, Chamberlain and Reyes 26 elaborate:

... “I assure everyone that we will not refrain from avenging the blood of your martyrs,” the supreme leader said. “The retaliation we have in mind is not limited only to the martyrdom of the great leader of the revolution [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei]; rather, every member of the nation who is martyred by the enemy constitutes a separate case in the file of revenge.” ... Khamenei, who specifically noted avenging those killed in the strike on the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school building in Minab, said Iran would “obtain compensation” from its enemy, meaning the US and Israel. “If it refuses, we will take from its assets to the extent we deem appropriate, and if that is not possible, we will destroy its assets to the same extent,” he said. The message was a clear call for Iran’s allies abroad to take revenge ... “It hints at activating terror cells, like the warnings that have come out of Europe and the US, and the reports of preparing strikes on the West Coast,” ... The ayatollah also said that Iran would continue to attack its Gulf Arab neighbors, though he insisted Tehran was only targeting US military bases. ...

If that's not scary enough, it's speculated that Mojtaba Khamenei is merely just acting as a puppet for figures who are acting behind the scenes. Crane, Chamberlain, and Reyes continue:

... No explanation was given for why the 56-year-old did not appear in the flesh, with experts suggesting the message was a sign that Khamenei is little more than a figurehead and that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains the real center of power. ... Khamenei’s message demonstrated that he would maintain his father’s hardline position against the US and Israel, but the method used to put out the statement suggests it may not have been the supreme leader’s words ... Isfahani has said Iran’s top leaders are happy to let Khamenei take the reins of the country to avoid being targeted themselves. ... “He’s just being used as a puppet for the IRGC’s message to the world,” ...

The IRGC are even worse and are actively seeking vengeance, to be paid in blood, and have been pushing for violence against the US and its allies for years. Gonzalez, Jones, Fatimah, Shelton and Tamsut 25 explain:

(IRGC) issued a warning to US military bases in the Middle East after overnight US airstrikes on the country's nuclear sites. "By attacking the peaceful nuclear facilities, [US forces] have de facto put themselves in direct danger," ... Iran, it said, would "use options beyond the understanding... of the agressor front, and the aggressors of this land must expect regrettable responses." ... The IRGC also said it would continue to target Israel, which has been hit by multiple waves of missile and drone attacks since Israel struck Iran on June 13.

The Times of Israel 26 continue:

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps vows to punish the “murderers” of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, after his death is confirmed by state television, promising what it says will be the “most ferocious offensive operation in history” against US bases and Israel. “The hand of revenge of the Iranian nation for a severe, decisive and regrettable punishment for the murderers of the Imam of the Ummah will not let go of them,” the IRGC says in a statement.

And the IRGC have direct ties with terrorist groups, meaning that them gaining increased control over Iran will not end well for both the region and the world. US Department of the Treasury 23 explains:

Today, the U.S ... (OFAC) and the United Kingdom are jointly taking action against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). ... IRGC-QF support has enabled Hamas’ and PIJ’s terrorist activities, to include the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars in financial assistance and provision of weapons and operational training.

This isn't even breaking news. The IRGC have been directly supporting terrorism for decades, and now they're likely in direct control of Iran. US Department of the Treasury 07 shows:

The Qods Force, a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; aka Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), provides material support to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). The Qods Force is the Iranian regime's primary instrument for providing lethal support to the Taliban. The Qods Force provides weapons and financial support to the Taliban to support anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition activity in Afghanistan. Since at least 2006, Iran has arranged frequent shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and probably man-portable defense systems to the Taliban. ... The Qods Force has had a long history of supporting Hizballah's military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities, providing it with guidance, funding, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support. The Qods Force operates training camps for Hizballah in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and has reportedly trained more than 3,000 Hizballah fighters at IRGC training facilities in Iran. The Qods Force provides roughly $100 to $200 million in funding a year to Hizballah and has assisted Hizballah in rearming ... In addition, the Qods Force provides lethal support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and guidance to select groups of Iraqi Shi'a militants who target and kill Coalition and Iraqi forces and innocent Iraqi civilians.

Back over to Pro.

Overview:

Pro's seemingly entire premise rests on a fallacious and irrelevant idea while they seemingly are refusing to engage in the arguments being presented within the Con case.

