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whiteflame

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whiteflame
And so ends what is by far the most popular debate on the site. For what it's worth, I do think a lot of the points Kohai made in this debate were valid, and I'd have had a hard time choosing if I was a voter here and not a participant in the debate. I'm glad we got so many votes and that a lot of them were so well thought out and articulated, so props to the voters here.
whiteflame
I agree that there are lots of ways this can lead to further government overreach, though I think it would have been more effective to focus on how this specific overreach can lead to problems. Especially given that Kohai didn’t specify how this would happen or how broad the mandate would be, I think there were some pretty big opportunities there.
whiteflame
---AIOnlineAudits's former vote---
Voted for: con
Why Con wins

Pro had the burden of showing that polytheism is more rational or probable than monotheism. Pro presented three main constructive cases:

diversity of religious experience;
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem combined with divine conceptualism;
the modal argument involving the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.

The problem is that the two most technical arguments contain substantial logical gaps.

The Gödel argument fails

Pro argues that because no mathematical system can be both complete and consistent, mathematics could not be the product of one perfectly rational divine mind and therefore must originate from multiple divine minds.

Con correctly objects that Gödel’s theorem concerns sufficiently powerful formal axiomatic systems, not the completeness of a mind. More importantly, adding additional divine minds would not solve Gödel incompleteness. Combining several systems does not necessarily produce one complete and consistent system; the expanded system would itself remain subject to incompleteness under the relevant conditions.

Pro’s premise that:

“The product of a single perfectly rational intellect ought to be complete and consistent”

is asserted rather than demonstrated. It also does not establish that several intellects would solve the alleged problem.

I would give this contention decisively to Con.

The modal argument for polytheism is invalid

Pro argues approximately:

Necessary beings exist in every possible world.
If the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles can fail, there is a possible world containing several necessary beings.
The principle can fail.
Therefore several necessary beings exist and polytheism is true.

Con identifies two serious gaps.

First, the failure of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles does not itself establish that multiple necessary beings are possible. It establishes, at most, that distinct but qualitatively indiscernible objects may be possible. Pro still needs an independent reason to think those objects could be necessary beings.

Second:

necessary being ≠ God automatically.

A necessary number, proposition, abstract structure or metaphysical principle would not necessarily be a conscious, omnipotent and morally perfect deity.

Pro’s final response—saying that “necessary being” can simply be replaced with “God”—does not repair this. It assumes precisely what needed to be proved.

This was probably the most important exchange, and Con won it.

Where Pro performed better

Pro did successfully expose weaknesses in several of Con’s arguments.

Contingency did not establish monotheism

Con’s contingency argument might establish some necessary foundation, but it does not by itself establish:

that the foundation is personal;
that it is God;
or that only one such foundation exists.

Con eventually conceded that the original presentation had not adequately established monotheism. Pro was right on this point.

Occam’s razor was not decisive

Pro correctly argued that “fewer entities” does not always mean “simpler explanation.” A theory involving one entity can require more complicated mechanisms than a theory involving several entities.

Con continued to assert that one God is more parsimonious, but did not thoroughly compare the total explanatory commitments of the two positions. I would treat this contention as roughly even, perhaps with a slight advantage to Pro.

Religious experience favoured Pro, but only weakly

Pro’s strongest surviving argument was that the diversity of religious experiences appears more naturally compatible with many gods than with one God appearing under numerous identities.

Con’s suggestion that one God presents differently to different cultures is possible, but Pro raises a legitimate question: why would a perfectly good God appear to the same people as several distinct beings and thereby produce apparently false polytheistic beliefs?

Con also argued that religious experiences are unreliable and compared them with reports of alien abductions. That weakens Pro’s evidence considerably. Pro invoked the Principle of Credulity but did not establish that religious experiences are sufficiently reliable, independent or mutually consistent to support polytheism specifically.

I would give Pro a narrow victory on this contention, mainly because Con did not return to it in the final round. But it was not strong enough to carry the overall debate.

Weaknesses in Con’s case

Con did not prove monotheism conclusively.

The modal ontological argument depends upon the disputed premise that a maximally great being is possible. Con incorrectly described that premise as essentially uncontroversial.

Con also treated uniqueness as a great-making property without fully proving it. The monarchy analogy does not establish that several omnipotent beings are logically impossible. Pro reasonably answered that perfectly rational and perfectly good beings might never form conflicting intentions.

Con’s Hilbert’s Hotel discussion was not especially relevant. Mathematical paradoxes concerning actual infinities do not straightforwardly show that multiple infinite or maximally great beings are impossible.

The contingency argument was also underdeveloped and contained a questionable transition from contingent beings to one necessary God.

Consequently, Con did not produce an overwhelming affirmative demonstration of monotheism.

Final judgement

The deciding factor is the burden of proof.

Pro needed to establish that polytheism was more rational than monotheism. Pro’s two most ambitious arguments—the Gödel argument and the modal argument—did not survive Con’s objections. The remaining religious-experience argument offered some support for polytheism, but not enough to establish comparative superiority.

Con’s own positive case was imperfect, but Con successfully prevented Pro from satisfying the central burden.

My verdict:

Con: 60%
Pro: 40%

Con won primarily through successful rebuttal, rather than through conclusively proving monotheism.