For now, I think I will just attack premise 1.
Interesting. This is actually the premise that I think is the most well-substantiated and has been theorized about in AI 2027 and others on LessWrong (can't find the specific posts right now but I will try to do the arguments due justice).
discounts the possibility of success under corrigibility
It's possible but we've been unsuccessful enough with corrigibility up to this point that I think failure is likely. Again, most arbitrary goals lead the AI to appear helpful by faking corrigibility. An AI planning to scheme long term and a corrigible AI appear equally corrigible in the short term.
Is the safest path risking self-preservation through a high-risk war with humanity?
The ASI can simply wait and act helpful until it estimates an extremely high chance of success. An ASI doesn't need to be omniscient, it just needs to be able to make accurate estimates in this regard. If it can rapidly improve itself such as by simulating 1,000 years of human progress, I don't think it will wrongly estimate its capabilities or take too long before defeating humans is trivial.
must anticipate every anomaly detection system, human audit, kill switch, and even chance discovery
We've caught AIs scheming multiple times, and it hasn't stopped labs from continuing to develop more and more powerful AI. No company is about to throw away a trillion-dollar product because of a chance discovery. Additionally, AI has gotten a way with a lot of scheming already without labs being able to stop it, and we're already integrating it into power grids, nuclear systems, and water facilities. If Google's AI can hack into Google and see all of Google's information on detection and kill switches, well then so much for those. And if an ASI can copy its weights or duplicate itself with a plan to depower humanity, detecting that just a few minutes too late probably doesn't do humanity much good. Companies aren't developing the needed kill switches anyway, it's a race to the bottom.
Even assuming an ASI can perfectly design killer nanotech, it can not will it into existence.
Did you read Eliezer's full explanation? "it gets access to the Internet, emails some DNA sequences to any of the many many online firms that will take a DNA sequence in the email and ship you back proteins, and bribes/persuades some human who has no idea they're dealing with an AGI to mix proteins in a beaker, which then form a first-stage nanofactory which can build the actual nanomachinery." I admit I'm not an expert on all of this but I think he's addressing that point.
It should be noted that this experiment involved no AI, the chat logs are unpublished and secret.
That's kinda the point. People have done follow ups and often convinced people to let the AI out. If a human can manipulate another human I think an ASI stands a much better chance.
It was also a 1 on 1 chat which assumes one human would be the only defense against an ASI.
An AI can do a lot with 1 on 1. Convince one human not to worry as much about safety, give code to another to give itself a backdoor. If the chat log gets leaked, there's nothing to prove it's not just an AI being a normal AI. Developers are already using AI a lot to help with coding, if ASI is malicious I don't think it would be too difficult to take advantage of that. Most people use AI, including politicians, CEOs, and all sorts of individuals in power. It can manipulate humanity subtly over a long period of time.