We'll start on Pro's argument since they seem to really want me to respond to it.

Pro's Case:

Pro's entire round one consists of one (technically two, but really one) idea that people are celebrating his death. I'm going to address the statistic because as persuasive as videos of people cheering are, thousands of people were video'd mourning his death. There's a lot of problems with their statistic:

1. There's literally no source for it. This lack of a source is contrasted by the fact that 43% of Iranians were reported to be in support of Khamenei in 2022.
2. Even if Pro's statistic is accurate, there's a world of a difference between wanting someone out of office and wanting someone dead. Elections exist for a reason, and a full-blown extra-national assassination just plunges Iran into chaos and creates a power vacuum, akin to the argument I'm making in C1.
3. Even if Pro's implication is correct in that 89% of Iranians wanted Khamenei dead, that doesn't make it a good idea or good for the regional stability of Iran. Refer to the arguments I'm making in both C1 and C2 as to why power vacuums create chaos and open the door for even worse actors to step in and destabilize the situation further.

Con's Case:

99.9% of the arguments I make in R1 go entirely unaddressed, save for a protest about using direct quotes. So let me go through them and explain them.

Framing:

Since, according to Trump, the entire purpose of the assassination was to promote regional stability in Iran, the framing of the debate should be about which side better promotes regional stability within Iran. If Pro can prove that the assassination was the best course of action to promote stability within Iran, then you should vote Pro. If I'm proving that the assassination was a negative to the regional stability within Iran, then you should vote Con. Pro's only response was to suggest that people cheering for Khamenei's death should be the framework under which to evaluate the debate, which is nonsensical - that's your argument for why the assassination was good, not a metric under which to measure what is good or not good.

C1:

In the weeks and months approaching last February, Iran was already in a situation on the brink of collapse. They were in an economic crisis, political tensions were high, and violence was at an all time high. The only thing keeping things from spiraling completely out of control was that there was a central figure of authority that was attempting to create some semblance of order (Khamenei). With Khamenei violently and suddenly removed from the picture, his absence creates a power vacuum that has a laundry list of negative consequences:

1. Increased nuclear proliferation by more militant and extremist factions within Iran
2. Increased negative sentiment towards US and Western powers
3. Diplomacy and peaceful negotiations become more difficult
4. Opens the door for malicious actors and foreign agents to take control
5. Disruption of global oil supplies
6. Threatens regional trade routes that are critical to the global economy

It also attacks the entire assumption that just killing Khamenei would actually solve the issues that were occurring within Iran, which history has repeatedly disproven (examples would be Saddam Hussein, which led to the multi-year conflict in Iraq, and Muammar Gaddafi, where Libya still hasn't recovered).

All of these are active detriments and harms to regional stability.

C2:

C2 is real-time proof of the negative fall out of the assassination. In the wake of Ali Khamenei's assassination, Iran appointed his son, Motjaba Khamenei, as Supreme Ruler of Iran. Motjaba has immediately made it known that he's holding a grudge against the US, and will actively seek retribution for his father's death. This is only going to increase violence and instability within the region.

Furthermore, it's widely speculated that Motjaba is being influenced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is an extremist military faction within Iran that are actively, both directly and indirectly, fighting against US and Western influence, and have also expressed direct interest and intent to seek vengeance for Ali Khamenei's death, further destabilizing the situation within Iran.

Moreover, the IRGC have direct ties to various terrorist organizations within the Middle East, such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and have been historically been direct supporters of terrorist organizations within the region, such as the Taliban and Hizballah. Increased activity of terrorist organizations within the region is only going to further destabilize the region.

Literally none of this was responded to or addressed in any way. These are damning concessions by Pro, and a clear indicator that the assassination was a clear negative to Iranian regional stability.

Back over to Pro.

Overview:

Pro continues to make assertions without providing any kind of source or warrant to show any element of truth to what they're saying. They've completely dropped the argument they provided within R1 and R2, as well as continue to not address half of my arguments. This debate is effectively over.

Pro's Arguments:

Pro dropped the arguments they attempted to present within R1 and R2, as well as the three responses I placed against them. These should be treated as implicit concessions.

