Thank you for that well-thought out response.
Thank you for giving us something of substance to discuss. I'm glad it seems well-thought out, I've been thinking about it for decades.
When you say you're a dualist, I assume you mean a substance dualist rather than a property dualist.
Yes, you could say I'm a substance dualist, but I absolutely hate that term, referring to consciousness as a substance is misleading and jacks up the conversation from the very beginning. Let’s just say I believe the physical world and consciousness are two ontologically distinct kinds of things.
I can understand wanting to reject physicalism because of its inability to account for conscious experience, which is incorrigible and undeniable. But it seems to me substance dualism has issues of its own when it comes to mental causation, one of which I was happy to see you brought up.
The so-called interaction problem is contrived, simply declaring the observed and experienced interaction between mind and physical reality is metaphysically impossible is not a coherent argument.
As I think I said before, we do have an intuition that our mental states, by virtue of their intentionality/aboutness, have some causal influence over our behavior.
I'm not usually a semantic stickler, but I don't think it's helpful to call it an intuition, if your philosophy is to be grounded in reality, then it is more appropriate to consider it an observation. It is a straightforward and undeniable fact that we observe the interaction of the mental and physical during most of our waking moments.
It is true that minds perceive intra-mental states differently from sensory phenomena, and this cognitive difference results in mental and physical phenomena having seemingly disparate properties, but that should have no bearing on our understanding of causation between the two.
But what puzzles me is how that happens. I've already articulated why I think that's problematic on physicalism, but it seems to me to be problematic on dualism as well.
We have a fairly good understanding of how physical things can have causal influence over other physical things, but how does something that isn't physical have causal influence over something that is?
I don’t really think there is a dichotomy there, I think our understanding of both are the same.
David Hume defined how we understand cause and effect, and three hundred years later I don’t think our understanding has changed all that much. Our current understanding of cause and effect does not involve any kind of explanatory causal power or forces, we do not understand cause and effect to be rationally related through logical deduction, causation is inductively presumed. The extent of our understanding of causation results from observations of the sequencing of events that are presumed to be related. That’s why science is inductive, what science presents to us are generalizations of observed patterns of the sequence of events that we understand to be cause and effect. That’s also why science is descriptive rather than explanatory. Causation is based on the observation of patterns in nature; science can tell us that force equals mass times acceleration (f=ma), which is nothing but a mathematical generalization of the observations, but it does explain to us why f=ma, nor does it tell us why force doesn’t equal mass squared times acceleration times 4.
So, if that is our understanding of how physical things have causal influence over other physical things, why isn’t it the same with our understanding of something that isn’t physical. As I already mentioned, we observe that our mental thoughts have causal effects in the physical world, it would be a pretty good trick to type an argument that proves that it is metaphysically impossible to type the argument. Our understanding of causation between immaterial thoughts and the material world should similarly be a matter of observing the sequential connection between an intention and the resultant action in the physical world.
For reductionists, they at least equate mental states with physical states, and that's how they explain it (though it doesn't solve the semantic issue). But how does it work if there's no physical component to mental states--if mental states are part of a non-physical substance of some sort?
Do you just accept that it does happen and leave it an open question as to how it happens? Or do you have some thoughts on the "how"?
I’ve been typically verbose already, but I’d also like to point out that there is nothing illogical or unscientific about this analysis.
A large part of current physical science examines non-physical realities, including other dimensions, and the fact is that current scientific understanding is that you cannot reduce all of reality to a single ontological level; it certainly doesn’t in any way say that all of reality is purely physical,
In science there are plenty of things that are not physical, but that have causal power to affect things that are physical, in fact, the study of immaterial entities are foundational to physics. The concept of a field in physics is not a physical or material thing, but it has an effect on physical objects. Newtonian gravity is a field that has an observable and measurable effect on anything with mass, but it is certainly an immaterial thing. In Relativity theory, gravity is a curvature of spacetime, still not a physical or material thing. All of the unifying theories of physics postulate more dimensions, most reference ten or eleven dimensions, that is to say that reality ultimately consists of at least six additional dimensions that transcend the four-dimensional frame of reference of physicalism. Physicalism is not supported by science, quite the opposite, physicalism would require the causal closure of the material world and science pretty much abandoned the attempt to demonstrate that over a hundred years ago. In fact, Kurt Godel provided a logically consistent proof that such causal closure is impossible, even in principle.
When science drilled down into the material world as far as it could, it found the physical world to consist of probability waves in Hilbert space, “particles” that move from place to place without traveling the distance in between, and a very strong argument that a conscious observation is required to collapse the wave function making potential reality become actual. Physical science does not support the argument that the mental is an effect of the material world, it does make a strong argument that the physical world is an effect of the mental.