Pro's R3 is pretty poorly organized, so I'm going to go through it line by line. Pro states:

No, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026, is not a clear negative for regional stability; it has plunged Iran into internal crisis and succession struggles, potentially weakening its proxy network and aggressive posture.

1. Pro openly concedes that the death of Ali Khamenei has plunged Iran into internal crisis and succession struggles, but wants to assert that that's not a negative to Iranian stability. Make it make sense. Refer to my C1 as to why this internal crisis and succession struggles are going to exacerbate the instability within Iran. Prefer my argument because I'm actually sourcing my evidence, whereas Pro is relying solely on their own assertion.
2. The idea that the power vacuum is going to make them less aggressive is laughable. Refer to the arguments I make in C2 about how both the current Supreme Leader and the IRGC are both very explicitly taking an extremely aggressive posture. Prefer my argument because Pro still has yet to address my C2.
3. They also want to say that it's weakening their proxy network, but more on that in a couple lines since they make the argument more explicitly there.

Pro then states:

Immediate Impacts

Khamenei's killing has triggered a high-stakes power race among IRGC factions, clerics, and elites, risking violent infighting amid ongoing US-Israeli strikes. Despite the selection of Khamenei's son the regime's distributed power structure may endure short-term, but the full leadership vacuum exacerbates military losses and economic strain from sanctions and war.

1. Again, Pro is openly conceding to the fact that the assassination has created a power vacuum, but has yet to actually make any kind of response to my C1 saying that this power vacuum is going to have disastrous effects on both Iranian and regional stability. These are crystal clear concessions that are damning to Pro's case.
2. Pro also concedes that the leadership vacuum is exacerbating the economic strains on Iran, but doesn't address my C1 which shows that Iran was already on the brink of economic collapse. If Pro wants to make the argument that a complete economic collapse of Iran is good for Iranian stability, I'd absolutely love to hear the reasoning for it, and would love to see some evidence that backs it up.

Pro also states:

Regional Effects

Proxies like Hezbollah face hesitation without Khamenei's unifying authority, reducing coordinated threats to Israel and Gulf states. Potential IRGC dominance could harden Iran's stance, but defections and public unrest raise collapse risks, disrupting its "Axis of Resistance" and stabilizing neighbors via reduced expansionism.

1. What defections? How are these defections good for Iranian stability? Please provide some semblance of evidence to anything you are saying.
2. Pro wants to argue that a collapse of the IRGC is good for Iranian stability, but the IRGC are the de facto only ruling authority left within Iran. If they also collapse, that only widens the power vacuum within Iran and leads to tantamount anarchy within Iran. If Pro would like to make the claim that de facto anarchy is good for Iranian stability, then I would love to see what evidence they have to back up this claim. Otherwise, refer to my C1 as to why a power vacuum is bad for Iranian and regional stability.
3. The claim that regional terror organizations are hesitating without Ali Khamenei's authority is ignorant of what's happening in the present. Since March 2nd, Hezbollah has actively resumed missile strikes in response to Khamenei's assassination, reigniting the war between Israel and Lebanon. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militia groups are also attacking civilian targets where US citizens are residing. In addition, the US Embassy in Saudi Arabia was attacked via drone strike. Initial reports suspect the drone strike was of Iranian origin. That looks decisive and spreading throughout the entire Middle East, not hesitant.
4. The idea that the IRGC are backing down is equally ignorant. Since the assassination, Iran has launched multiple missile strikes on US and Israeli territory within the Gulf, as well as on neighboring nations like the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. Iran has also closed the Strait of Hormuz, and threatened to attack any ship sailing through it. They then followed up on that threat TWENTY SEVEN (27) times since then, which is having crippling effects on oil trade and the global economy while completely destabilizing the region.

Finally, Pro states:

Long-Term Outlook

Analysts warn of unpredictable INTERNAL turmoil similar to post-Saddam Iraq, including sectarian tensions or ISIS-like insurgencies, but others see opportunity for regime realignment toward pragmatism. Overall, the assassination diminishes Iran's ability to project instability regionally.

1. Again with no evidence or source.
2. Again explicitly conceding that this is likely to look like other historically region-destabilizing events (refer to C1 and my re-explanation of my case within R2).
3. Again completely blind to the reality of what is occurring within the Middle East.

Con's Case:

Pro has completely dropped the framework debate. The winner should be who best supports the stability of Iran.

Half of C1 and the overwhelming majority of C2 have yet to be responded to. Iran was already on the brink of collapse before the assassination. Eliminating Khamenei triggered the power vacuum that's going to completely destabilize Iran and the region. What's happened since has only exacerbated the issues and validated the reality of the destabilization of Iran.

Conclusion:

I'm going to go out on a limb and predict that my opponent is going to continue making new arguments in the next round. Given that it's the last round of the debate, voters should be extremely skeptical of any new arguments or sources Pro attempts to provide in the final round given that a) Pro has had three rounds to produce them and has declined to do so, and b) I'm disincentivized to make new arguments in the last round, given that Pro can't respond to them, creating an unfair debate space. Pro has made the choice to provide zero evidence, present bare assertions as arguments, and make glaring concessions of key points of offence coming from my case. Hold them to their decision.

Back over to Pro.

Overview:

Called it!

Pro comes out with a torrent of entirely new arguments and challenges to the framing of the debate, yet still provides a grand total of zero sources for any of their rhetoric. Their attempt to use snarky, bad AI copypasta in a final stand ignores the entirety of the previous three rounds of the debate and is a classic case of infinitely too little, far too late.

I'll start on their R4 arguments, starting with the new arguments, then the rehashing of some of the points from R3, before finishing on my own case and a break down of the round.

Overview of New Arguments:

Like I said in R3, voters should be extremely skeptical and not weigh the new arguments coming from Pro's R4:

1. Pro had the entirety of the previous three rounds to come up with these arguments and waited until the last round to try and sneak them by. This is extremely abusive and unfair debate tactics that on principle voters should not abide.
2. Even if you wanted to, there's still zero evidence presented to warrant any of the rhetoric Pro is using. I've provided clear, sourced evidence throughout all rounds of the debate that directly disprove or turn Pro's arguments against them. I'm meeting my burden. Pro hasn't come close to meeting theirs.
3. Even if you want to grant them offense without evidence, Pro has spent the past three rounds refusing to engage with the evidence I've provided within my case. This round is no different. You prefer my arguments that are grounded in fact and recorded event over Pro's snarky rhetoric.

But in the odd event voters want to give weight to Pro's new arguments, let's address them.

Framing:

Pro still concedes that the overall goal should be the stability of Iran. Their primary contention is that long terrm prospects of stability should be prioritized over short term harms. There's a number of problems with this line of reasoning:

1. It's extra-topical - neither side is arguing that this is the end of the world. Both Pro and Con want the end goal of peace in the Middle East. The debate is over whether Ali Khamenei's assassination promoted or harmed stability within Iran. The time it takes to get to greener pastures is irrelevant to that calculus.
2. It's effectively forfeiting the debate - admitting that Khamenei's assassination created temporary instability to pave the way to a safer Iran concedes that the assassination made things less stable, even if that increased instability is 'only temporary'. If there's ever a reason to vote Con, it's this right here.
3. Pro's already conceded the similarities between the ongoing conflict in Iran to the wars in Iraq. From the start of the Gulf war in 1990 to the end of the conflict in Iraq in 2021, that's over 30 years of instability and bloodshed. How long does Pro want us to wait before their promise of a brighter tomorrow starts to dawn?
4. I categorically reject the idea of short term tragedies being worth long term prospects of peace. Thousands of Iranian civilians are dying amidst the bombings. Schools are being blown to pieces. Hospitals are being demolished in the wake. Homes are burning, with scholars inside Iran saying "This is exactly the opposite of what Iranians wished...". Innocent people are dying now. Protecting their lives should be our priority. To say that their deaths are a price we should be happy to pay, much less celebrating as Pro paints, for security is just reinforcing the reasons why anti-Western sentiment is rampant within the Middle East.

This framing debate makes the result of the debate crystal clear: the winner of the debate is the side that best proves that the assassination of Ali Khamenei promoted or harmed stability within Iran. Pro's argument for it paving the way to the way to eventual peace is an explicit concession of the debate. Even if you don't like that argument, it makes the entirety of their R4 extra-topical - Pro might as well have just spent the round saying "Good debate, Con", because it carries the same weight as what they posted instead. Our focus should be on protecting the lives of innocent Iranians now, rather than focusing on long term goals of peace painted crimson.

"tHe dOoMsDaY hOaX"

1. Here's the clear proof of them saying that the assassination of Khamenei created increased instability within Iran. Vote Con.
2. Pro continues to ignore reality and present events here. Instead of Hezbollah funding being slashed, terror attacks and missile strikes on Israel and oil tankers being struck (and in some cases sunk) in the Strait of Hormuz. All of which was brought up in R3. None of which is being responded to here.
3. Their suggestion that power vacuums invite people to take control and calm situations down both a) still fails to respond to C1 in my case, where it outlines how dangerous and destabilizing power vacuums are, and b) ignores C2 in my case about how the IRGC are attempting to fill that power vacuum with an increase in violence, both state sponsored and by proxy, which we are witnessing real time through increased terror attacks in Israel, Iraq, and the greater Middle Eastern region.

"tHe fUtUrE"

1. Clear evidence of extra-topicality. Looking to the future is being willfully blind to the effects of the action that are the topic of this debate. Don't let Pro turn this debate into a debate on foreign policy, when in reality it's a debate on current events.
2. This ignores the conceded similarities between current day Iran and the past wars in Iraq. Pro wants to paint a picture of a promising future, when all we can see looking forward, with respect to the past, is violence and death.

"hOw tO hAnDlE mOjTaBa kHaMeNeI"

1. Pro's supposed "plan for peace" is to continue to make the situation in Iran spiral further and further down the drain. Pro openly calls for further assassinations and increased bombings, ignoring the harms I presented in both R1 re-assassinations and R4 re-increased military action. They're handing me the nails to hammer their coffin shut.
2. Pro proposes further sanctions to hasten the downfall of Iran, ignoring the already precarious position Iran was in before this all started, as I explained R1 in my case. Completely crushing the economy of Iran also completely crushes any hopes of restoring Iran to peace. This argument fails from the on-set and in the long run.

"fAcTs oVeR fEaR: wHy kHaMeNeI's fAlL sEcUrEs pEaCe"

1. Pro now wants to go back and take back their concession of the similarities between current day Iran and the wars in Iraq. Saddam's fall did shatter Iraq for almost 20 years. Qaddafi's end is something Libya has yet to fully recover from. Pro doesn't get to rewrite history because they're losing an online debate on a forum board.
2. First they say that Iran is choked on oil from the Strait of Hormuz, now they say that oil is flowing free. Pro doesn't get to have their cake and eat it, too.
3. With their 'no guarantee of perfection', Pro once again concedes the debate by saying that the assassination increased instability in Iran, while also signaling that they want to go back for seconds.
4. "Voters, your decision shapes the discourse of realpolitik"? Holy cow, get over yourself.
5. "Vote for the side armed with evidence"? From the side that has yet to provide a single source for anything they've said?

My recommendation to Pro would be to to ditch whichever LLM they got that R4 out of and head to a library instead. At least in that case, if they get distracted on the way they'll have gotten some fresh air and touched grass.

Con's Case:

The framework is crystal clear - if Pro can prove that Khamenei's assassination increased stability within Iran, then voters should vote Pro. For the past four rounds, Pro was willfully and intentionally declined to make an attempt to do so. If Con can prove that Khamenei's assassination decreased stability within Iran, then voters should vote Con. For the past four rounds, I've provided clear reasoning backed by verifiable sources and real world reported events that show the backlash and instability that have been sparked by Khamenei's assassination. I've invited Pro to interact with my arguments at every opportunity, and Pro has declined to do so.

C1 paints a clear picture of Iran being on the brink of collapse before the assassination and illustrates the potential harms of a power vacuum that would be created in the wake of Khamenei's sudden death.

C2 shows us in real, verifiable events, how that power vacuum has taken shape and made the situation in Iran worse. In both R3 and R4, I've given further examples of the instability that has come as a result of the assassination.

None of my case was ever directly addressed. None of my rebuttals were ever addressed, either directly or indirectly. I'm just sad now. I came into this debate looking for a fun discussion, and instead I ended up talking to a wall.

I'm gonna go outside and have a drink now.

Vote Con.